

WOLF CREEK

NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

Bart D. Withers
President and
Chief Executive Officer

February 7, 1990

WM 90-0021

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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
Reference: Letter dated January 3, 1990 from S. J. Collins, NRC,
to B. D. Withers, WCNOG
Subject: Docket No. 50-482: Response to NRC Inspection Report
482/8930

Gentlemen:

Attached is Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation's (WCNOG) response to exercise weaknesses 482/8930-01 and 8930-02 and open item 482/89-03. Exercise weakness 482/8930-01 involved the failure of the emergency operations facility staff to be aware of significant reactor conditions. Exercise weakness 482/8930-02 involved inadequacies associated with the exercise scenario. Open item 482/8930-03 involved the reliability of telephone communications during an emergency.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr. H. K. Chernoff of my staff.

Very truly yours,



Bart D. Withers
President and
Chief Executive Officer

BDW/aem

Attachment:

cc: E. J. Holler (NRC), w/a
R. D. Martin (NRC), w/a
D. V. Pickett (NRC), w/a
M. E. Skow (NRC), w/a

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Exercise Weakness (482/8930-01): The failure of the EOF staff to be aware of significant reactor conditions

Response:

The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff was unaware of significant reactor conditions due to incomplete plant information from the Control Room Simulator. Procedures EPP 01-1.1 "WCGS Organization" and EPP 01-1.2 "Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Organization" requires the Operations Status Board Recorders (OSRs) in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and EOF to update the Operations Status Boards from the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS). If the ERFIS is not functioning, the preferred method of transmitting plant information is by the Operations Assessment Coordinator (OAC) via telephone to the OSRs. For this exercise, the scenario directed that the ERFIS be out of service. EPP 01-11.2 "Status Boards" requires the OAC provide updated plant information to the OSRs at intervals of no more than 15 minutes. The plant information is then posted on the Operations Status Boards in the TSC and EOF. During the exercise, various critical plant parameters were not relayed to the OSRs by the OAC. This failure to provide these parameters resulted in the EOF staff not recognizing that the core became uncovered and the hydrogen levels were increasing.

WCNOC will review the communications flow process between facilities and the locations of the Operations Status Boards to identify needed improvements. As part of Emergency Plan Training, WCNOC will emphasize to OAC and OSR personnel the process for updating and maintaining the Operations Status Boards. Additionally, the Engineering Team will be given training on analyzing and trending of critical plant parameters.

These corrective measures will be implemented before the 1990 Emergency Preparedness exercise.

Exercise Weakness (482/8930-02): Inadequacies associated with the exercise scenario

Response:

WCNOC has reviewed the examples of scenario inadequacies identified in the Reference. This review determined that the lack of specific details and insufficient control of the scenario by the controllers led to these inadequacies.

WCNOC will assign additional Maintenance and Operations personnel to the Scenario Development Committee. This will allow greater input for review and development of scenario details. A detailed timeline will be developed for use by the simulator staff to allow them to quickly exert more control over the Control Room Simulator crew. In addition, more simulator time will be scheduled during the scenario development stage to better estimate player actions during the exercise. The controller briefings will be more detailed to ensure controllers are aware of their responsibilities. Management personnel have been assigned to the Scenario Development Committee to provide support to the activities needed to build a good scenario.

These corrective measures will be implemented before the 1990 Emergency Preparedness exercise.

Open Item (482/8930-03): Reliability of telephone communications during an emergency

Response:

Evaluation of Observations by the NRC and WCNOC

During the exercise several telephones were observed to ring simultaneously at intermittent times starting at approximately 1005 hours and lasting for two or three minutes. The affected telephones were eight of the direct outside lines, the ringdown lines to Wichita (to the WDEC), and to Topeka (to the PIO and telecopier), for a total of eleven lines.

The ENS, HPN, verification phone, and the twenty-nine telephone numbers through the Wolf Creek System continued working. All necessary communications by telephone could still be maintained to all facilities and locations. Backup radio communications to the State of Kansas and Coffey County remained available.

The problem lasted a very short amount of time and therefore there was no adverse impact on the exercise. If the problem would have continued the impact would have been minimal since other telephones were available.

Another telephone problem identified during the exercise occurred at the State Forward Staging Area. One of the two installed lines was not working properly. The Kansas Highway Patrol and National Guard were able to share the remaining telephone line and each had radio communications.

Description of Similar Problems

The only similar problem occurred during a drill on October 26, 1984. During this drill all telephones through the Wolf Creek System were inoperable for two to three hours. The few direct outside lines present at that time were not affected. Radio communications were operable and utilized by the State.

This problem occurred when a telephone company work crew cut through the cable for the Wolf Creek System. The cable was repaired in approximately two hours.

Description of the Cause

United Telephone System (UTS) was contacted concerning the telephone problem during the drill. UTS had installed a new buried cable from the south side of New Strawn, along Highway 75 to north of the Sharpe Road intersection. On the morning of December 6, 1989 two UTS technicians were assigned to splice the new cable to the existing cable that supplies the EOF telephone service. The temporary loss of telephone service and ringing was caused by the UTS technicians splicing the new cable to the existing cable.

The cause of the State Forward Staging Area problem was a faulty telephone jack.

Description of Additional Testing or Remedial Action

The telephone cable that supplies the EOF emergency plan circuits is located in the Burlington central office where six of the emergency plan telephone numbers are assigned to one line finder group which is made up of one hundred telephone numbers. WCNOG had six emergency plan telephone numbers in the group along with ninety-four private telephone numbers. A maximum of twelve telephone calls can be made from this one line finder group at any given time, and the remaining attempted calls from the eighty-eight telephone numbers would not be processed until one of the twelve line finders is disconnected. UTS has relocated our emergency plan telephone numbers and placed them in different line finder groups. This will reduce the chance of overloading any line finder group.

In addition WCNOG will investigate the possibility of placing each emergency plan telephone circuit on its own dedicated telephone cable pair to further reduce the possibility of losing all emergency plan telephones at the same time.

UTS is scheduled to install a new digital telephone system for Burlington in 1991. This should increase the number of line finder groups available and will decrease the time it currently takes to put a call through. These items will enhance our telephone communications system.

At the State Forward Staging Area a new telephone jack has been installed and tested. Both telephone lines will be tested on a quarterly basis for outgoing and incoming calls.