

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Region I

50-278/810414
50-277/810422
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Report No. 50-277/81-14
50-278/81-15

Docket No. 50-277
50-278

License No. DPR-44 Priority _____ Category C
DPR-56 _____ C

Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company

2301 Market Street

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Facility Name: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3

Inspection At: Delta, Pennsylvania

Inspection Conducted: May 1-31, 1981

Inspectors: E.C. McCabe, Jr., Sr. 7/23/81
C.J. Cowgill, III, Senior Resident Inspector date signed

E.C. McCabe, Jr., Sr. 7/23/81
A.R. Blough, Resident Inspector date signed

E.C. McCabe, Jr., Sr. (May 27-29) 7/23/81
L. Doerflein, Resident Inspector (Fitzpatrick) date signed

J.W. Chung for 7/28/81
R.J. Summers, Reactor Inspector, May 13-14, 18-22 date signed

Approved by: E.C. McCabe, Jr. 7/28/81
E.C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects date signed
Section No. 2B, DRPI

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on May 1-31, 1981 (Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-277/81-14 and 50-278/81-15)

Areas Inspected: Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspections by the resident inspectors (56.5 hours Unit 2, 54 hours Unit 3). Areas inspected included accessible portions of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities, operational safety, radiation protection, physical security, control room observations, LER review, IE Bulletin followup, radwaste shipping, outstanding items follow-up, plant safety during organized labor activities, periodic reports and allegations received through local news media.

Results: Noncompliances: none in eleven areas, one in one area (failure to meet primary containment integrity Limiting Conditions for Operation, Detail 3).

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

M.J. Cooney, Superintendent, Generation Division (Nuclear)

J.K. Davenport, Maintenance Engineer

G.F. Davson, I&C Engineer

*R.S. Fleischmann, Assistant Station Superintendent

A. Fulvio, Results Engineer

N. Gazda, Health Physics, Radiation Protection Manager

S.R. Roberts, Operations Engineer

D.C. Smith, Outage Coordinator

S.A. Spitko, Site Q.A. Engineer

S.Q. Tharpe, Security Supervisor

*W.T. Ullrich, Station Superintendent

H.L. Watson, Chemistry Supervisor

J.E. Winzenried, Technical Engineer

Other licensee employees were also contacted.

*Present at exit interviews on site and for summation of preliminary inspection findings.

2. Outstanding Item Update

(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (277/81-09-03), review recirc pump failure and drywell fire alarm. During a Unit 2 Reactor Shutdown on April 22, 1981, a drywell fire alarm actuated. Initial drywell investigation showed no evidence of fire. The licensee performed ST 15.4 "Calibration Test of 2 Reactor Building Up River Smoke Detectors", Revision 2, dated September 19, 1980 and ST 15.5 "Calibration Test 2 Reactor Building Reactor Vessel Smoke Detector Down River", Revision 2, dated September 19, 1980. The results of these tests showed that both smoke detectors in the drywell were operating satisfactorily.

The 'B' recirculation pump motor had displayed high vibration prior to Unit shutdown and the mechanical seal for the pump had failed. Investigation showed that the recirculation pump motor oil reservoir was empty, the motor bearings had seized, and some bearing material had been imbedded in the pump motor. Additionally, the motor shaft showed evidence of heating. The smoke detectors used in the Unit 2 drywell operate on an ionization principle which detects and reacts to heated vapors. No visible smoke or flame is required. The licensee concluded that, based on the above information, the smoke detector actuation was proper.

The inspector reviewed the completed surveillance tests, observed the discolored areas on the motor shaft and inspected the area surrounding the 'B' recirculation pump in the Unit 2 drywell. There was evidence that oil had been sprayed in the area. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the instruction booklet containing the operating characteristics for the fire detector and discussed the event with Region I fire protection specialists. The licensee replaced the Unit 2 'B' recirculation pump motor with the 'B' recirculation pump motor from Unit 3. The inspector identified no unacceptable conditions.

(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (79-11-05 and 79-12-06). Numerous indicating lights were inoperative. Through observations and discussions the inspector determined that operating personnel are responsive to indicating lights requiring repair or bulb replacement. Only isolated cases of indicating light failure have been identified by the inspector -- licensee response to these had been prompt.

