

JUL 9, 1981

American Electric Power Service Corporation
D. C. Cook 1, 2 (50-315, 50-316)

Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company
Zimmer (50-358)

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company
Perry 1, 2 (50-440, 50-441)

Commonwealth Edison Company
Braidwood 1, 2 (50-456, 50-457)
Byron 1, 2 (50-454, 50-455)
Dresden 1, 2, 3 (50-10, 50-237, 50-249)
La Salle 1, 2 (50-373, 50-374)
Quad-Cities 1, 2 (50-254, 50-265)
Zion 1, 2 (50-295, 50-304)

Consumers Power Company
Big Rock Point (50-155)
Palisades (50-255)
Midland 1, 2 (50-329, 50-330)

Dairyland Power Corporation
LACBWR (50-409)

The Detroit Edison Company
Fermi 2 (50-341)

Illinois Power Company
Clinton 1, 2 (50-461, 50-462)

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company
Duane Arnold (50-331)

Northern Indiana Public Service Company
Bailly (50-367)

Northern States Power Company
Monticello (50-263)
Prairie Island 1, 2 (50-282, 50-306)

Public Service of Indiana
Marble Hill 1, 2 (50-546, 50-547)

Toledo Edison Company
Davis-Besse 1 (50-346)

Union Electric Company
Callaway 1, 2 (40-483, 50-486)

Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Point Beach 1, 2 (50-266, 50-301)

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation
Kewaunee (50-305)



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ADD: Elaine Schell 77

SSINS No.: 6835
Accession No.:
8103300399
IN 81-19

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

July 6, 1981

IE Information Notice No. 81-19: LOST PARTS IN PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM

Description of Circumstances:

During an outage for turbine maintenance, Public Service Electric and Gas Company elected to drain the primary system at Salem Unit 1 to about the midplane of the hot leg nozzles and open two steam generators in an attempt to locate the source of an intermittent series of impacts that had been recorded on the Metal Impact Monitoring System (MIMS) during operation. Not finding the source, an additional attempt to search the loops was made by floating a TV camera, suspended from a foam float, down the hot legs.

The camera was successfully retrieved from one steam generator, whose hot leg does not have a connection for residual heat removal (RHR) suction. Retrieval from a second steam generator, whose hot leg does have a 3000 gpm RHR suction flow, proved impossible until the RHR flow was turned off temporarily. Successful retrieval was further compounded by thermal wells protruding into the hot leg. Upon retrieval of the camera float, the following parts were missing: 1) a five-inch long by one-inch diameter stainless steel tube containing lenses and a lens positioning motor; 2) a three-inch long plastic extension tube; 3) a three-inch length of 3/8-inch plastic tubing; 4) a short length of nylon line; and 5) a piece of float material. Most of these parts were later found in the RHR heat exchanger and heat exchanger bypass valve, downstream of the RHR pump which was not damaged when it chopped the five-inch long stainless tube into two shorter tubes.

While exhaustive efforts to resolve the cause of MIMS impacts are desirable and commendable, careful planning should precede placing any additional foreign material into the primary system. A detailed inventory of all such material should be maintained, and special precautions should be taken to prevent the generation of loose parts in the system. In the above example, a thorough analysis regarding effects of the RHR flow on the equipment could have prevented the potential safety problems that resulted from this event.

No written response to this information notice is required. If you need additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Attachment:
Recently issued IE Information Notices

RECENTLY ISSUED
 IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Notice No.	Subject	Date of Issue	Issued to
81-18	Excessive Radiation Exposures to the Fingers of Three Individuals Incurred During Cleaning and Wipe Testing of Radioactive Sealed Sources at a Sealed-Source Manufacturing Facility	6/23/81	Specified licensees holding Byproduct licenses
81-16	Control Rod Drive System Malfunctions	4/23/81	All BWR facilities with an OL or CP
81-15	Degradation of Automatic ECCS Actuation Capability by Isolation of Instrument Lines	4/22/81	All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP
81-14	Potential Overstress of Shafts on Fisher Series 9200 Butterfly Valves with Expandable T Rings	4/17/81	All power reactor facilities with an OL
81-13	Jammed Source Rack in a Gamma Irradiator	4/14/81	Specified irradiator licensees
81-12	Guidance on Order Issued January 9, 1981 Regarding Automatic Control Rod Insertion on Low Control Air Pressure	3/31/81	All BWR facilities with an OL or CP
81-11	Alternate Rod Insertion for BWR Scram Represents a Potential Path for Loss of Primary Coolant	3/30/81	All BWR facilities with an OL or CP
81-10	Inadvertant Containment Spray Due to Personnel Error	3/25/81	All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP
81-09	Degradation of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System	3/26/81	All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP

OL = Operating Licenses
 CP = Construction Permits