


Southern California Edison Company

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June 25, 1981

J. G. HAYNES
MANAGER OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS



SCE

TELEPHONE
(213) 572-1742

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1990 North California Boulevard
Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director



DOCKET No. 50-206
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 1

Dear Sir:

This letter is written to inform you of two separate instances wherein there was an inadvertent breach of containment integrity in violation of station procedures. However, in neither case was there a violation of Technical Specification 3.6.B(1) which requires containment integrity when the reactor coolant system (RCS) is above 500 psig or less than 1% $\Delta K/K$ shutdown. Submittal is in accordance with the reporting requirements stipulated in Section 6.9.2.b of Appendix A to Provisional Operating License DPR-13.

The first occurrence was on June 3, 1981 while the RCS was at approximately 380 psig, 350°F, and greater than 1% $\Delta K/K$ shutdown. An entry through the main (south) containment personnel air lock was in progress by a station maintenance foreman. The outer door opened and closed properly. However, upon operating the inner door handwheel, approximately one turn, the foreman felt an obstruction. He immediately stopped opening the handwheel and returned it to its original (closed) position. He then began exiting through the outer door. When it opened, however, the inner door swung open, apparently because it was not fully latched closed and due to the differential between the slight negative containment pressure and the outside atmosphere. It was immediately recognized that a breach of procedurally required containment integrity existed. The foreman, with the assistance of three additional people, succeeded in closing the outer door. The interior door would not operate and was left as is. Exit was effected through the emergency (north) air lock. It was estimated that both doors were open for a period of approximately 5 minutes.

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Maintenance personnel immediately began investigation and repair of the inoperable inner door. Inspection revealed no mechanical damage. The roller chain which connects both door operating mechanisms was removed, the doors were operated and the door timing sequence reset and verified correct. Both doors and associated interlocks operated properly. As a result, the door was again declared operable about 1-1/2 hours after the occurrence.


Two days later, on June 5, 1981, a health physics technician was entering containment through the main (south) personnel air lock. The technician was not experienced in air lock operation and may have operated the inner door handwheel too rapidly and in the incorrect sequence (before the outer door was completely closed). As a result, damage occurred, and the inner door opened while the outer door was still open. The RCS was at approximately 350 psig, 310°F and greater than 1% $\Delta K/K$ shutdown. The situation was recognized as a violation of containment integrity required by procedure and the control room and maintenance personnel were notified. Assistance arrived and the doors were both closed approximately 15 minutes after the original breach.

Due to the close recurrence of this event, a thorough inspection of the main personnel air lock operating mechanism was conducted. This examination revealed 3 damaged cam followers in the inner door gear train mechanism. Additionally, the actuator gear shaft was found to be out of alignment. The damaged cam followers were replaced, the actuator shaft was realigned and the door operating mechanism verified to be operating properly. Additionally, a security guard familiar with the proper operation of the airlock was posted there to assure that proper operating procedures were used by personnel entering containment. This guard was maintained until the airlock was chained shut prior to plant criticality.

During both events, containment was at a negative pressure precluding the release of any gases in containment to atmosphere. Consequently, there was no adverse impact on the environment or public health and safety.

Should you have any questions relative to this matter, please contact me.

Sincerely,


J. G. Hayes

Manager of Nuclear Operations

GTM:dh:73U

Attachments: Licensee Event Report 81-010

cc: L. F. Miller (NRC Resident Inspector)

Director, Office of Management Information & Program Control
Director, Nuclear Safety Analysis Center