

February 22, 1990

Docket No. 50-346

Mr. Donald C. Shelton
Vice President - Nuclear
Toledo Edison Company
Edison Plaza - Stop 712
300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, Ohio 43652

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Dear Mr. Shelton:

SUBJECT: CORRECTIONS TO AMENDMENT NOS. 145 AND 146 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

On January 25, 1990, the Commission issued Amendment No. 145 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, in response to your application dated September 10, 1987. The amendment changed Technical Specification (TS) 4.0.3 and Bases Section 4.0.3 in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 87-09.

In revising TS page 3/4 0-2, the existing Section 4.0.4 was inadvertently deleted entirely and Section 4.0.5 was renumbered 4.0.4. A corrected page 3/4 0-2 is enclosed.

Also, on January 31, 1990, Amendment No. 146 was issued in response to your application dated March 7, 1988. That amendment removed the requirement in TS 4.6.1.2.a that the third test of each set of three Type A tests be conducted during the same shutdown when the 10-year inservice inspection is being conducted, and also changed the Bases to reflect the change.

Page B 3/4 6-1, Basis 3/4.6.1.2, first paragraph, third line, contained an error in that a comma was inadvertently used instead of a period. A corrected page B 3/4 6-1 is also enclosed.

Please accept our apologies for any inconvenience these administrative errors may have caused you.

Sincerely,

/s/

Thomas V. Wambach, Sr. Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
TS pages 3/4 0-2 and
B 3/4 6-1

cc: See next page
DOCUMENT NAME: CORRECTION AMD 145/146
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Surname: PKreutzer
Date: 2/22/90

Handwritten initials: TW, JH, JF

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Thomas V. Wambach".

Thomas V. Wambach, Sr. Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
TS pages 3/4 0-2 and
B 3/4 6-1

cc: See next page

Mr. Donald C. Shelton
Toledo Edison Company

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
Unit No. 1

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3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3/4.0 APPLICABILITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.0.1 Limiting Conditions for Operation and ACTION requirements shall be applicable during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified for each specification.

3.0.2 Adherence to the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation and/or associated ACTION within the specified time interval shall constitute compliance with the specification. In the event the Limiting Condition for Operation is restored prior to expiration of the specified time interval, completion of the ACTION statement is not required.

3.0.3 When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, action shall be initiated within 1 hour to place the unit in a MODE in which the Specification does not apply to placing it, as applicable, in:

1. At least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours,
2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual Specifications.

3.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified applicability condition shall not be made unless the conditions of the Limiting Condition for Operation are met without reliance on provisions contained in the ACTION statements unless otherwise excepted. This provision shall not prevent passage through OPERATIONAL MODES as required to comply with ACTION statements.

3.0.5 When a system, subsystem, train, component or device is determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely because its normal power source is inoperable, it may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of its applicable Limiting Condition for Operation, provided: (1) its corresponding normal or emergency power source is OPERABLE; and (2) all of its redundant system(s), subsystem(s), train(s), component(s) and device(s) are OPERABLE, or likewise satisfy the requirements of this specification. Unless both conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, within 2 hours action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the applicable Limiting Condition for Operation does not apply by placing it as applicable in:

1. At least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours,
2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.

This Specification is not applicable in MODES 5 or 6.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during accident conditions.

3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the safety analyses at the peak accident pressure of 38 psig, P_a . As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to $\leq 0.75 L_a$, during performance of the periodic tests to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J with the following exemption. The third test of each Type A testing set need not be conducted when the plant is shutdown for the 10-year plant inservice inspections. The operational readiness of the vessel is considered proven by the ILRT, and in accordance with license requirements, when completed per the 40 ± 10 months frequency.

The special test for the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves is intended to detect gross degradation of seals on the valve seats. The special test is performed in addition to the Appendix J requirements.

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provide assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE

The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that 1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the annulus atmosphere of 0.5 psi and 2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 40 psig during LOCA conditions.

The maximum peak pressure obtained from a LOCA event is 37 psig. The limit of 1 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 38 psig which is less than the design pressure and is consistent with the safety analyses.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the accident analysis for a LOCA.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment steel vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the vessel will withstand the maximum pressure of 38 psig in the event of a LOCA. A visual inspection in conjunction with Type A leakage tests is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

The limitation on use of the Containment Purge and Exhaust System limits the time this system may be in operation with the reactor coolant system temperature above 200°F. This restriction minimizes the time that a direct open path would exist from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere and consequently reduces the probability that an accident dose would exceed 10 CFR 100 guideline values in the event of a LOCA occurring coincident with purge system operation. The use of this system is therefore restricted to non-routine usage not to exceed 90 hours in any consecutive 365 day period which is equivalent to approximately 1% of the total possible yearly unit operating time.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment