

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-155/81-02

Docket No. 50-155

License No. DPR-6

Licensee: Consumers Power Company
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, MI 49201

Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant

Inspection At: Charlevoix, MI

Inspection Conducted: February 10 through March 9, 1981

Inspectors: *D.C. Boyd*
for G. C. Wright 4-1-81
D.C. Boyd
for M. B. Parker 4-1-81
D.C. Boyd
Approved By: D. C. Boyd, Chief 4-1-81
Project Section 1A

Inspection Summary

Inspection on February 9 through March 10, 1981 (Report No. 50-155/81-02)

Areas Inspected: Routine, resident inspector inspection involving; Operational safety verification, LER review, surveillance observation and independent inspection. The inspection involved a total of 113 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including zero inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.

Results: Of the areas inspected no apparent items of noncompliance were identified, one unresolved item pending licensee review is outstanding.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *C. R. Abel, Operations and Maintenance Superintendent
- *D. E. DeMoor, Technical Engineer
- *C. E. Axtell, Health Physicist
- A. C. Sevener, Operations Supervisor
- *T. R. Fisher, QA Analyst
- *R. E. Schrader, Technical Superintendent

The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel, including shift supervisors, control room operators and health physics technicians.

*Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Operational Safety Verification

- a. The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of February, 1981. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations. The inspector by observation verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of February the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the core spray, containment spray and firewater systems to verify operability.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

- b. During a control room walk through on March 3, 1981, one Area Monitor was observed to be out of calibration. The inspectors questioned radiation protection personnel about this in light of the Technical Specification requirement of monthly calibration checks. The inspectors were informed that the area monitor in question was only calibrated during shutdown due to the radiation field the detector is in.

Further investigation by the inspectors revealed that the Technical Specifications requires nineteen (19) area monitors to be operable. A review of all area monitors revealed that, in addition to the out of calibration detector (condenser area) one other monitor has been out of service for an indeterminate amount of time (Control Rod Drive Equipment Room).

Technical Specification Section 6.4.2., "Area Monitoring System" states in part.... "Nineteen fixed gamma monitors.... shall be installed throughout the plant...." Further, Section 6.4.3 "Operating Requirements" Part (e) states in part.... "The area monitoring system shall normally be in operation;... During monitor outages in normally accessible areas, temporary monitoring shall be provided if the remaining area monitors do not provide adequate coverage. Calibration of monitors shall be checked at least monthly."

Discussions with licensee personnel revealed that the Area Monitors in the CRD equipment room and main condenser area are not calibrated due to personnel safety and ALARA considerations. It is further noted that neither of the areas in question are normally occupied during power operation. The CRD equipment room is not habitable during power operation due to high gamma and neutron radiation (normal condition). The main condenser area receives weekly inspections by the operations department; however, prior to entry radiation protection personnel are contacted and an air sample and area survey are conducted. In addition, inspection personnel carry and use a survey instrument during the inspection.

The licensee has shown considerable interest in resolving the above problem and as such this item will be carried as an unresolved item pending evaluation by the licensee (50-155/81-02-02).

- c. The inspectors discussed the way the licensee documents the Technical Specification requirement of daily control rod drive exercises. The licensee has agreed to add a sign off to the shift supervisor's shift turnover surveillance procedure pertaining to CRD daily exercising.

3. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The inspector observed required surveillance testing on the Turbine Bypass Valve (T7-18) and Reactor Protection System (T7-04) and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing

the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

No apparent items of noncompliance were identified.

4. Licensee Event Reports Followup

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.

- LER 80-36 (Closed) Emergency Diesel Generator output voltage failure to build up.
- LER 80-37 (Closed) Emergency Diesel Generator cooling water pump coupling overheating.
- LER 80-39 (Closed) Check valve failed leak rate test.
- LER 80-42 (Closed) Through wall leakage in CRD excess flow line.
- LER 80-44 (Closed) Emergency Diesel Generator output voltage regulator failure.
- LER 80-45 (Closed) Check valve failed leak rate test.
- LER 80-46 (Closed) RDS Channel A Battery Cells low specific gravity. Procedure revision will be inspected during subsequent inspection (50-155/81-02-03).
- LER 80-47 (Closed) Emergency Diesel Generator output voltage failed to build up.
- LER 80-50 (Closed) Monthly DC battery test not done in timely manner. Maintenance schedule reviewed to verify that review of surveillance schedule is included.
- LER 81-02 (Closed) Potential for overpressurizing CRD pump suction lines. Relief valves installed. CRD suction piping was hydrostatically tested during 1980 refueling outage.

5. Independent Inspection Effort

The inspector reviewed the circumstances and ultimate resolution of the potential breakage of main lug bolts in MCC2B. The potential problem was first reported to the NRC on February 25, 1981 by the General Electric Company.

The problem involved factory installed bus bar connection bolting. Two sizes of bolts were used, half-inch and three-eighths inch diameters of which the half inch bolts displayed a potential for head fracture if over torqued. The three-eighths inch bolts were not in question.

Record review and inspection of MCC2B, recently installed, showed that the bolting used was three-eighths inch diameter and it is thus concluded that the potential problem does not exist for Big Rock Point.

A written report, dated February 27, 1981, was sent to Region III by the General Electric Company setting forth the details of the problem summarized above, and the conclusion that Big Rock Point is not involved in the problem.

The item is considered closed.

6. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with the individuals denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.