



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-416/81-18

Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Company
 Jackson, MS

Facility Name: Grand Gulf

Docket No. 50-416

License No. CPPR-118

Inspection at Grand Gulf site near Port Gibson, Mississippi

Inspector: P. A. Taylor for
 J. W. Chase

6-23-81
 Date Signed

Approved by: [Signature]
 F. S. Cantrell, Section Chief, Division of
 Resident and Reactor Project Inspection

6/24/81
 Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on June 1-5, 1981

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 32 inspector-hours on site in the areas of safety committee activity, operational staffing, preoperational test and preoperational test procedure review.

Results

Of the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *J. P. McGaughy, Assistant Vice-President Nuclear Production
- *C. M. McCoy, Plant Manager
- *J. W. Yelverton, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- *C. R. Hutchinson, Startup Manager
- *J. C. Roberts, Startup Supervisor
- *J. C. Bell, Quality Assurance Representative
- C. L. Stuart, Assistant Plant Manager
- R. A. Ambrosino, Nuclear Support Manager
- A. McCordy, Technical Superintendent
- J. R. Elms, Maintenance Superintendent
- G. Johnson, Operations Superintendent

*Attended exit interview

Other licensee employees contacted included startup engineers, shift supervisors, operators, and maintenance personnel.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 5, 1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The licensee was informed of one open item (paragraph 5) identified during this inspection. The licensee stated that this item would be cleared once the technical specifications are approved.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

No unresolved items were identified during this inspection.

5. Safety Committee Activity

During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the written program of the Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC) and the charter of the off-site Safety Review Committee (SRC). The review consisted of discussions with PSRC representatives, reviewing the minutes of previous PSRC meetings, and determining if the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) commitments were met. As of this inspection the SRC was not functioning.

The inspectors findings for the PSRC indicated that it was functioning as required by the proposed technical specification, FSAR and ANSI 18.7-1976. The inspector had no questions in the area of the PSRC.

The charter for the SRC was issued on May 29, 1981 with the requirement that the first meeting be no later than June 26, 1981. A review of the charter, which is the proposed Technical Specifications requirements, shows a disparity between the FSAR and the charter. Some examples of these disparities are:

- a. Charter does not specify alternate members to be designated in advance as committed to in the FSAR.
- b. Charter states that the Chairman of the SRC will determine when to use consultants while the FSAR states the SRC committee will determine when to use a consultant.
- c. There are also disagreements in what the charter says the SRC will review and what the FSAR states. (Example: FSAR says SRC will review reportable occurrences, charter says 24 hour reports.)
- d. Charter states SRC will meet once a quarter during initial year of operation following fuel loading while the FSAR states it will meet once a quarter after fuel load for one year.

The inspector found that the differences between the Charter and the FSAR does not prevent the SRC from operating as required; however the difference does need to be clarified to allow consistency between the FSAR and the Charter. The applicant stated that the proposed Technical Specifications (Charter) for the SRC are currently being discussed with Nuclear Reactors Regulation and that once the proposed Technical Specifications are approved, the FSAR would be changed to agreed with the Technical Specification. The inspector identified this as an open item (50-416/81-18-01).

In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.

6. Operational Staffing

The inspector reviewed the qualifications of the plant staff personnel. This review consisted of personnel interviews, reviewing resumes in the FSAR and determining if the intent of ANSI 3.1 as committed to in the QA Topical Report was met. The positions on the plant staff which were reviewed were found to exceed the requirements of ANSI 3.1

The positions that were reviewed by the inspector included the Plant Manager, Assistant Plant Manager, Nuclear Support Manager, Operations Superintendent, Maintenance Superintendent, Technical Superintendent and Shift Supervisors.

In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.

7. Preoperational Test

The inspector observed portions of the below listed tests. The tests were observed for conduct of the test, adherence to procedures and compliance with applicable codes and regulations.

- a. 1E22PT01 - High Pressure Core Spray
- b. 1E21PT01 - Low Pressure Core Spray

In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.

8. Preoperational Test Procedure Review

The following preoperational tests procedures were reviewed for equipment malfunction which would require a construction deficiency report, and adherence to procedure.

- a. 1R21PT01 - Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) 4.16 KV Preoperational Test
- b. 1R20PT01 - 480 VAC Preoperational Test
- c. 1E21PT01 - Low Pressure Core Spray Preoperational Test
- d. 1E22PT01 - High Pressure Core Spray Preoperational Test
- e. 1L21PT01 - 125V ESF Batteries, Charges and Distribution

During this review, it was determined by the licensee and the inspector that some of the independent verification sign-offs for test procedure 1L21PT01, 125V ESF Batteries, Charges and Distribution, were signed off by the engineer performing the test rather than a separate individual as required by Startup Manual 5000. A review of the procedure by licensee's startup personnel indicated that there were six independent verification steps for removal of test equipment that was not signed off by a second person. On June 4, 1981, the licensee documented that the test equipment was removed by performing an independent verification and documented this fact by signature for each item and attaching it to the procedure as exception #11.

The inspector reviewed the other procedures to determine if similar problems existed. Based on this review, the problem of having an independent verification appeared to be isolated to test procedure 1L21PT01. The licensee stated that since the time test procedure 1L21PT01 was performed, the requirement for an independent verification had been clarified to the startup engineers. The inspector had no further questions.

In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.