



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-395/81-20

Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
Columbia, SC 29218

Facility Name: V. C. Summer

Docket No. 50-395

License No. CPPR-94

Inspection at V. C. Summer site near Jenkinsville, South Carolina

Inspector: Virgil L. Brownlee for 8/17/81
J. L. Skolts Date Signed

Approved by: Virgil L. Brownlee 8/17/81
Virgil L. Brownlee, Acting Section Chief, Date Signed
Division of Resident and Reactor Project
Inspection

SUMMARY

Inspection on July 1-31, 1981

Areas Inspected

This routine announced inspection involved 96 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Open Items Review, Preoperational Test Results Review, Followup of unresolved items and violations, Followup of 50.55(e) and Part 21 Reports.

Results

Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *O. S. Bradham, Station Manager
- *J. G. Connelly, Assistant Station Manager
- *B. G. Croley, Technical Support Supervisor
- *C. L. Ligon, Administrative Supervisor
- *A. A. Smith, Director Site Surveillance
- *S. J. Smith, Maintenance Supervisor
- *R. M. Fowlkes, Shift Technical Advisor
- *J. W. Parks, Technical Specialist

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanic, security force members, and office personnel.

Other Organizations

C. W. Bowman, Westinghouse

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 31, 1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector also attended the exit interview of L. Foster on 7/9/81 and J. Lenahan on 7/30/81.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Violation (395/80-18-06) Use of Draft Procedure. This violation involved the use of a draft procedure while performing CS-7, Boric Acid Transfer Test. Corrective action was taken prior to the issuance of Inspection Report 80-18. The inspector has observed numerous tests since the violation occurred and has observed no repeat usage of draft procedures.

(Closed) Violation (395/80-34-01) Failure to Establish Procedures. This item dealt with the failure to establish corrective action control procedures as described in the Operational QA Plan. The inspector reviewed the licensee response dated January 23, 1981. This response indicated that the intent of the QA Plan was met but the QA Plan needed revision to more accurately reflect the method of implementation. The inspector has reviewed Sections 12.2.2. and 12.5.2 Revision 4 to the Operational QA Plan. The plan now adequately reflects the actual implementation.

(Closed) Violation (395/80-34-02) Failure to Follow Procedure. This item dealt with the improper classification of Startup Field Reports (SFR) and improper implementation of the disposition of a Nonconformance Notice (NCN).

The inspector reviewed the licensee response dated January 23, 1981. This response indicates that the Startup Field Report (SFR) procedures, SUM-B-13, was revised to provide clearer guidance on the classification of SFR's. The inspector reviewed the revised procedure and found it to still be confusing regarding classification of SFR's. Test Engineers are still forcing a situation into one of the categories. However, since the review cycle is nearly identical for Category "SA", "Nonconformance" and "Other" an improper classification would not significantly affect the level of review.

The inspector reviewed SFR's and could find no SFR's which were classified as "SB" or "Deficiency" that should have received a higher classification. Therefore, even though the revised procedure appears no clearer, engineers are classifying items as "SA", "Nonconformance" or "Other" if there is any doubt.

The inspector also reviewed the correspondence with Anchor Darling concerning the acceptability of a minor diameter of 2.570 inches for valve XVT 1678B. The valve was determined acceptable as is. The inspector also reviewed the training record held by the Inspection Coordinator on January 16, 1981 to stress the importance of conforming to written procedures.

In reviewing the Startup Manual concerning the generation of SFR's, the inspector noted that procedure SUM-B-13 "Startup Field Reports" requires a deficiency tag be hung on equipment for which an SFR (category Deficiency or Nonconformance) has been written. The inspector selected six SFR's (4612, 4519, 4556, 4572, 4574 and 4515) at random to verify whether deficiency tags had been hung. None of the deficient equipment had tags on them. Quality Assurance performed an audit in March of 1981 and identified this problem. QA is required to followup in 6 months to verify proper corrective action has been taken. It is still within the 6 month period and therefore an opportunity must be given for QA to followup on this problem. After QA has reviewed this problem, the corrective action will be reviewed. Until that time, this item will remain unresolved (80-21-04).

(Closed) 80-34-07 Grease on Circuit Breakers. This item dealt with the discovery of NO-OX-II grease on 14 safety-related circuit breakers. This item was determined to be not reportable based on the fact that the vendor, ITE, reported that the grease would not affect the operability of the breaker.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviation. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 3.

5. Open Item Review

(Closed) 79-31-06 PSI Stroke Time. This item deal with the lack of stroke time values in the preservice inspection program. The most recent PSI program submitted by the applicant has the stroke times listed.

