NEC FC9 (7-77)	U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
	CONTROL BLOCK:
0 1 7 8	$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $
CON'T	REPORT L 6 0 5 0 - 0 3 2 4 0 0 8 0 4 8 1 8 1 8 1 8 9 SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10 [Following a reactor scram in which HPCI and RCIC Systems auto-initi. ed on low reactor
	water level, it was discovered that suppression pool level had exceeded specifications
han adar and	1(-27.0") with the highest recorded value being -26.5". This event did not affect the
	health and safety of the public.
06	
08	Technical Specifications 3.6.2.1, 6.9.1.9b
0 <u>9</u> 7 8	$\begin{array}{c cccccc} SYSTEM & CAUSE & CAUSE & CAUSE & COMPONENT CODE & SUBCODE & SU$
110	Image: Normal action future taken action and pened safety-relief valve and water from the condensate storage Sequential REPORT NO. Occurrence Report Type Report Type NO. 17 LER/RO REPORT 8 1 23 0 8 2 27 0 3 1 0 32 Action Future Taken Action 4 EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS 22 Attachment Submitted Form Submitted NPRD-4 8 0 32 18 8 19 2 20 2 2 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 2 41 23 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 12 0
	tank via a failed open HPCI System minimum flow valve, 2-E41-F012, caused the level to
12	be exceeded. Within 25 minutes of discovery, both valves were closed and the level was
13	returned to normal. The FO12 valve was inoperable due to burned windings in the valve
14	operator motor.
16	G 0
	ACTIVITY CONTENT ELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) U Z (34) Z (34) 11 44 45 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA 10 11 10 14 45 80
$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 7 \\ 7 & 8 \end{bmatrix}$	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (4) 0 0 0 40 NA
19	9 11 12 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE DESCRIPTION NA NA
7 8	9 10 80 PUBLICITY B109090161 B10831 NRC USE ONLY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) S N (44) S PDR
7 9	9 10 NAME OF PREPARERM. J. Pastva, Jr. PHONE:

LER ATTACHMENT - RO # 2-81-82

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2

Event Date: 8-4-81

Following the discovery that the suppression pool level was out of specification, special surveillance of all ECCS Systems' minimum flow valves was performed to determine the source of the inleakage to the suppression pool. It was discovered that the HPCI System minimum flow valve, 2-E41-F012, had failed in the open position due to a failure of the valve operator motor. An inspection of the motor revealed burned windings that failed due to out of adjustment valve open position limit switches. As designed, the motor incorporates limits switches in the valve open position to prevent motor overtorquing. The switches apparently became out of adjustment and allowed the valve motor to burn up while attempting to drive the disk into its open seat. Following the receipt of a rewound motor, the valve operator to F012 will be repaired and returned to service.