GPU Nuclear

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June 29, 1981

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-08/3L-1

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to submit Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-08/3L-1 in accordance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.4 of our technical specifications. This is a revision to the original LER No. 50-219/81-08, and provides more detailed information on actions that have been completed.

Very truly yours,

Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.
Vice President - JCP&L
Director - Oyster Creek

IRF:DGH:lse

attachment

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cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3 copies)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1 copy)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-08/3L-1

Report Date

June 29, 1981

Occurrence Date

February 10, 1981

Identification of Occurrence

An unmonitored release of radioactive water due to seepage through the 3 foot thick outside wall at the northwest side of the New Radwaste Building.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.4.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power.

Major Plant Parameters:

Power:	Reactor	1756 MWt
	Generator	597 MWe
Flow:	Recirculation	15.0×10^4 gpm
	Feedwater	6.37×10^6 lb/hr

Description of Occurrence

On February 10, 1981 at approximately 0740 hours, the offgoing New Radwaste operator discovered water seeping through the NRW building at various locations along the west wall. By visual observation during the time period of the occurrence, the total amount of water released was estimated at approximately 15 gallons.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence was attributed to the unusually high level of water contained in the Chemical Waste Collection Tank vaults and to the fact that the concrete wall did not contain this water within the building. The high water level in the vaults was due to the overflow of the three Chemical Waste Collection Tanks, caused by inleakage from the Condensate Transfer System.

Analysis of Occurrence

Samples were taken of the water outside the building and the gross beta concentration was 3.2×10^{-3} µCi/ml. The Radiological Controls department conducted direct frisks of various points along the wall, showing contamination levels ranging from approximately 15,000 DPM up to 120,000 DPM. More importantly, the direct survey showed detectable ground contamination only within 6 inches of the wall. Soil core samples were also taken on February 18 and on February 26. An extensive analysis of these samples shows that they did not contain any of the radionuclides specific to the Chemical Waste Collection Tanks. The distinct difference in isotopic variety and concentrations of the water which seeped through the building compared to that of the soil samples suggests that there was no lateral migration of contaminated water to the surrounding soils. Based on the above discussion, the safety significance of this event is considered minimal.

This building was designed and constructed in accordance with Regulatory Guides 1.26 rev. 2 and 1.29 rev. 2. The concrete of the floor and lower five feet of the walls is all designed and constructed to Seismic Category I specifications. This five foot high "bathtub" is designed to withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and is capable of preventing the instantaneous release of the total inventory of water in all tanks in the event of a common mode failure (such as SSE).

Corrective Action

The immediate corrective actions taken were to rope off the area around the northwest corner of the NRW building and to post the area a "Contaminated Area RWP Required". Herculite was secured and sealed against the wall in order to contain the seepage. Once the continuous overflow of the Chemical Waste Collection tanks was halted, the effort was concentrated on processing the water from the vaults and from the tanks to the waste surge tank, where it could be stored and later processed.

The walls in this area were stripped and coated with 2 layers of sealant. The contaminated soil along the wall was removed, and upon reclamation of the area all ropes and postings were removed. The area was then released for unrestricted access. There is presently an engineering request to investigate the extent of leakage pathways through the building and to determine a suitable means of assuring building integrity. There is also an engineering request to evaluate the possible installation of level detectors in the tank vaults. The NRW operators have received instructions not to exceed 95% level in any tank, and have been made aware of what actions to take in the event a tank reaches a level greater than 95%.

Also, the PORC has approved a procedure change which requires the tank room floor drain to the sump to be open, so that the vaults will not become flooded.

Failure Data

Not applicable.