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LEON B. RUSSELL
MANAGER
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DEPARTMENT

January 19, 1990

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Unit No. 1; Docket No. 50-317
Fire Suppression Water System Special Report
Technical Specification 3.7.11.1.c

REFERENCES: (a) Letter from Mr. L. B. Russell (BG&E) to Document Control Desk (NRC), dated January 11, 1990

Gentlemen:

Per the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.1, we hereby submit the following Special Report concerning the potential inoperability of the Unit 1 fire suppression water system. In accordance with our Technical Specifications, this event was reported to you by telephone and telecopy on January 10 and 11, 1990, respectively.

Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

LBRussell

LBR/CDS/bjd

Attachment

cc: D. A. Brune, Esquire
J. E. Silberg, Esquire
R. A. Capra, NRC
D. G. McDonald, Jr., NRC
W. T. Russell, NRC
J. E. Beall, NRC
T. Magette, DNR

Cert No P013618747
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ATTACHMENT (1)

FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM
SPECIAL REPORT

On January 10, 1990 at 1005, while Unit 1 was in MODE 5 (cold shutdown), it was discovered that the Containment Isolation Valve (1-MOV-6200) for the Containment Hose Station Riser would not open upon remote initiation from the Control Room. The isolation valve is addressed by Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.11.1, "Fire Suppression Water System." The associated Action Statement, 3.7.11.1.b, was entered as was the Action Statement for Technical Specification 3.7.11.4.a, "Fire Hose Stations."

Establishment of a back-up water supply was provided within one hour by manually opening 1-MOV-6200 which pressurized the Unit 1 Containment Hose Station Riser. Therefore, all Unit 1 Containment Fire Hose Stations are currently operable. This action satisfied Action Statement 3.7.11.1.b.1 and allowed Action Statement 3.7.11.4.a to be exited.

At 1700 on January 10, 1990, a telephone notification was made by the Shift Supervisor to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Duty Officer. This telephone notification satisfied Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.1.b.2.a. A letter providing written confirmation of the telephone report no later than the first working day following the event and satisfying Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.1.b.2.b was sent by facsimile transmission to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on January 11, 1990.

This Special Report satisfies Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.1.b.2.c. This Action Statement requires a Special Report be submitted within 14 days following the event, outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.

EFFECT ON UNIT OPERATION

1-MOV-6200 is the Containment Isolation Valve for the hose standpipe riser in the Unit 1 Containment. This valve, located in the Unit 1 east piping penetration room, is normally kept closed and the containment hose standpipe kept dry. The valve can be opened remotely by handswitches in the Control Room, East Electrical Penetration Room, and at each hose station within containment. On January 10, 1990 an attempt was made to open the valve remotely from the Control Room. This attempt failed and the valve was opened manually to pressurize the hose standpipe riser in Containment. At this point the hose stations in the Containment were returned to operability. Therefore, there was no actual effect on Unit Operation. The valve was originally to be opened in order to pressurize the containment hose standpipe riser while work was performed on the containment electrical penetration that contains cable for the remote handswitches to open MOV-6200 located at the hose stations. This was being done as a precautionary measure.

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FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM
SPECIAL REPORT

TASKS TO ASSURE FUTURE COMPLIANCE

In addition to manually opening MOV-6200 to establish the operability of the containment hose stations, and following the Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.1.b.2(a-c), 1-MOV-6200 was repaired by January 12, 1990. The failure of the valve to open upon a remote actuation signal was attributed to dirty contacts within the motor operator. The similar valve for Unit 2, 2-MOV-6200, will be checked for dirty contacts as well. Both the 1-MOV-6200 and 2-MOV-6200 will be subjected to the surveillance required by Technical Specification 4.7.11.1.1.f.1 prior to restart of the respective units. No additional corrective actions are deemed necessary at this time.