(Open) Inspector Follow Item (278/81-10-01). Review of HPCI room flooding event. The licensee found that measures for alerting workers in the torus and torus room to evacuation (or other matters) were not adequate. During torus modifications, noise level from chipping, grinding and welding can render the PA system inaudible. Two field engineers in the torus room during the HPCI room flooding and CARDOX initiation did not hear the PA. Both exited upon feeling slightly dizzy and were not hurt. Corrective measures initiated by the licensee and the contractor involved in torus modifications included adding

additional PA speakers, raising PA speaker volumes, and devising a flashing light alert system. Temporary torus and torus room lights are manually flashed by a worker to signal evacuation (normal lighting stays on). The inspector verified that appropriate personnel were familiar with the flashing light alert system.

This item remains open pending licensee analysis and inspector review of other aspects of the event.

3. Plant Operations Review

a. Logs and Records

(1) Documents Reviewed

A sampling review of logs and records was made to: identify significant changes and trends; assure that required entries were being made; to verify that operating orders and night orders conform to Technical Specification requirements; check correctness of communications concerning equipment and lockout status; verify jumper log conformance to procedural requirements; and to verify conformance to limiting conditions for operations. Logs and records reviewed were:

- (a) Shift Supervision Log - May 1-31, 1981
- (b) Reactor Operators Log - Unit 2 - May 1-31, 1981
- (c) Reactor Operators Log - Unit 3 - May 1-31, 1981
- (d) CO Log Book - May 1-31, 1981
- (e) Night Orders - Current Entries
- (f) Radiation Work Permits (RWP's) - Units 2 and 3, (Sampling) May, 1981
- (g) Maintenance Request Forms (MRF's) - Units 2 and 3, (Sampling) May, 1981
- (h) Ignition Source Control Checklists (Sampling), May, 1981
- (i) Operation Work & Information Data - May, 1981

Control room logs were reviewed pursuant to requirements of Administrative Procedure A-7, "Shift Operations." Frequent initialing of entries by licensed operators, shift supervision, and licensee on-site management constituted evidence of licensee review. Logs were also reviewed to assure that plant conditions including abnormalities and significant operations were accurately and completely recorded. Logs were also assessed to determine that matters requiring reports to the NRC were being processed as suspected reportable occurrences. No unacceptable conditions were identified.

(2) Facility Tours

- (a) During the course of this inspection, which also included shift turnover, the inspector conducted daily tours and made observations of:
- Control Room - (daily)
 - Turbine Building - (all levels)
 - Reactor Building - (accessible areas)
 - Diesel Generator Building
 - Yard area and perimeter exterior to the power block, including Emergency Cooling Tower and torus dewatering tank
 - Security Building, including CAS, Aux SAS, and control point monitoring
 - Vehicular Control
 - The SAS and power block control points
 - Security Fencing
 - Portal Monitoring
 - Personnel and Badging
 - Control of Radiation and High Radiation areas including locked door checks
 - TV monitoring capabilities

Off-Shift Inspections during this inspection period and the areas examined were as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>AREAS EXAMINED</u>
May 1, 1981	Access Controls
May 4, 1981	Observations of CAS and Protected area access controls, checks of Security force manning
May 5, 1981	Security force manning, Control Room Tour
May 6, 1981	Tours of Unit 2 and Unit 3 Reactor Building, checks of security force manning
May 7, 1981	CAS and SAS observations, Control Room Observations
May 11, 1981	Control Room Observations
May 14, 1981	Control Room Observations, Turbine Building Tour
May 18, 1981	Control Room Observation, Reactor Building Tour
May 20, 1981	Control Room Observations
May 28, 1981	Protected Area Tours
May 29, 1981	Control Room Observations

- Off-Normal Alarms. Selected annunciators were discussed with control room operators and supervision to assure they were knowledgeable of plant conditions and that corrective action, if required, was being taken. The operators were knowledgeable of alarm status and plant conditions.
- Control Room Manning. On frequent occasions during this inspection, the inspector confirmed that requirements of 10CFR50.54(k), the Technical Specifications, and commitments to the NRR letter of July 31, 1980 for minimum staffing were satisfied. The inspector frequently confirmed that a senior licensed operator was in the control room complex. No unacceptable conditions were identified.

