LIST OF HOLDERS OF A NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR OPERATING LICENSE OR CONSTRUCTION PERMIT RECEIVING IE BULLETIN NO. 81-02 (FOR ACTION)

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company ATTN: Mr. A. E. Lundvall, Jr. Vice President, Supply P. O. Box 1475 Docket Nos. 50-317 50-318

Baltimore, Maryland 21203

Boston Edison Company M/C Nuclear
ATTN: Mr. A. V. Morisi
Nuclear Operations Support Manager
800 Boylston Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02199

Docket No. 50-293

Docket No. 50-213

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company ATTN: Mr. W. G. Counsil

Vice President - Nuclear Engineering and Operations

P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. ATTN: Mr. John O'Toole Assistant Vice President - Nuclear

Docket Nos. 50-03 50-247

Affairs and Quality Assurance 4 Irving Place New York, New York 10003

Duquesne Light Company ATTN: Mr. C. N. Dunn Vice President Operations Division 435 Sixth Avenue

Docket No. 50-334

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

Jersey Central Power and Light Company

ATTN: Mr. Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.
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Forked River, New Jersey 03731

Docket No. 50-219

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company ATIN: Mr. Robert H. Groce Senior Engineer-Licensing 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701	Docket No. 50-309
Metropolitan Edison Company ATTN: Mr. H. D. Hukill Vice President and Director of TMI-1 P. O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057	Jocket No. 50-289
Metropolitan Edison Company ATTN: Mr. G. K. Hovey Vice President and Director of TMI-2 P. O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057	Docket No. 50-320
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation ATTN: Mr. T. E. Lempges Vice President Nuclear Generation 300 Erie Boulevard West Syracuse, New York 13202	Docket No. 50-220
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company ATTN: Mr. W. G. Counsil Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering and Operations P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101	Docket Nos. 50-336 50-245 50-423
Philadelphia Electric Company ATTN: Mr. S. L. Daltroff Vice President Electric Production 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101	Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278
Power Authority of the State of New York Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant ATTN: Mr. S. S. Zulla Resident Manager P. O. Box 215 Buchanan, New York 10511	Docket No. 50-286

Power Authority of the State of New York James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant ATTN: Mr. R. J. Pasternak Resident Manager P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093	Docket No. 50-333
Public Service Electric and Gas Company ATTN: Mr. F. W. Schneider Vice President - Production 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101	Docket Nos. 50-272 50-311
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation ATTN: Mr. John E. Maier Vice President Electric and Steam Production 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649	Docket No. 50-244
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation ATTN: Mr. Robert L. Smith Licensing Engineer 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701	Oocket No. 50-271
Yankee Atomic Electric Company ATTN: Mr. James A. Kay Senior Engineer-Licensing 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701	Docket No. 50-29
Duquesne Light Company ATTN: Mr. E. J. Woolever Vice President 435 Sixth Avenue Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219	Docket No. 50-412
Jersey Central Power & Light Company ATTN: Mr. I. R. Finfrock, Jr. Vice President 260 Cherry Hill Road Parsippany, New Jersey 07054	Docket No. 50-363
Long Island Lighting Company ATTN: Mr. M. S. Pollock Vice President - Nuclear 175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, New York 11801	Docket No. 50-322

Docket Nos. 50-516 Long Island Lighting Company ATTN: Mr. Charles P. Davis 50-517 Senior Vice President 250 Old Country Road Mineola, New York 11501 Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Docket No. 50-410 ATTN: Mr. G. K. Rhode Vice President System Project Management c/o Miss Catherine R. Seibert 300 Erie Boulevard, West Syracuse, NY 13202 Docket Nos. 50-387 Pennsylvania Power & Light Company ATTN: Mr. Norman W. Curtis 50-388 Vice President Engineering and Construction - Nuclear 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Docket Nos. 50-352 Philadelphia Electric Company ATTN: Mr. Jonn S. Kemper 50-353 Vice President Engineering and Research 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Docket Nos. 50 15 Public Service Electric & Gas Company ATTN: Mr. T. J. Martin 50-3 Vice President Engineering and Construction 80 Park Plaza - 17C Newark, New Jersey 07101 Public Service Company of New Hampshire Docket Nos. 50-443 ATTN: Mr. W. C. Tallman 50-444 Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 1000 Elm Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation Docket No. 50-485

