

# MISSISSIPPA DWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Helping Build Mississippi
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JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR. ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT

Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N.W. Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

July 22, 1981



SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-416/417
File 0260/15525/15526
PRD-81/24, Status Report #1,
Reactor Mounting Channels

AECM-81/261

Reference: AECM-81/173, 5/18/81

On April 16, 1981, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. P. A. Taylor, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. When we first notified your office, we indicated that the deficiency was due to structural damage sustained by the mounting channels during shipment to the jobsite. We also reported that this deficiency, if left uncorrected, could have adversely affected the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant over the lifetime of the plant, and was thus reportable under 10CFR50.55(e). The information as reported had been furnished to Mississippi Power & Light by General Electric, our NSSS vendor, who had been informed by Morrison-Knudsen, the supplier of the diesel generator.

We have since been informed by General Electric that the above information is incorrect. The damage did not occur to equipment delivered to Grand Gulf Nuclear Station but to the Skagit Project of Puget Sound Power & Light. When the damage was discovered at Skagit, it was noted that the channels were undersized. The channels at Skagit as well as the ones at GGNS were replaced.

Since the channels were not damaged, MP&L is withdrawing their previous statement that this deficiency is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). We are currently investigating, along with General Electric, the effects on safety of the nuclear power plant if the undersized channels had not been replaced.

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Mr. J. P. O'Reilly

When Mississippi Power & Light was informed that the information they had previously sent to the NRC was inaccurate, we telephoned Mr. Floyd Cantrell on June 2, 1981 to advise him of this fact. He requested that we send an updated report in July.

We expect to make our Final Report on October 12, 1981. Attached is Status Report No. 1.

Yours truly,

J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

KDS:dr ATTACHMENT

cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley Mr. R. B. McGehee

Mr. T. B. Conner

Mr. Victor Stello, Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

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Mr. P. A. Taylor

PRD or Inspection Report File

File

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
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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#### STATUS REPORT NO. 1 FOR PRD-81/24

#### I. Description of the Deficiency

Morrison-Knudsen informed our NSSS vendor that the reactor mounting channels installed in Panel Q1H22P118 were a different size from the hardware on which the seismic qualification tests were run. This condition was discovered when similar equipment furnished by Morrison-Knudsen to the Skagit Project of Puget Sound Power & Light sustained damage during shipment to the jobsite. The tested equipment had 3/16" aluminum brackets whereas the reactors in the Grand Gulf and Skagit panels were mounted on 1/8" aluminum brackets.

Systems affected were the High Pressure Core Spray (E22) and the HPCS Diesel Generator (P81). The deficiency affects Unit 1 and Unit 2. It is applicable only to the NSSS scope of supply.

We are currently investigating the effect on safety of operations of the nuclear prower plant if this condition had remained uncorrected and the reportability under the provisions of 10CFR21.

#### II. Approach to Resolution of the Problem

The cause of the problem was that the wrong reactor mounting hardware was furnished by the control panel manufacturer as a result of the manufacturer's error. This occurred on equipment for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

To correct the deficiency the mounting hardware was changed at the jobsite to 3/16" aluminum brackets. Since no further similar equipment will be furnished to GGNS, actions to preclude recurrence are not necessary.

## III. Status of Proposed Resolution

The NSSS vendor is currently evaluating the effect on safety of the nuclear power plant, had this condition remained uncorrected.

# IV. Reason Why a Final Report Will Be Delayed

The NSSS vendor has not completed its investigation.

## V. Date When Final Report Will Be Submitted

October 12, 1981