- Fluid Leaks. No significant fluid leaks were identified which had not also been identified by the licensee nor for which necessary corrective action had not been initiated. The inspector observed sump status, alarms, pump-out rates, and held discussions with licensee personnel. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
- Piping Vibration. No significant piping vibration or unusual conditions were identified.
- Monitoring Instrumentation. The inspector frequently confirmed that selected instruments were operating and indicated values were within Technical Specification requirements. On a daily basis when the inspector was on site, ECCS switch positioning and valve lineups, based on control room indicators and plant observations were verified. Examples of instrumentation observed included breaker positioning, PCIS status, and radiation monitoring instruments.

On May 18, 1981 Reactor coolant temperature exceeded 212°F for about 2.5 hours, from 12:45 p.m. until about 3:15 p.m. During this time period the primary containment was not intact. The inspector reviewed this event and held discussions with various licensee representatives regarding the causes.

At about 7:00 a.m. the shutdown cooling system was blocked for an estimated 4-hour repair of a packing leak on MOV-17 (Shutdown Cooling Suction Isolation Valve). Prior to isolating the system reactor coolant temperature had been reduced to about 110°F as indicated by Reactor Water Cleanup inlet temperature. About 4 hours later the operator checked the maintenance status and requested that the system be restored. Reactor coolant temperature as indicated by reactor skin temperature at the main stem lines, and verified by an indication of steam pressure, reached 231°F before shutdown cooling was restored.

The inspector reviewed maintenance request form M2-10-M-0-125 which was initiated in November 1980 for the repair of a packing leak on MOV-17. The Plant Staff Investigation and Approval Section identified that Technical Specifications governed this maintenance action but failed to identify any special plant restraints under required plant restraints. The inspector discussed the event with a licensee representative who stated that instructions

had been given to shift superintendent to allow only four hours for completion of the maintenance. He stated that he based the four hour time limit on previous cycle times for the shutdown cooling system. However, no specific reactor coolant breakup rate had been calculated. Also, the temperature being monitored, Reactor Water Cleanup Inlet, was not representative. Since recirculation pumps were not running, cleanup inlet temperature lagged actual reactor water temperature near the top of the vessel during heatup, due to stratification. Technical Specifications require that primary containment be maintained when reactor coolant temperature exceeds 212 F. The failure to have primary containment integrity prior to increasing reactor coolant temperature above 212 F is an item of noncompliance. (277/81-14-01)

- Fire Protection. On frequent occasions the inspector verified the licensee's measures for fire protection. The inspector observed control room indications of fire detection and fire suppression systems, spot-checked for proper use of fire watches and ignition source controls, checked a sampling of fire barriers for integrity, and observed fire-fighting equipment stations. No unacceptable conditions were identified.

4. IE Bulletin Followup

- a. IE Bulletin 79-07, "Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety Related Piping (April 14, 1979)".

The bulletin specified algebraic summation techniques which could result in erroneous seismic analyses. The bulletin required licensees to identify any safety systems or portions thereof which employed specified summation techniques for the seismic analysis of said systems; to provide computer listings which employed the specified techniques; to verify that all piping computer programs were checked against appropriate piping benchmark problems or other piping computer programs and to identify the benchmark; and, if the specified techniques are identified, to submit a plan of action and an estimated schedule for correction. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated April 24, 1979. The response stated that neither the licensee nor their vendors used the specified summation techniques in the seismic analysis of safety-related piping at Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3. However, the licensee had deferred submittal of some of the benchmarking data required by Action Item No. 3 of the bulletin. The inspector asked about the missing information. A licensee representative said the information had been received and reviewed but had not been submitted to the NRC. The inspector requested that the submittal be

made. The inspector also verified that PORC had reviewed the bulletin. Subsequent to this inspection period and prior to report issuance, the inspector reviewed the licensee's supplemental response, dated June 3, 1981, and verified that the required information was provided. No unacceptable conditions were identified.

b. IE Bulletin 79-12, "Short Period Scrams at BWR Facilities (May 31, 1979)."

