



MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Helping Build Mississippi

P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205


JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR.
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT

September 8, 1981

Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 0303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:



SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 79-416/417
File 0260/155. /15526
PRD-81/33, Interim Report #1,
Dickers Safety Relief Valves
AEC-81/348

On August 7, 1981, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. F. S. Cantrell, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns the failure of Dickers Safety Relief Valves.

We have determined that this deficiency, had it remained uncorrected, could have affected the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant and is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). We are continuing our investigation to determine reportability under 10CFR21 as well as corrective actions. We expect to submit a final report by November 2, 1981.

Attached is our interim report.

Yours truly,

J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

For

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ATTACHMENT

cc: See page 2

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Member Middle South Utilities System

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly
NRC

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File

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INTERIM REPORT NO. 1 FOR DRD-81/33

I. Description of the Deficiency

During testing of Dikkers Safety Relief Valves by Wyle Laboratories, six (6) did not meet the Emergency Operability Acceptance Criteria, i.e., the valves did not open within the required time period when power was applied to the solenoid valves. In addition, another solenoid valve failed the seat leakage test. The failures have been identified to be a result of improper solenoid valve operation.

This deficiency affects the Nuclear Boiler System and the Automatic Depressurization System. At present it is known to apply only to Unit 1.

If two of these defective valves had been installed as Automatic Depressurization System valves, the single valve failure criteria of FSAR Table 6.3-7 would not be met. This deficiency could adversely affect the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant and is reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). We are currently investigating its reportability under 10CFR21.

II. Approach to Resolution of the Problem

The solenoid valve ball disc is bound or stuck to the solenoid valve nozzle. The actual cause has not been determined but it is felt that there is insufficient clearance between the ball disc and the nozzle and/or the presence of a foreign material on the ball disc. (Possibly "Loctite" which is used during the manufacturing process). Four defective solenoid assemblies are being returned to the vendor (Seitz) for analysis. Seven (7) solenoid assemblies have been identified as deficient to date.

Corrective action required to prevent recurrence can not be identified until the actual cause of the non-conforming condition has been determined.

After analysis by the vendor and positive determination of the cause, all deficient solenoid valves will be reworked or repaired, as appropriate, and all affected SRVs will be retested in accordance with Wyle Test procedure No. 1016, Rev. F for Dikkers Safety Relief Valves.

III. Status of Proposed Resolutions

It has been determined that this deficiency could adversely affect the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant. We expect to be able to determine the cause of the deficiency and to formulate corrective actions by September 25, 1981.

IV. Reason Why A Final Report Will Be Delayed

The vendor has not completed their evaluation and has not formulated corrective actions and actions to prevent recurrence.

V. Date When Final Report Will Be Submitted

We expect to submit our final report by November 2, 1981.