TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

October 21, 1981

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT - OPEN ITEM 50-328/81-20-04

The subject open item was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. W. Wright on October 24, 1980, in accordance with 10 TR 50.55(e) as NCR's SQN EEB 8023 through SQN EEB 8042 (excluding SQN EEB 8034), SQN EEB 8045Rl, SQN EEB 8051, SQN MEB 8007Rl, and SQN NEB 8031 through SQN NEB 8034. Information concerning these items was submitted on November 25, 1980, and January 23, February 18, March 25, April 14, April 28, August 21, and September 14, 1981. Enclosed is further information concerning item EEB 8031R3 as discussed with R. V. Crlenjak on October 21, 1931. We expect to submit our next report by July 25, 1982.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager

Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

CC: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT OPEN ITEM 50-328/81-20-04

In the response to SONEEB8031R3, TVA indicated that 13 of the 15 instruments listed on this nonconformance had been determined to be not qualified for the potentially harsh environment in which they are located. Further, the report noted that, based on the results of a safety evaluation, the instruments were not required to operate in the event of an accident. TVA has re-reviewed this response and found that the information provided is in error. Our revised response on this nonconformance is listed below:

NCR No.	Instrument No.	Model No.	Manufacturer	Corrective Action
SQNEED8031R3	F1S-67-206 F1S-67-209 F1S-70-81 PDIS-313-305 PDIS-313-340 F1S-65-55A/B F1S-65-44E/F F1S-65-25A/B F1S-65-25C/D F1S-65-31A/B F1S-65-44A/B F1S-65-44C/D F1S-65-25E/F F1S-65-31C/D	288A 288A 288A 288A 288A 288A 288A 288A	ITT Barton	See response to SONEEB8023R1 See response to SONEEB8023R1 See response to SONEEB8023R1 See response to SONEEB8023R1 See response to SONEEB3023R1 These switches have been determined to be not qualified for the potentially harsh environment in which they are located. As a result, TVA has modified the switch wiring (reference engineering change notice L5124) to remove those functions that, assuming failure of the switch in the harsh environment, could adversely affect the safety of operations of the plant. This change has been incorporated into the plant operating procedures. These switches will be replaced with qualified components per the
				qualified components per the guidelines of NURFG-0588.