The bulletin required licensees to ensure that an estimate of the critical rod pattern be made prior to criticality and that the method of estimation take into account all important reactivity variables. It also required licensee measures to limit the notch worth of individual control rods; to provide cautions to operators on conditions that can result in high notch worth; and, further to review and evaluate the "emergency rod in" switch for operability. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response; procedure for startup; and documentation of Unit 3 startups 80-11, 80-12, and 80-13. The licensee's response stated that they could not predict the critical rod pattern to the accuracy desired by the bulletin, but that they reviewed their startup procedures and together with the changes required by action items 2 and 3 of the bulletin, would provide the purpose of reducing the probability of short period scrams. The inspector's review of startup procedures (GP-2, GP-2A and the C.O.L. PG-2A) identified that the licensee is concerned with short period scrams, high notch worth, and the operability of the "emergency rod in" switch. The procedures contain cautions on short period scrams; instructions, including special group notch control sequences (Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence), and operability tests of the "emergency rod in" switch; to reduce the possibility of short period scrams, limit high notch worth, and provide assurance that in event of a short period condition, the "emergency rod in" is operable. The inspector also verified PORC review of the bulletin. No unacceptable conditions were identified.

5. Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)

The inspector reviewed LER's submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications. Report accuracy, compliance with current reporting requirements and applicability to other site systems and components were also reviewed. The following LER's were reviewed:

<u>LER No.</u>	<u>LER DATE</u>	<u>Event Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>
2-81-27/3L	May 22, 1981	April 24, 1981	During a maintenance outage 4 drywell snubbers inspected had low oil -- snubbers were repaired.

<u>LER No.</u>	<u>LER Date</u>	<u>Event Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>
2-81-28/1P and 2-81- 28/1T	April 29, 1981 May 11, 1981	April 28, 1981	Selected fans listed in FSAR were not seismically designed and therefore required modification
2-81-29/3L	May 18, 1981*	March 27, 1981	Battery and switchgear room ventilation damper pneumatic operators have non-seismic air supply-- appropriate dampers have been mechanically secured pending permanent modification

*originally reported by letter April 13, 1981

6. Radiation Protection

During this report period, the inspector examined work in progress in accessible areas of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities. Areas examined included:

- a. Health Physics (HP) controls
- b. Badging
- c. Use of protective clothing
- d. Personnel adherence to RWP requirements
- e. Surveys
- f. Handling of potentially contaminated equipment and materials

Additionally, inspections were conducted of use of friskers and portal monitors by personnel exiting various RWP areas, the power block, and the licensee's final exit point. More than 100 people were observed to meet frisking requirements of Health Physics procedures during the month. A sampling of high radiation doors was verified to be locked as required. Compliance with RWP requirements was verified during each tour; special emphasis was placed on RWP adherence at the Unit 3 Drywell, Torus, and Refuel Floor, and the Unit 2 Drywell. Over 30 RWP's were checked during the month, several hundred line entries were reviewed to verify that personnel had provided the required information; and about 50 people working in RWP areas were observed to be meeting the applicable requirements.

While touring the Unit 3 Reactor Building on May 28, the inspector reviewed Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 3-74-0243, Requirements for Entry and Work in the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room. The inspector noted that only two persons were signed in on this RWP and that there were actually three persons in the area. The inspector identified the inconsistency to a Health Physics technician, who then entered the area and directed the individual that was not properly signed in to immediately exit the area. Further review showed that the individual met the entry requirements specified on the RWP. (i.e., protective clothing and monitoring devices). Based on the large number of people observed to be properly following Health Physics procedures, this instance of failure to provide data for entry into an RWP area is considered an isolated case. The occurrence was discussed with station management. The inspector will continue to monitor Health Physics practices and adherence to procedural requirements in future inspections.

7. Radwaste Shipment Operations

On May 19, the inspector observed one truck being loaded with low specific activity waste for shipment. The inspector observed the licensee's survey for loose contamination on the vehicle. In addition, the inspector selectively verified that radiation levels, exterior to the truck, were less than required by both regulation and licensee procedures (less than or equal to 10 milliroentgens per hour and less than or equal to 8 milliroentgens per hour, respectively, at six feet from the outer edges of the vehicle). Further, the inspector reviewed the licensee's shipping documentation for the above shipment, including the Radioactive Shipment Report (RSR), the RSR form for the burial contractor, the shipping documents for the carrier, the vehicle survey report, the isotopic reports for the material shipped, the check-off list for procedure HOP/CO-71F-1; and the procedure HPO/CO-71G. No unacceptable conditions were identified.

8. Physical Securitya. Observation of Activities

The inspector spot-checked compliance with the Accepted Security Plan and implementing procedures, including operations of the CAS and SAS, over 30 spot-checks of vehicles onsite to verify proper control, observation of protected area access control and badging procedures on each shift, inspection of physical barriers, checks on control of vital area access and escort procedures.

