LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

	CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
0 1	V A S P S 2 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
0 1 8	SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80
0 2	With the unit at 100% power, it was discovered that inside recirculation spray HX
0 3	service water radiation monitoring pump 2-SW-P-58 would not operate. This is
0 4	contrary to T.S3.4.2.A.2 and reportable per T.S6.6.2.b.(2). Failure of the
0 5	pump would not affect performance of the heat exchanger. In addition, the discharge
0 6	tunnel radiation monitor provides backup radiation monitoring campility. There-
0 7	fore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.
0 8	9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE
0 9	SI B TO THE SUBCODE SU
	17 REPORT NUMBER 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
	TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS (22) SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIFE MANUFACTURER B 18 F 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 A 25 V 1 2 5 26 33 34 35 35 36 37 40 41 42 42 43 45 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
1 0	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) Sediment in the service water had dried and hardened on the pump internals, prevent-
111	ing the pump from rotating. The pump was cleaned, adjusted, and tested. A design
1 2	change in progress will provide the capability to flush the pumps.
1 3	
7 8	80
1 5	FACILITY STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 [E 28 1 0 0 29 N/A A 31 Observation
	ACTIVITY CONTENT ELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 Z 33 Z 34 N/A N/A AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 N/A
7 8	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 N/A
; a	PERSONNEL INJURIES 13 NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41 N/A
3	LOSS OF OR DANIAGE TO FACILITY 43 TYPE DESCRIPTION Z (42)
2 8	PUBLICITY STUDED DESCRIPTION 45 N/A
2 0	N (44)
	B030195 810724 L. Wilson SHONE (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO: 50-281

REPORT NO:

81-041-03L-0

EVENT DATE:

06-28-31

INOFERABLE SERVICE WATER PUMP

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: 1.

With Unit 2 at 100% power, an attempt was made to start 2-SW-P-5B (inside recirculation spray service water radiation monitoring pump) to compare its operation to 2-SW-P-5A which was undergoing preventative maintenance. It was discovered that 2-SW-P-5B would not operate. This event is contrary to T.S.-3.4.2.A.2 and is reportable par T.S.-6.6.2.b(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES:

Pump 2-5W-P-5B takes suction from the service water discharge of one of the four recirculation spray heat exchangers. Failure of 2-SW-P-5B would not affect performance of its associated heat exchanger. In addition, the discharge tunnel radiation monitor provides backup radiation monitoring capability; therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The pump would not operate because sediment form the service water had dried and hardened on the pump internals, preventing the pump from rotating.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION: 4.

The immediate corrective action was to declare the pump inoperable and initiate a maintenance request.

SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION: 5.

The failed pump was cleaned, readjusted, and then tested and verified to operate.

ACTION TO PREVENT OCCURRENCE:

As a result of Design Change 80-56, currently underway, piping for the recirculation spray heat exchanger radiation monitors is being changed, wich will provide a means for flushing the radiation monitor pumps. This should prevent buildup of material in the pump.

GENERIC IMPLICATIONS: 7.

The modifications described in Section 6 will also be implemented on Unit 1.