

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-341/89031(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-341

License No. NPF-43

Licensee: Detroit Edison Company
2200 Second Avenue
Detroit, MI 48226

Facility Name: Fermi 2 Atomic Power Plant

Inspection at: Plant Site and NRC Region III Office

Inspection Conducted: November 13-22, 1989, and December 5-7, 1989, onsite
November 27-29, 1989, and December 8 and 15, 1989, in NRC
Region III Office

Inspector:

James Creed
G. L. Pirtle
Physical Security Inspector

1/12/90
Date

Approved By:

James Creed
J. R. Creed, Chief
Safeguards Section

1/12/90
Date

Inspection Summary: Routine, unannounced physical security and allegation review between November 13 and December 15, 1989, (Report No. 50-341/89031(DRSS))
Areas Inspected: Included Management Support; Protected and Vital Area Barriers; Access Control-Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and Communications; Power Supply; Testing, Maintenance, and Compensatory Measures; Training and Qualification; Management Effectiveness for Security Operations; Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings; Follow-up on Temporary Instruction 2515/102 "Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedures Verification;" (Sims Item MPA L9-07) Allegation Review; and Licensee's Plans for Coping with Strikes.
Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas inspected except for inadequate closed circuit television coverage of some portions of the isolation zone during the hours of darkness.

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SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
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Four of five previous inspection findings were reviewed and closed. The remaining previous inspection finding pertained to a decline in maintenance support for security equipment and remains open. Security force training files and security screening case files require closer review to identify minor administrative errors of the nature noted during this inspection. Contingency planning for the land vehicle bomb threat was reviewed and the required planning had been completed. The licensee's plans for coping with a security force strike were reviewed and considered adequate.

The licensee's actions were considered appropriate and adequate in reference to the allegation addressed in the Attachment to the Report Details. General management of the security organization and use of available resources were effective. (Details- SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION)

ATTACHMENT-ALLEGATION REVIEW

(Closed) Allegation RIII-89-A-0128

This allegation, which consists of three parts, was received by NRC Region III on October 11, 1989. Listed below are the allegations, NRC review actions, and conclusions based upon the inspector's review of the issues.

a. Allegation:

About September 1, 1989, a contract security officer (Burns International Security Services, Inc. - BISSI) was posted to watch closed circuit television (CCTV) monitors used to observe portions of a vital area barrier. The security watchperson allegedly left her post and walked about 20 feet away from the monitor to get a new battery for her radio. The CCTV monitors were not observed while she was away from them and getting the battery.

NRC Review Actions:

Inspector interviews with the General Supervisor, Security Operations, and review of a licensee document in response to their Ombudsman Concern Report No. 89-12, showed that the incident described above occurred on October 28, 1989. The contract security officer was away from the CCTV monitors for approximately 10-15 seconds. Her stated reason for leaving her post was to obtain a battery for her radio so she could advise security management that she was approaching her maximum allowed time on that specific post. Her radio did not work properly when she tried it earlier. The contract security officer advised a licensee security officer that she had left her post to get a battery. Disciplinary action was initiated against the security officer, and interview results confirmed that the incident was included in the Security Event Log which is reviewed by the NRC on a quarterly basis.

Conclusion:

The incident happened generally as described in the allegation, and the security officer's actions violated the licensee's security procedures. This incident meets the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V.G.1 as a licensee identified item. Therefore, a separate Notice of Violation will not be issued (NCV 341/89031-04).

b. Allegation:

Approximately mid-September 1989, a contract security officer allegedly issued the wrong security key-card to an individual who was entering the protected area. When the individual tried to advise the security officer of the error, the security officer allegedly argued that the individual should accept the wrong security key-card.

NRC Review Actions:

Inspector interview by telephone with the individual involved and review of a licensee's Nuclear Security Incident Report, dated November 15, 1989, showed that the individual was not issued the wrong security key-card. The individual stated that the security officer initially issued the wrong security key-card to him. When he noticed the incorrect key-card, he advised the officer of that fact. The individual further stated that the security officer either did not hear or misunderstood his comments so he (the individual) repeated in a louder voice that the officer mistakenly issued the wrong key-card. The individual further stated that the security officer did not try to reissue the wrong key-card to him and no argument occurred between him and the security officer.

Conclusion:

A contract security officer did initially issue an incorrect key-card to an individual. The error was noticed by the individual, the security officer was advised of the error, and the correct key-card was then issued. The allegation was not substantiated and no NRC requirements were violated.

c. Allegation:

On October 10, 1989, a manager on the licensee's staff allegedly advised the on-duty security shift supervisor (SSS) that he observed a contract security officer in a "non-productive mode" (sleeping or with eyes shut).

NRC Review Actions:

The inspector interviewed the SSS and reviewed a document prepared by the SSS in reference to the October 10, 1989, incident. The SSS was advised by a licensee manager that he observed a contract security officer asleep as he was exiting the Primary Access Portal (PAP). When asked if he observed the officer asleep, "the manager stated that she had her head down (looking down)". When questioned by the SSS, the contract security officer denied being asleep or dozing off. She stated that she was looking down because she was writing her post rotation schedule in her notebook and she showed her notebook to the SSS. The SSS questioned another contractor security officer and a licensee security officer in the immediate area to determine if either of them observed the first security officer asleep or inattentive. Neither officer observed the first security officer asleep or inattentive. The SSS then assigned the contract security officer to a post outside of the protected area. The General Supervisor, Security Operations, was advised of the incident on October 11, 1989.

Conclusion:

The allegation was not substantiated. A contract security officer's alertness was questioned by a licensee manager on October 10, 1989. The security supervisor's inquiries to resolve the issue were appropriate and timely. The alleged inattentiveness was not confirmed.

In the three issues described above, a concern was expressed that the contract security officers received less severe disciplinary action than licensee security officers would have received for similar incidents. In this case, different disciplinary actions may occur since the licensee security officers are represented by a union and the contractor security officers are a separate entity not included in existing collective bargaining agreements.