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August 11, 1981

MP-1-1842

Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director, Region I Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference: Provisional License No. DPR-21 Docket No. 50-245 Reportable Occurrence R0-81-21/3L

Dear Mr. Grier:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence RO-81-21/3L required to be submitted within 30 days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.a. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

E.J. Mroczka Station Superintendent Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM/TST:bjo

Attachment: LER RO-81-21/3L

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. (30) Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control, Washington, D. C. (3) U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch, Washington, D. C. 20555

ATTACHMENT TO LER 81-21/3L NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-21 DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

Identification of Occurrence

Reactor protection system instrument setting was found to be less conservative than those established by Technical Specifications.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at a steady state power level of 100 percent.

Description of Occurrence

On July 10, 1981 at 1540 hours while performing routine surveillance (Condenser Low Vacuum Scram Functional Calibration Test), it was discovered that pressure switch 503D tripped at 22.4" Hg vacuum. The trip level setting is required by Technical Specification 3.1 (Table 3.1.1) to be greater than or equal to 23" Hg decreasing.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The failure of this switch to trip at its desired setpoint was attributed to setpoint drift.

Analysis of Occurrence

The pressure switch in question is one of four pressure switches arranged in a one-out-of-two twice logic system sensing low condenser vacuum for input to the Reactor Protection System scram logic. At a condenser vacuum of greater than 23" Hg, the Reactor Protection System would scram the reactor. The remaining three switches were found to be at the proper setpoint and would have initiated the required action upon receipt of a low condenser vacuum.

Corrective Action

The pressure switch was reset to its required setpoint and satisfactorily test.

The switch is a Barksdale Model No. DIT-H-1855 with a range of .8 to 29.2" Hg.

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