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/0/1/	CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / (1)(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE $/V/A/N/A/S/2/$ (2) $/0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/$ (3)LICENSEE CODELICENSE NUMBER	ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) $\frac{\frac{4}{11}}{112}$ $\frac{\frac{4}{11}}{12}$ $\frac{\frac{1}{11}}{12}$ $\frac{\frac{1}{11}}{12}$ $\frac{\frac{1}{11}}{12}$ $\frac{\frac{1}{11}}{12}$ $\frac{\frac{1}{11}}{12}$ $\frac{1}{12}$
/0/1/	$\frac{\text{REPORT}}{\text{SOURCE}} \frac{/L}{/L} (6) \frac{/0/5/0/0/3/3/9}{\text{DOCKET} \text{ NUMBER}} (7) \frac{/0/7/0/1}{\text{EVENT} \text{ DAT}} \frac{8}{3}$	$\frac{1}{1}$ (8) $\frac{1072/481}{1}$ (9) REPORT DATE
	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES '0)	
/0/2/	/ On July 1, 1981, while testing the Unit 2 steam turoin	ne driven auxiliary feed- /
/0/3/	/ water pump, one of two parallel steam supply valves,	TV-MS-211A, failed to close /
/0/4/	/ completely. On July 3, 1981, while recov ing from a	plant trip, the other steam/
/0/5/	/ supply valve, TV-MS-211B, failed to close completely.	Two redundant motor driven/
/0/6/	/ auxiliar, feedwater pumps were operable. This event	is reportable pursuant to /
/0/7/	/ T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. The public health and safety were no	t affected. /
/0/8/	/	/
	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COUSE CODE CODE SUBCIDE COMPONENT CODE SUBCIDE	MP. VALVE BCODE SUBCODE
/0/9/	$\underline{/C/H}/(11)$ $\underline{/E}/(12)$ $\underline{/B}/(13)$ $\underline{/V/A/L/V/E/X}/(14)$ $\underline{/E}$	/ (15) <u>/D</u> / (16)
	LER/RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE	TYPE NO.
(17) REPORT NIMBER (8/1) /-/ (0/5/3/ /) / (0/2/	
	NORBER 10/1/ 1-1 10/3/3/ 1 1/ 10/3/	<u>/L</u> / <u>/-</u> / <u>/0</u> /
ACT TAK	ION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMEN EN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED	T NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTUREF
<u>/B</u> /	(18) $\underline{/2}/(19)$ $\underline{/2}/(20)$ $\underline{/2}/(21)$ $\underline{/0/0/0}/(22)$ $\underline{/Y}/(2)$	3) $/N/(24) /A/(25) /F/1/2/7/(26)$
C.	AUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)	
/1/0/	/ Contaminates and corrosion products in the instrument	air system caused an air /
/1/1/	/ control valve piston to stick preventing air from ven	ting from the operator of /
/1/2/	/ TV-MS-211A. The same control air problem prevented T	V-MS-211B from closing. The/
/1/3/	/ control air valves were repaired and the steam supply	valves returned to service /
/1/4/	/_after testing.	
	FACILITY METHOD OF	DISCOURDY DESCRIPTION (22)
/1/5/	$\underline{/G}/(28)$ $\underline{/0/0/0}/(29)$ $\underline{/NA}/(30)$ $\underline{/A}/(31)$	/ Operator Observation /
	ACTIVITY CONTENT	
/1/6/	Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / /	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	PERS^VINEL EXPOSURES	/
/1/7/	NUMJER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA	
	PERSONNEL INJURIES	/
/1/8/	NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)	
1.1.01	LOSS OF OR LAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)	/
/1/0/	TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)	
11/3/	PUBLICITY	/
12101	ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) PDR ADOCK 05000337	NRC USE ONLY
12/0/	/// (44) / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /	
	NAME OF PREDADED W D CADTUDICUT	PHONE (702) 90/-5151

Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station, Unit #2 Docket No. 50-339 Report No. LER 81-053/03L-0

Description of Event

On July 1, 1981, while testing the Unit 2 steam turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, one of two parallel steam supply valves, TV-MS-211A, failed to close completely. Unit 2 was in mode 3 and preparing to return to service when the event occurred. On July 3, 1981, while recovering from a plant trip, the other steam supply valve, TV-MS-211B, failed to close completely. Both events are reportable pursuant to T S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Two redundant 100 percent motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were operable. Since at least one steam supply valve was operable at all times, an operable steam supply system to the steam turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was always maintained. Because each valve receives an open signal from one SSPS train, the reliability of the steam turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was reduced. The public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event

Contaminates and corrosion products in the instrument air system caused an air control valve piston to stick preventing air from venting from the operator of TV-MS-211A. The same control air problem prevented TV-MS-211B from closing.

Immediate Corrective Action

Steam was isolated from the affected valve in each event. Both control air valves were cleaned and the steam supply valves returned to service after testing.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No scheduled corrective actions are required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Actions to prevent recurrence are not required.

Generic Implications

This event had no generic implications.