



Nebraska Public Power District

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION
P.O. BOX 98, BROWNVILLE, NEBRASKA 68321
TELEPHONE (402) 825-3811

CNSS810427

July 22, 1981



Mr. K. V. Seyfrit, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with Section 6.7.2.B.1 of the Technical Specifications for Cooper Nuclear Station and discusses a reportable occurrence that was discovered on June 25, 1981. A licensee event report form is also enclosed.

Report No.: 50-298-81-18
Report Date: July 22, 1981
Occurrence Date: June 25, 1981
Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station
Brownville, Nebraska 68321

Identification of Occurrence:

Operation with an engineered safety feature instrument setting less conservative than those established in Table 3.2.B, page 1 of the Technical Specifications.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

The reactor was operating at a steady state power level of approximately 98% of rated thermal power.

Description of Occurrence:

While performing Surveillance Test Procedure 6.2.2.1.3, pressure switch NBI-PS-52A was found to trip at a setpoint higher than that allowed by Technical Specifications.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The apparent cause of this occurrence was setpoint drift.

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Analysis of Occurrence:


The function of pressure switch NBI-PS-52A is to monitor reactor pressure and to initiate Core Spray and Residual Heat Removal Valve open permissive circuitry at ≤ 450 psig. The switch setpoint was found to trip at 452 psig. The redundant pressure switches, NBI-PIS-52B, PS-52C, and PIS-52D, were also tested at the time of the occurrence and operated properly within Technical Specification limits.

The switch was examined and no apparent cause for the setpoint drift could be found. Surveillance Procedure 6.2.2.1.3, which discovered NBI-PS-52A in violation of Technical Specifications, was performed at the end of a scheduled refueling outage. A review of the previous calibration records revealed that this switch had demonstrated a drift in the upward direction after several refueling outages, but not enough to violate the Technical Specification setpoint. There was no appreciable drifting of the instrument between outages. This occurrence presented no adverse consequences from the standpoint of public health and safety.

Corrective Action:

Pressure switch NBI-PS-52A was readjusted to the correct setpoint at the time of occurrence. Investigation of the setpoint for NBI-PS-52A indicated that the shut off head of the Core Spray and Residual Heat Removal pumps was approximately 350 psig. The Technical Specification setpoint of ≤ 450 psig for NBI-PS-52A prevents over-pressurization of the CS and RHR piping and reduces the differential pressure across the valves during the opening sequence. The setpoints for pressure switches NBI-PS-52A and redundant pressure switches NBI PIS-52B, PS-52C, and PIS-52D were subsequently reset to 400 psig in order to provide a greater margin from the Technical Specification limit and still ensure that the valve opens before the shut off head of the ECCS pumps is reached in the accident sequence.

Sincerely,



L. C. Lessor
Station Superintendent
Cooper Nuclear Station

LCL:cg
Attach.