


TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

June 12, 1981

Don Quick
ORIGINAL COPY
NRC-RII
1 of 2
50-328

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



100-30-10000-1
100-30-10000-1

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - WALWORTH VALVE WEIGHT INCORRECT -
NCR CEB 80-12 - REVISED FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
Floyd Cantrell on March 12, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(a).
Enclosed is our revised final report. Our final report (submitted on
April 11, 1980) referenced an incorrect hangar number. All modifications
have been completed on this deficiency.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at
PTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

2 of 2

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2
EXCESSIVE PRESSURE DROPS ACROSS THE ERCW STRAINERS
SQRD-50-328/81-17
10 CFR 50.55(a)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

During preoperational testing at Sequoyah unit 1, it was discovered that pressure drops in excess of that designed for existed across the ERCW strainers. S. P. Kinney Engineering in Carnegie, Pennsylvania, supplied these strainers and predicted their pressure drop. The actual pressure drop, however, was much larger than the stated value. As a result, reduced flow rates could occur due to increased system resistance.

Safety Implications

The ERCW System is designed to supply a continuous flow of cooling water to various heat loads in systems and components necessary for plant safety. As a result of the excessive pressure drops across the strainers, flow rates less than the values claimed in the plant safety analysis could have resulted, which could have adversely affected the safety of the plant.

Corrective Actions

TVA has reevaluated the total system flow requirements and adjusted them downward as discussed in NCR SQMSWP8107 and has completed the preoperational flow balance test on the ERCW system. The test results indicate the system is capable of providing the sufficient flows to the main auxiliary building headers without removing or replacing the strainers, although the flows to certain individual components continue to be deficient (refer to NCR SQMSWP8107). Any design modifications to the ERCW system and the required surveillance test program will be reported in NCR SQN NEB 8035 and NCR SQN SWP 8107. Should a surveillance test program indicate that modifications to the system are required, TVA has determined that other more effective potential design modifications exist which could eliminate the need to replace, modify, or remove the ERCW strainers, while at the same time, combating the corrosion problem.