

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	W I P B H 2	2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0	3 4 1 1 1 1	4	5
7 8 9	LICENSEE CODE 14 15	LICENSE NUMBER 25 26	LICENSE TYPE 30	57 CAT	58

0 1	L	6 0 5 0 0 0 0 3 0 1	7 0 5 2 9 8 1	8 0 6 1 2 8 1 1	9
7 8	REPORT SOURCE 60	DOCKET NUMBER 61 68	EVENT DATE 69 74	REPORT DATE 75 80	

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | At 0256 on May 29, 1981, during a routine shutdown for secondary plant

0 3 | maintenance, MSIV 2CV-2017 failed to shut as required. Immediate

0 4 | investigation revealed the two vent valves for the air operator failed

0 5 | to open, preventing the closure of 2CV-2017. Vent valve 2SV-2017C was

0 6 | manually tripped open and the MSIV shut immediately. This event is

0 7 | reportable under Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.A.5. This event is

0 8 | similar to LER 77-02 Docket No. 50-301.

0 9	H B	11 E	12 B	13 V A L V O P	14	D	15	Z	16
7 8	SYSTEM CODE 9 10	CAUSE CODE 11	CAUSE SUBCODE 12	COMPONENT CODE 13	18	COMP. SUBCODE 19		VALVE SUBCODE 20	

17	LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	8 1	21	22	—	23	0 0 4	24	26	27	0 1	28	29	T	30	31	—	32	0
		EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.			SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)				OCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE							REVISION NO.
A	18	Z	19	Z	20	Z	21	0 0 0 0	37	50	Y	23	Y	24	L	25	A 4 9 9	26	47
		ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)				ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER				COMPONENT MANUFACTURER		

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | After the failure of the vent valves, numerous attempts failed to

1 1 | duplicate the failure mode. Prior to returning to power, the MSIV

1 2 | 2CV-2017 was again tested satisfactorily; however, due to the sluggish

1 3 | operation of the vent valve, both vent valves were replaced on 6-1-81.

1 4 | The testing frequency has been increased to detect future problems.

1 5	D	28	0 0 0	29	N/A	30	A	31	Operator observation	32
7 8 9	FACILITY STATUS		% POWER	OTHER STATUS	(30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY			DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	(32)

1 6	Z	33	Z	34	N/A	35	N/A	36
7 8 9	ACTIVITY CONTENT		RELEASED OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	(35)		LOCATION OF RELEASE	(36)

1 7	0 0 0	37	Z	38	N/A	39
7 8 9	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION	(39)	

1 8	0 0 0	40	N/A	41
7 8 9	PERSONNEL INJURIES	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	(41)

1 9	Z	42	N/A	43
7 8 9	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY	TYPE	DESCRIPTION	(43)

2 0	N	44	N/A	45	8107160282 810612 PDR ADOCK 05000301 S	68 69	_____	80
7 8 9	PUBLICITY ISSUED	DESCRIPTION	(45)		NRC USE ONLY			

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 81-004/01T-0

Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 2
Docket No. 50-301

At 0256 hours on May 29, 1981, with the unit in the off-line, zero power, critical condition in preparation for operator licensing startups and secondary plant maintenance, the operator attempted to shut both main steam isolation valves with a remote manual signal in preparation to take steam out. Main steam isolation valve 2CV-2018 shut as called for; main steam isolation valve 2CV-2017 failed to shut. This is a reportable occurrence in accordance with Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.A.5 with 24-hour written notification provided to U. S. NRC Region III on May 29, 1981.

An immediate investigation ensued and found the two air-operated vent solenoid-operated valves, 2SV-2017C&D, were shut preventing closure of 2CV-2017. The two air-operator supply solenoid valves, 2SV-2017A&B, were shut as required. Vent valve 2SV-2017C was locally manually tripped at the valve operator station and the main steam isolation valve, 2CV-2017, shut immediately.

The air operator of the main steam isolation valve has a two-train logic. There are two in-series air supply solenoids. The vent path has two parallel solenoid valves. The supply line is orificed so that on failure of both supply solenoids to close, a vent will still cause closure of the main steam isolation valve. Two manual key-operated isolation valves are provided on the vent lines upstream of the air vent solenoid-operated valves to allow for testing. Due to reliability problems experienced in the past with the original installed Lawrence Series 1200 internal pilot-operated solenoid valve, they were replaced on one main steam isolation valve operator assembly with ASCO Bulletin 8015 internal pilot-operated solenoid valves. Prior to the initial installation of the new ASCO valves, a testing program was undertaken which included vibration, leakage, voltage and operational testing. At the conclusion of these tests the ASCO valve was disassembled and inspected. At the conclusion of this program the ASCO valves were approved for installation.

The new ASCO valves were installed during the recent refueling outage and were extensively tested in place prior to the successful completion on May 22, 1981, of the timed test required by Technical Specification 15.4.7. After the failure of these valves to operate on May 29, 1981,

attempts were made to duplicate this failure mode but all the valves operated properly. Upon the completion of the other secondary plant maintenance and training startups, the main steam isolation valve 2CV-2017 was tested at 2000 hours on May 31, 1981. Although 2CV-2017D ("green" train vent valve) operated sluggishly, the main steam isolation valve cycled properly on each of six attempts. Due to this sluggish operation, both vent valves, 2CV-2017C&D, were replaced on June 1, 1981, and proper operation was again verified. The removed valves are undergoing a testing and evaluation program to attempt to determine the cause of their failure. In addition, the testing frequency has been increased on the 2CV-2017 operator to foretell future problems.