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

April 9, 1981

IE Bulletin No. 81-02- FAILURE OF GATE TYPE VALVES TO CLOSE AGAINST DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE

Description of Circumstances:

As a part of its pressurized water reactor (PWR) Safety and Relief Valve Testing Program, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) conducted limited testing of a number of valves used on PWRs as power-operated relief valve (PORV) isolation or block valves. These tests indicate a number of cases in which certain of these valves failed to fully close under conditions that approximated those of their intended service (i.e., saturated steam at approximately 2,400 psi). The valves that failed to fully close are gate type motor-operated valves that may be used in various safety-related applications in addition to PORV block valves.

Background on EPRI Testing:

The proposed full-scale qualification testing of PORV block valves, with a completion date of July 1, 1982, was first provided to the utilities in a September 5, 1980, draft of NUREG-0737. The item was formally issued, with Commission approval, in NUREG-0737 on October 31, 1980.

The block valve qualification testing was proposed in NUREG-0737 primarily as an additional means of reducing the number of challenges to the emergency core cooling system and the safety valves during plant operation.

In anticipating a request for PWR block valve testing, EPRI decided to make provisions for the installation of block valves between the test steam source and the test PORV in July 1980 at the Marshall test facility. The Marshall test facility is a full-flow steam test facility owned by Duke Power Company. Test PORVs had been carefully selected, with close coordination between EPRI, its consultants and PWR utilities, to assure that PORVs representative of those in service or intended for service would be tested. However, for the block valves that have been tested concurrently, this selection process was not followed because an NRC block valve test program had not been formulated. Therefore, seven readily available valves were obtained and tested by EPRI, primarily to obtain some general baseline information on block valve closure capability.

For the block valves that were tested, EPRI had not established, at least at the time of testing, the population of plants, either operating or under construction, that might have a valve of the type needed for testing. In addition, it should be noted that the test conditions used at Marshall to date were only those that were determined to be applicable for steam testing of PORVs.

These test conditions were selected after review by EPRI, utilities, and PWR NSSS vendors. NRC staff also reviewed and concurred with the test conditions. To date, there has been no similar specific determination by EPRI or the NRC staff as to the relevance of the Marshall block valve tast conditions to the conditions in any specific PWR plant under which a block valve should be able to close to isolate a stuck-open PORV.

To date, EPRI has tested a total of seven PORV block valves, all at the Marshall facility. During these tests, the following valves failed to fully close during the EPRI PORV block valve testing:

- 1. Westinghouse Electro-Mechanical Division (W-EMD) 3-inch Valves These valves, which are manufactured by W-EMD, can be identified by the yoke-mounted nameplates that are stamped "WESTINGHOUSE" and include "VALVE IDENT." and "VALVE I.D." numbers given in Table 1. Supplemental analyses and water testing, performed by W-EMD, determined that a 4-inch valve also would not close fully and therefore is included in this bulletin. The nameplate data on this valve are given in Table 1. These analyses and tests also determined the threshold differential pressure across the valves above which closure cannot be assured. These values are given in Table 1. A list of power reactor facilities believed to have the affected valves is given in Table 2. It is our understanding that W-EMD has notified these facilities of the failure of these valves to fully close.
- 2. Borg-Warner Nuclear Valve Division (BW-NVD) 3-inch 1500-pound Motor-Operated Gate Valves These valves can be identified by BW-NVD part numbers 75460, 77910, and 79190. Supplemental testing to determine threshold differential pressures for less severe service has yet to be completed. A list of power reactor facilities believed to have the affected valves it given in Table 3. BW-NVD has submitted a 10 CFR Part 21 report in which they indicated that they have notified these facilities of the failure of these valves to fully close. (Note: Similar valves with BW-NVD part numbers 74380 and 74380-1 have been modified, recested, and demonstrated to close under test conditions. As a result, they are not included in this bulletin.)
- 3. Anchor Darling 3-inch 1540-pound Double-Disc Valve This valve, the first of a series of specially designed valves, has been modified, retested, and demonstrated to close under test conditions. The remaining va'ves will be similarly modified during manufacture. As a result, they are not included in this bulletin.

It must be cautioned that Tables 2 and 3 may not be complete. For example, the staff is aware of one power reactor facility that obtained affected valves from another inventory. For this reason, this bulletin is applicable to all power reactor facilities with an operating license or construction permit.

The tests and analyses performed to date raise doubts as to the ability of the affected valves to close under less severe service conditions. These valves have also been supplied for utilization in a number of safety-related

applications. In the case of the W-EMD valves, they are also provided as spares or replacements through direct sales from the manufacturer. For this reason, this bulletin is applicable to the affected valves that are required to close with a differential pressure across them in safety-related systems or as PORV block valves.

The responsibility for notification and corrective actions based on adverse test results continues to lie with the utilities and vendors in the industry. NRC will continue to monitor the progress of the qualification program. All adverse test data will continue to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. NRC staff will take appropriate action, if necessary, to assure that the necessary corrective actions are made in a timely manner.

Actions to be Taken by Licensees:

- 1. Within 30 days of the issuance date of this bulletin, ascertain whether any of the affected valves have been installed, or are maintained as spares for installation, where they are required to close with a differential pressure across them in safety-related systems or as PORV block valves. The differential pressures of concern include the following:
 - a. For the W-EMD manufactured valves, values in excess of the threshold values in Table 1.
 - b. For the BW-NVD valves, any value.
- If no affected valves are identified, report this to be the case and a ignore the items below.
- 3. If any affected valves are identified as being installed, take corrective action and evaluate the effect that failure to close under any condition requiring closure would have on system(s) operability pursuant to the facility technical specifications for continued operation.
- 4. If any affected valves are identified as spares, either modify the valves so that they are qualified for the intended service or obtain qualified replacements prior to installation.
- 5. Within 45 days of the issuance date of this bulletin, submit a report to NRC listing the affected valves identified, their service or planned service, the maximum differential pressure at which they would be required to close, the safety consequences of the valve's failure to close, the corrective action taken or planned, and the schedule for completing the corrective action.

Actions to be Taken by Construction Permit Holders:

 Ascertain whether any of the affected valves are or will be installed or maintained as spares for installation where they are required to close with a differential pressure across them in safety-related systems or as PORV block valves. The differential pressures of concern include the following:

- a. For the W-EMD manufactured valves, values in excess of the threshold values in Table 1.
- b. For the BW-NVD valves, any value.
- 2. If no affected valves are identified, report this to be the case and ignore the items below.
- If any affected valves are identified, either modify the valves so that they are qualified for the intended service or obtain qualified replacements prior to startup.
- 4. Within 90 days of the issuance date of this bulletin, submit a report to NRC listing the affected valves identified, their planned service, the maximum differential pressure at which they would be required to close, the safety consequences of the valve's failure to close, the corrective action taken or planned, and the schedule for completing the corrective action.

For those cases in which reports have already been submitted in accordance with the Technical Specification, 10 CFR Parts 21 and/or 50.55(e), this information need not be resubmitted. Rather, licensees or construction permit holders should reference this earlier report and submit only the additional information requested above.

Reports, signed under oath or affirmation under the provisions of Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Recional Office and a copy shall be forwarded to the Director of the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. 20555.

If you need additional information regarding this matter, please contact the appropriate NKC Regional Office.

This request for information was approved by GAO under blanket clearance number ROG72 that expires November 30, 1983. Comments on burden and duplication should be directed to Office of Management and Budget, Room 3201, New Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20503.

Attachments:

- 1. Table 1 Identification of W-EMD

 Manufactured Valves and Differential

 Pressure Limits for Operation
- Table 2 Partial List of Plants With Affected Valves Manufactured by W-EMD
- Table 3 Partial List of Plants With Affected Valves Manufactured by BW-NVD
- A. Recently issued IE Bulletins

TABLE 1. IDENTIFICATION OF W-EMD MANUFACTURED VALVES AND DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE LIMITS FOR VALVE OPERATION

Nominal Valve Size (in.)	번-EMD Model Reference	"VALVE IDENT."*	"VALVE I.O."**	Δ*** (psid)
3	3GM88	03000GM88	3GM58 or 3GM78 or 3GM88	1300
	3GM88	07002GM88	3GM58 or 3GM78 or 3GM88	1500
	3GM99	03001GM99	3GM58 or 3GM78 or 3GM88	750
4	4GM88	04000GM88	4GM78 or 4GM88	750
	4GM88	04002GM88	4GM78 or 4GM88	750
4	4GM87	04000GM87	4GM77	750
	4GM87	04C02GM87	4GM77	750

- * This number is found on the yoke-mounted nameplate and occupies the first nine positions of a 24-position number. It is used in evaluating the functional ΔP requirements.
- ** This number is found on the yoke-mounted nameplate and occupies the first three positions of a six-position number. Valves sold as spares or replacements may not contain this number.
- *** Pressure below which valve will close (as shipped).

Notes: A "position" may contain more than one character. The three-position "VALVE I.D." number consists of five digits in the three positions; for example, 3 GM 78.

All nameplates have "VALVE IDENT." numbers, but those sold as spares or replacements may not have "VALVE I.D." numbers. The "VALVE IDENT." number includes the manufacturer's model reference, and the "VALVE I.D." number is a reference to the valve system application. The "VALVE I.D." number also appears on Westinghouse valve indexes and system flow diagrams. There is no reference to the "VALVE IDENT." number on these indexes or flow diagrams.

TABLE 2. PARTIAL LIST OF PLANTS WITH AFFECTED VALVES MANUFACTURED BY W-EMD

"VALVE IDENT." Number			
Plant	03000GM88 03002GM88	03001GM99	04000GM88 04002GM88 04000GM87 04002GM87
Operating plants (s	upplied as seen	us or replacements ex	xcept as noted):
Beaver Valley 1	X		
Connecticut Yankee	X		
Farley 1, 2		Х*	
Indian Point 2	X		
Kewaunee	X		
North Anna 1, 2 Oconee 1, 2, 3	X		X
San Onofre 1	Ŷ		. ^
Surry 1, 2	X X	X	X
Zion 1, 2			X
Nonoperating plants	s (supplied as o	riginal scope of sup	ply except as noted):
Beaver Valley 2	X		X
Braidwood 1, 2	X		X
Byron 1, 2	X X X		X X X
Callaway 1, 2			X
Comanche Peak 1 2	X		X
Harris 1, 2, 3, 4		X	X
Jamesport 1, 2	X	X	X
Marble Hill 1, 2	Α	X**	Λ
San Onofre 2, 3 Seabrook 1, 2		X	χ
South Texas 1, 2		^	x
Summer	X		X
Vogtle 1, 2		X	X
Watts Bar 1, 2	X		X
	X		X

^{*}Transferred from inventory at another plant.

^{**}Spares or replacements.

TABLE 3. PARTIAL LIST OF PLANTS WITH AFFECTED VALVES MANUFACTURED BY BW-NVD

Plant	NVD-P/N
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2	75460
Bellefonte	79190
Palo Verde	77910

RECENTLY ISSUED IE RULLETINS

Bulletin No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued To
Revision 1 81-01	Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers	3/5/81	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP
Supplement 5 80-17	Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at BWR	2/13/81	All holders of a BWR power reactor OL or CP
81-01	Surveillance of Mechanical Snumbers	1/27/81	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP
80-25	Operating Problems with Target Rock Safety- Relief Valves at BWRs	12/19/80	All holders of a BWR power reactor OL or CP
Supplement 4 to 80-17	Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR	12/18/80	All holders of a 8WR power reactor OL or CP
80-24	Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment (October 17, 1980 Indian Point 2 Event)	11/21/80	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP
80-23	Failures of Solenoid Valves Manufactured by Valcor Engineering Corporation	11/14/80	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP
80-22	Automation Industries, Model 200-520-008 Sealed- Source Connectors	9/12/80	All holders of a radiography license
80-21	Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc.	11/6/80	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP
Revision 1 to 79-26	Boron Loss from BWR Control Blades	8/29/80	All holders of a BWR power reactor OL