A strike of security force personnel began with the absenteeism of some members on the afternoon shift on April 30. The strike continued throughout this inspection period and was honored by a number of personnel varying from about one-fifth to one-half of the regular force. The security contractor provided sufficient qualified personnel to meet regulatory requirements through use of overtime, supervisory personnel, qualified guards from other sites, and newly hired personnel. The inspector verified at least daily that selected security force activities met the requirements of the Accepted Security Plan. On May 1, May 4 and May 6 the inspector observed all posted guard and watchman locations. conducted discussions with security personnel to verify that they understood their responsibilities, and verified guard alertness and proper performance. Signs of inexperience of x-ray operators were discussed with on-shift supervisors and the Security Supervisor. The inspector also verified licensee adherence to commitments made to a region-based physical security inspector during an inspection on May 1 (e.g., use of site-experienced versus new personnel for certain tasks). The inspector noted that for several hours on May 5 the roving "clock" guard was not stationed in the Protected Area as called for in the licensee's procedures. Accepted Security Plan requirements were met, however, in that another continuously roving patrol was on duty in the Protected Area and completed a tour at least every two hours. This matter was discussed with the Security Supervisor. Additional detail is contained in the following physical security inspections:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Report No.</u>	<u>Inspector</u>
May 1, 1981	50-277/81-13 and 50-278/81-14	G. Smith
May 7-8, 1981	50-277/81-15 and 50-278/81-16	R. Ladun

b. Examination of Allegations

A number of allegations were provided to the NRC Region I office by the York Daily Record (newspaper) on May 6, 1981. The newspaper had received these allegations from Peach Bottom Security force personnel involved in the labor dispute. The inspector examined and evaluated these allegations. In evaluating the allegations, the inspector referred to previous IE inspections, consulted region-based specialist inspectors who have conducted inspections at Peach Bottom, used personal knowledge of site activities and inspections, observed security force operations, and reviewed records. The allegations and inspector findings are summarized below:

(1) Allegation: Short-staffed guard force; posts left unmanned

This area has been specifically inspected, during the labor dispute, by the inspectors and by NRC region-based security specialists. No instances of failure to man NRC-required security positions were identified. There were instances of securing of optional posts. One instance of a roving, "clock" guard not being on duty for several hours on May 5, 1981 was identified, but that function is one required by the licensee in addition to the requirements of the NRC-approved security plan. This allegation has not been substantiated.

(2) Allegation: Clock round records falsified

The inspector and a region-based security specialist reviewed the clock round entries in the security logs and identified no discrepancies. The licensee stated to the resident inspector that their periodic audits of clock tapes have identified no discrepancies. Although the clock rounds are not part of the NRC requirements, any false entry in the security logs would be cause for NRC concern, and the individual who made the allegation will be contacted to obtain more details when he returns to work (81-14-02 and 81-15-01).

(3) Allegation: Vehicles entering the gate cannot be properly checked at night; guards are rushed to complete vehicle checks

Resident inspector checks during 1980 found no failures to meet vehicle check requirements during darkness. Inspection of vehicle checks during region-based security specialist inspection have identified no failures to meet vehicle check requirements during darkness. Neither the resident inspector nor visiting region-based security specialists have observed the guards to be rushing. The resident inspector has noted instances of vehicle drivers appearing to be concerned about the time required to complete vehicle checks. This allegation has not been substantiated.

- (4) Allegation: Licensee personnel have stated that the guards are for "window-dressing" only

The security force is required to meet specific NRC security requirements adjudged necessary to protect the public. There is no indication that this licensee is treating security as a decorative function, and considerable licensee effort and resources have been committed to security. Security is routinely inspected and discussed with licensee management, and this allegation appears to constitute individual statement or statements of opinion which are not consistent with the actual situation.

- (5) Allegation: Security force personnel are assigned as fire watches and are trained improperly for that job

Guards have been used, on occasion, as fire watches after receiving verbal instructions. Fire watches are routinely checked by the resident inspectors. No inadequacies in the ability of those fire watches to detect and report fires have been identified. This allegation has not been substantiated.