(Closed) 79-41-01 Procedure CC-1. This item dealt with numerous technical problems with procedure CC-1 plus on operational problem with the Component Cooling Water System. The technical problems with the procedure were corrected. The operational problem dealt with the operation of the CCW system after a LOCA. The three options available after a LOCA were: (a) switch to high speed pump operation, b) isolate the nonessential loads, c) isolate nonessential loads individually with the exception of the Spent Fuel Heat Exchangers. Credit could not be given for option (a) since the high speed windings were not safety-related. Option (b) is available only if the Spent Fuel Cooling heat load was low enough such that a heatup would not occur. Option (c) is available only if the operators are able to gain access to the areas necessary to isolate the various components. Appendix 12A of the FSAR describes routes to vital areas in post accident conditions. Although not all areas where CCW components are situated are listed in the appendix, areas adjacent to or nearby are listed and therefore should allow access. Also, section 9.2.2.3.2 of the FSAR now indicates that the maximum time the Spent Fuel Heat Exchanger can be removed from service ranges from 13 to 50 hours, which appears to be enough time to perform the necessary valve lineups.

(Closed) 79-41-03 Load Sequence Test. This item dealt with completing the load sequence test in order to complete ES01E15, 480 volt switchgear bus test. The test sequence test was completed satisfactorily.

(Closed) 79-41-07 Corrosion Current Test on Fuel Oil Storage Tank. This item dealt with the performance of corrosion current tests on the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks. This test was performed in 1970 and has periodically been repeated since that time.

(Closed) 80-13-11 TDEFP Governor. This item dealt with the operation of the TDEFP after the TDEFP has shutdown. This item is identical to item 80-16-06 and will therefore be closed.

(Closed) 80-23-01 Fan Vibration. This item dealt with the correlation of fan vibration velocity to displacement. The velocity and displacement can be correlated given that the frequency is known. The Startup Procedure concerning vibration adequately covers this relationship.

(Closed) 80-23-02 Filter Bank Differential Pressure. This item dealt with the measurement of differential pressure across filter banks. The inspector verified that differential pressure was measured in Phase I procedures.

(Closed) 80-25-07 Technical Specification Comments. This item dealt with a number of comments concerning draft Technical Specifications. All comments have been resolved.

6. Review of 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21 Reports

(Closed) 79-23-01 Steam Generator Level Indication. This item dealt with the problem of reference leg flashing in steam generator level transmitters. This item is identical to the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Confirmatory Issue 1.7.11 "Trip Setpoints and Margins". This item is therefore closed based on the fact that the SER issue will be resolved.

(Closed) 80-16-02 RHR Valve Failure. This item dealt with the failure of RHR butterfly valves. The inspector reviewed a letter from the applicant dated May 19, 1980 concerning the RHR flow control valve. The failure was caused by excessive stud bolt penetration into the stem connector. The letter indicated that it was believed this was an isolated case and no further corrective action was necessary. The inspector found that this failure was the first of many problems with these valves. After the above mentioned failure, Startup Field Report (SER) 1512 was written to investigate the problem. On June 6, 1980 Nonconformance Notice 87 was written due to another failure of the valve. This failure was due to improper thread engagement of the stem and connector. The disposition of this NCN involved installing the connector properly and to adjust the air setpoint and cams on the operator. NCN 171 was written on November 4, 1980. This NCN concerned capscrew and washer replacement for the valve. NCN 246 was written on January 29, 1981 on the flow control valve in the 'B' train. The problem in this case was missing and incorrectly placed parts on the operating mechanism. NCN 297 was written on March 17, 1981. This NCN concerned the improper travel of the valve from the backseat to the normal position. The inspector reviewed all of the NCN's mentioned above as well as the Maintenance Work Requests generated to implement the final disposition. It appeared that proper corrective action was taken in all cases.

(Open) 81-20-03 Laboratory Failure of Twinax Cable. On July 13, 1981 the licensee reported the laboratory failure of qualified Twinax cable. Details will be provided in a written report to be supplied at a later date.

7. Peroperational Test Results Review

The inspector reviewed the results of the following tests:

ED-1	DC Distribution
EI-1	Seismic Instrumentation
LR-5	Airlock LLRT
AH-P1	Reactor Building Cooling System
AH-P14	Reactor Building Cooling Fan Test
CR-1	Rod Drive MG Set
CR-2	Reactor Trip Breaker
CS-5	Solid System Pressure Control

The results were reviewed to ensure the tests were performed in accordance with procedure and the commitments in the FSAR. The results were also

reviewed to ensure the indicated results were within the acceptance criteria. Findings were acceptable with the following exceptions:

a. ED-1

The test was performed partly to verify the battery charger capacity to recharge the battery and carry the vital ac load simultaneously. The value used for the vital ac loads was 216 amps. Since the test was performed, the FSAR, Section 8.3.2.1.3 has been changed and full load is 288 amps. An evaluation must be done to determine whether the original value of 216 amps is still sufficient to verify the operability of the battery charges. This item will remain open (81-20-01) pending future inspector review.

b. LR-5

This test was acceptable in all respects except that the acceptance criteria differed from the draft Technical Specifications for air lock door leakage. The Technical Specifications state that no detectable leakage is the limit. Until the airlock doors pass the Technical Specification limit this item will remain open (81-20-02).

8. ASLB Hearings

The inspector spent portions of the week of June 29, July 6 and July 13, 1981 participating in the ASLB Hearings in Columbia, South Carolina.