


July 27, 1981

Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mr. Hendrie, Chairman  
Washington, D.C. 20555



Dear Chairman Hendrie:

The enclosed paper will be presented and submitted for record at the July 29, 1981 public hearings on the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station licensing of units two and three to be held at San Clemente High School.

I thought you should have a copy for your attention.

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- c.c. SCE
- SDG&E
- NRC
- Governor Brown
- Mayor of San Clemente
- Department of Defense
- Commander, Camp Pendleton
- L. A. Times
- Mother Jones Magazine
- New Age Magazine
- KPFK Radio



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THE VULNERABILITY OF  
THE SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO ACTS OF  
SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM

or

A MIDNIGHT SERENADE OF SONGS 1, 2, AND 3



With the increase in the news of sabotage and international terrorism including the recent Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear power plant I am concerned about the possible vulnerability of all nuclear power plants. Nuclear power plants may become prime targets for sabotage and terrorism.

The San Onofre plant could be substantially attractive to terrorism because one half of the population in California lives within 100 miles of the site and when units two and three are licensed and operating San Onofre will be the second largest nuclear power plant in the United States.

I therefore conducted my own study of possible weak points in the security systems and discovered through the material open to the public at Mission Viejo Public Library, the San Onofre Visitors Center personnel, and persons who have worked at the construction site that even an average person can within a very short time obtain information useful to potential acts of damage, destruction, and the worst being a core meltdown.

This study of sabotage and terrorism was primarily focused on the ocean cooling system. There are no security systems protecting the entrance of the ocean intake structures of all three reactors and all three are extremely vulnerable to irreparable destruction by way of knocking out the systems that provide critical cooling ocean water to the main steam condensers, the component circulating water heat exchangers, and the turbine plant circulating water heat exchangers. "Critical" in that without the millions of gallons of water per minute that are pumped through these condensers ~~and~~ a core meltdown would be eminent.

An example of this vulnerability is that a scuba diver can easily swim into the intake structures (fig.1) and 3300 feet through the large pipes (fig.2) and be inside the plant in about eight minutes

place explosives near the pump impellers. Then with the help of a boat and line be pulled out and after some miles away detonate the explosives stopping all cooling waters to the condensers, creating within hours a core meltdown.

The following three of many interesting scenarios have already taken place at San Onofre.

During a plant tour of unit one a tour member shockingly displayed a bottle labeled "nitroglycerin" while in the control room. This person was demonstrating how lax the security was at the most strategic location of the plant. Security was substantially tightened after this incident.

Another example was when some people partially made a film on how easy it was to hijack the trucks that carry away the spent fuel rods to the federal depositories. The film was shown to the power company which then prompted the action of placing a special armed escort with the shipments from then on.

Another incident was when unsafe chemicals were being poured into the water at the plant to clear some problem up but was obviously environmentally harmful to the ocean life. The power company denied the use of the chemical additives so a concerned person jumped over the fence and photographed them in the act. He safely got back out undetected. After the expose security was tightened up around the perimeter.

Yet uncorrected are the important control panels at unit one that can be shot out from the highway. There is a two mile off limits air space around the plant that is not enforced. A half dozen terrorists can easily take over the plant and demand most anything they want from this country. Honest and sincere people from the anti-nuke movement say that maybe if we don't publicly bring up the subject of terrorist vulnerability no one else will think of it. I think this is pretty naive!

By the above stories it seems like it takes a person outside of the nuclear industry to show the vulnerable spots in the plant. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, San Diego Gas and Electric, and Southern California Edison have been grossly negligent in protecting

the many people that work at the plant and the thousands of people who live in the surrounding communities. I propose that a "public safety monitor" be at the plant at all times to protect the nearby citizens. This person should not be an employee of the NRC or the power companies but an outside observer from the local community.

Undoubtedly unfriendly nations have devised attack scenarios on United States nuclear power plants. The vulnerability of San Onofre to acts of sabotage and terrorism invite immense destruction without even having to fire a missile at it.

Since the outcome of acts of terrorism may have far-reaching, costly, and obviously disastrous consequences, an indepth study and investigation must be made to determine the importance of these and other potential weaknesses of the total security planning at San Onofre.

In the interest of both public safety and national security it is imperative that unit one be shut down and the licensing of units two and three be delayed until such safeguards can be met.

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


Fig. 1. Unit 1 intake terminal structure.




Figure 2. Physical layout of offshore structures at San Onofre.




Figure 3.





Fig. 4. Water-use diagram for Unit 1.





a. AVERAGE OF MONTHS JULY TO SEP 1965 TO 1968  
 b. AVERAGE OF MONTHS NOV TO FEB 1965 TO 1969  
 c. AMBIENT TEMP DATA FROM SCRIPPS SURFACE WATER TEMP AT SHORE STATIONS UNITED STATES WEST COAST

Fig. 5. Unit 1 circulating water system under normal operating conditions.