University of Wisconsin

NUCLEAR REACTOR LABORATORY NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT PHONE 282-3892, AREA CODE 608 ADDRESS: 130 MECHANICAL ENGINEERING JUILDING MADISON, WISCONSIN 53706

September 3, 1981

Director of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20545

Re: Docket 50-156

Dear Sirs:

On Tuesday, 1 September 1981, an event reportable to NRC under Technical Sepcifications item 6.7 c(4) occurred. The circumstances and subsequent actions are indicated below.

Description of event:

Michael Jensen was the operator on duty with the reactor on automatic control at full power. At about 1435, Jensen asked Daniel Range to take the watch while he delivered a telephone message. Range verbally agreed to take the watch, but did not sign into the log since he thought Jensen would return in just a few seconds. Jensen returned to the control room 15 or 20 minutes later. At that time Range, Jensen and Daniel LeGare were in the control room and they were engaged in a discussion. No mention of reassuming the watch on the console was made by either Range or Jensen. Another staff member entered the console area and asked about the status of some laboratory equipment. LeGare, Jensen and the other staff member left the control room to go into Room 132 (an adjacent room outside the area defined by UWNR 001 as a permissable location for the operator on duty but within earshot of the console annunciator) to look for the equipment. At some point kange left the control room, probably before the other group left. R. Cashwell left room 132 and entered the control room, passing the group that had left the control room in the process. The interval between the group leaving the control room and Cashwell's entry was a matter of a few seconds, not exceeding 20 seconds, since the doors to the two rooms are only 12 feet apart. Upon entering the control room Cashwell noted there was no operator on duty and assumed control. Jensen returned to the control room about 2 minutes later. Had Cashwell not entered the control room the console would have been unattended for about 2 minutes before Jensen returned.

Procedure 001 defines the area allowable for operator observation. It also defines the procedure for relif of one operator by another. The event is an "observed inadequacy in the implementation of administrative or procedural control" and is thus reportable under the defined Technical Specification.

Corrective actions:

- 1) The console was remanned within a few seconds of the event.
- 2) Oral reprimands were immediately given to each of the involved operators.
- 3) A written reprimand was issued to each involved operator and placed in his license file on 3 September 1981.
- 4) All licensed personnel attended a lecture on proper compliance with written procedures on 3 September 1981.
- 5) Mr. Ken Ridgeway of Region III, USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement was notified on the morning of 2 September 1981, including contemplated corrective actions.

Very truly yours,

R. J. Cashweil Reactor Director

RJC:mld

XC: USNRC, Region III Office of Inspection and En reement Max W. Carbon, Department Chairman Reactor Safety Committee

Registered Mail, Return Receipt Requested