- (6) Allegation: When the day shift departs, it is impossible to check that all security badges are turned in

Approved and NRC-reviewed procedures cover badge issue and return. There are checks which will reveal failures to turn in badges. There are also other measures for protection against introduction of unauthorized materials and against improper entry into sensitive areas. Whether the existing measures should be improved is being reviewed by the NRC and by the licensee. No significant hazard to security has yet been identified. It is true, however, that no check that all security badges are turned in is specified.

- (7) Allegation: Portal monitors don't work. In 1975, a worker with contaminated shoes got through a portal monitor

Portal monitors are intended to check for radioactive sources or significant contamination. More sensitive detectors, located on site at the exit points from contaminated areas, will detect lower levels of contamination. The resident inspector has observed portal monitor failure and proper licensee response (taking inoperable equipment out-of-service). No public hazard has been identified in this area.

- (8) Allegation: 600 Rad/hr leak at the plant

The allegation described circumstances which indicate that the event involved was the April 27, 1981 radwaste discharge line break near the "B" cooling tower. The water which leaked had

been processed for discharge and was within the limits for discharge (see combined inspection report 277/81-09 and 288/81-10). Discharge paths to the environment are routinely monitored and recorded, and reviewed by the NRC. No major releases have been identified, and annual release limits have not been exceeded. It is possible that the allogger has misunderstood radiation terminology. The allegation has not been substantiated.

- (9) Allegation: Security force member received no whole body count (WBC) for 22 months

The licensee verified that this is true, and stated that a WBC was not required for the individual involved. Licensee procedure HPO/CO-26, "Personnel Bioassay Program", revision 5, dated October 20, 1980, specifies that a WBC should be provided annually for individuals who use respirators; upon receipt of a specified radiation dosage; at 3 year intervals; and upon termination. A WBC can also be obtained by request. No violation of NRC requirements has been identified in this case.

- (10) Allegation: Guards are not taught what protective clothing to wear

The inspector has confirmed that protective clothing is covered in General Employee Training (GET). Security personnel are required to receive GET. Entry into areas requiring protective clothing is governed by Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) or by a posting which specifies the protective clothing required. More comprehensive training is provided for personnel qualified to wear respirators, and that training is not required for all security force personnel. NRC requirements are being met in this area.

9. Operational Safety During Organized Labor Activities

On May 1, 1981, striking security force personnel picketed site access roads. Many contractor employees honored the lines. From May 2 to the end of the inspection, with the exception of May 6, the picketing was limited to the Unit 1 access road in accordance with a court injunction. On May 6, the Unit 2 and 3 access road was also picketed and contractors again honored the lines. Throughout the inspection, the inspector frequently verified that operating shift personnel and those security personnel not on strike were not being detained at the picket lines. The inspector frequently verified, during regular and back-shifts, that staffing of operating personnel and of the security force met regulatory requirements. Security force activities were closely monitored (see Detail 8). The inspector confirmed that liaison had been established with law enforcement agencies and that prompt access of emergency vehicles and essential supplies was assured. No unacceptable conditions were identified.

10. In-Office Review of Monthly Operating Reports

The following licensee reports have been reviewed in-office onsite. Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Monthly Operating Report for:

April 1981 dated May 12, 1981

This report was reviewed pursuant to Technical Specifications and verified to determine that operating statistics had been accurately reported and that narrative summaries of the month's operating experience were contained therein. No unacceptable conditions were identified.

11. Management Meetings

a. Preliminary Inspection Findings

A summary of preliminary findings was provided to the Station Superintendent at the conclusion of the inspection. During the period of this inspection, licensee management was periodically notified of the preliminary findings by the resident inspectors. The dates involved, the senior licensee representative contacted, and subjects discussed were as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Senior Licensee Representative Present</u>
May 1	Routine Discussions	Assistant Station Superintendent
May 8	Routine Discussions	Station Superintendent
May 15	Routine Discussion	Station Superintendent
May 21	Primary Containment (Detail 3)	Engineer Operations
May 22	Routine Discussions	Station Superintendent
May 29	Routine Discussions	Station Superintendent

b. Attendance at Management Meetings Conducted by Region-Based Inspectors

The resident inspectors attended entrance and exit interviews by region-based inspectors as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Inspection Report No.</u>	<u>Reporting Inspector</u>
May 4, 1981 (entrance) May 8, 1981 (exit)	Maintenance program	277/81-12 and 278/81-13	N. Blumberg
May 7, 1981 (entrance) May 8, 1981 (exit)	Security	277/81-15 and 278/81-16	R. Ladun