## DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CRARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

VICE PRESIDENT STEAM PRODUCTION

July 22, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704 373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/81-9. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2). which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.

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JLJ:eck Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee Nuclear Safety Analysis Center P. O. Box 10412 Palo Alto, California 94303

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## DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 1

Report Number: RO-269/81-9

Report Date: July 22, 1981

Occurrence Date: June 22, 1981

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Startup Transformer CT-1 Locked Out

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 90% FP

Description of Occurrence: At 1322 hours on June 22, 1981, startup transformer CT-1 locked out for unknown reasons. This constitutes operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.7.2(a) and is thus reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The reason for this incident is not exactly known. There is speculation that a bird or some other object could have entered the broken inspection glass on the 6900 volt disconnect switch causing a V  $\phi$  differential trip.

Analysis of Occurrence: During the time period that CT-1 was locked out, backup power was verified available from Keowee-1. Thus, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

Corrective Action: The CT-1 transformer and buss work were checked for faults, and the protective relaying was checked for malfunction prior to returning control to Operations. A more complete check will be performed on the CT-1 transformer and switchgear during the current Unit 1 refueling outage.