



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

FEB 17 1981



In Reply Refer To:

RII:JPO

50-518, 50-519

50-520, 50-521

50-553, 50-554


Tennessee Valley Authority
ATTN: H. G. Parris
Manager of Power
500A Chestnut Street Tower II
Chattanooga, TN 37401

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 80-17, Supplement 5 which is transmitted for information with regard to your nuclear power facility.

Should you have any questions regarding this bulletin supplement, please contact this office.

Sincerely,


James P. O'Reilly
Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Bulletin No. 80-17,
Supplement 5
2. List of Recently Issued
IE Bulletins

cc w/encl:

W. P. Kelleghan, Project Manager
J. E. Wills, Project Engineer
H. N. Culver, Chief, Nuclear Safety
Review Staff
R. T. Hathcote, Project Manager
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

DUPLICATE

February 13, 1981

IE BULLETIN NO. 80-17, SUPPLEMENT 5: FAILURE OF CONTROL RODS TO INSERT
DURING A SCRAM AT A BWR

Description of Circumstances:

On July 3, 1980, the NRC issued IE Bulletin No. 80-17, that required actions to be taken by licensees of all operating GE BWRs. Among the actions required, Item 6(a) required a prompt notification report by telephone to the appropriate Regional Office followed by a telecopy or other written submittal. These reports were required in the event that any of the systems (HPCI, RCIC, SLCS, RPT, RHR/pool cooling, and main steam bypass) were found to be less than fully operable.

These reports have served the purpose of notifying NRC of cases of potential reduction in operability of systems important to the mitigation of consequences of an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) event. These reports are no longer necessary since improvements have been accomplished to increase the reliability of control rod scram.

Actions No Longer Necessary by Licensees:

Further reporting is not required in response to Item 6(a) of IE Bulletin No. 80-17. This does not change the reporting requirements set forth in your license technical specifications.

No written response to IE Bulletin 80-17, Supplement 5, is required. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Attachment:

Recently issued IE Bulletins

RECENTLY ISSUED
IE BULLETINS

Bulletin No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued To
81-01	Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers	1/27/81	All power reactor facilities with an OL & to specified facilities with CP
80-25	Operating Problems with Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves at BWRs	12/19/80	All BWR facilities with an OL & specified near term OL BWR facilities & all BWRs with a CP
Supplement 4 to 80-17	Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR	12/18/80	To specified BWRs with an OL & All BWRs with a CP
80-24	Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment (October 17, 1980 Indian Point 2 Event)	11/21/80	All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP
80-23	Failures of Solenoid Valves Manufactured by Valcor Engineering Corporation	11/14/80	All power reactor facilities with OL or CP
80-22	Automation Industries, Model 200-520-008 Sealed-Source Connectors	9/11/80	All radiography licensees
80-21	Valve yokes supplied by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc.	11/6/80	All light water reactor facilities with OLs or CPs
Supplement 3 to 79-01B	Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment	10/24/80	All power reactor facilities with an OL
Supplement 2 to 79-01B	Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment	9/30/80	All power reactor facilities with an OL

OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit