	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
	CONTROL BLOCK:
0 1	$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c } \hline M & E & M & Y & P & 1 \\ \hline 9 & \text{Licensee code} & 14 \\ \hline \end{array} \begin{array}{ c c c c c c } \hline 0 & 0 & - & 0 \\ \hline 15 & & & \text{License number} \\ \hline \end{array} \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c } \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & - & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & - & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & - & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & - & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & - & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & - & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & - & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & - & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & - & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & - & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & - & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & - & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & - & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0$
0 1 8	REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 9 0 0 7 1 9 8 1 8 0 7 2 7 8 1 9 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10 IDuring plant start-up with the reactor plant at 1% power, while on
	alternator letdown, a CIS valve on the alternate letdown system
0 3	failed open. The reactor plant was taken subcritical, and a plant
0 4	cooldown was commenced. Compensatory measures were taken to have
0 5	two (2) valves available in the alternate letdown line if CIS was
0 6	required. There was no effect on public health and safety.
0 7	required. There was no effect on public health and safety.
0 8	9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE
0 9	$ \begin{array}{c} \text{CODE} \\ \text{S} \\ 9 \\ 10 \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \text{CODE} \\ 11 \\ 11 \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ 12 \\ 12 \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ 13 \\ 13 \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \text{COMPONENT CODE} \\ \text{COMPONENT CODE} \\ 18 \\ 18 \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ 19 \\ 19 \\ 19 \\ 19 \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10$
	Image: Number Num Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Nu
	ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER L 18 4 19 35 20 2 2 40 41 23 40 41 23 42 4 43 25 44 44 47 (COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27 40 40 41 42 43 43 45 44 47
1 0	Packing being too tight on a CIS valve in the alternate letdown
11	
	system caused the CIS valve to fail in the open position. The
1 2	system caused the CIS valve to fail in the open position. The
12	Special ended and the rest in the second sec
1 3	valve was repaired and tested satisfactory.
1 3 1 4 7 8	valve was repaired and tested satisfactory. y y p p aculity status b power c aculity status b power c aculity status c aculity b power c
1 3 1 4 7 8 1 5 7 8	Valve was repaired and tested satisfactory.
1 3 1 4 7 8 1 5 7 8	Valve was repaired and tested satisfactory.
1 3 1 4 7 8 1 5 7 8	valve was repaired and tested satisfactory. y
1 3 1 4 7 8 1 5 7 8	valve was repaired and tested satisfactory.
1 3 1 4 7 8 1 5 7 8	valve was repaired and tested satisfactory.
1 3 1 4 7 8 1 5 7 8	valve was repaired and tested satisfactory. valve was repaired and tested satisfactory. <t< td=""></t<>
1 3 1 4 7 8 1 5 7 8	valve was repaired and tested satisfactory. valve was repaired and tested satisfactory. <t< td=""></t<>

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Odi

NRC LORM 366

NAME OF PREPARER.

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION