


November 22, 1989

- 10 CFR 2 700 THEORMATION WITHHOLD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

Mr. A. Bert Davis Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137



Subject: Byron Station Units 1 & 2

Response to Allegation Concerning

Weapons Cleanliness

Allegation No. RIII-A-0019

NRC Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455

Reference: (a) Charles E. Norelius letter to

Cordell Reed dated October 23, 1989

Dear Mr. Davis:

Reference (a) informed Commonwealth Edison of an allegation concerning the possible uncleanliness of a weapon at Byron and the weapons capability of being safely fired, if necessary. An investigation was performed and the results are contained in the following attachment.

The attachment to this letter contains information which is exempt from public disclosure according to 10 CFR 2.790(a)(7).

If there are any further questions regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Very truly yours.

T/J. Kovach

Nuclear Licensing Manager

RAC/sc1:0363T:2

Attachment

"LOCFR 2.790 INFORMATION MENTING THUT APPLY WHEN THIS LETTER IS SEPARATE FROM THE ENCLOSURE"

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ATTACHMENT

Allegation RIII-A-0119

In September 1989, we received an allegation pertaining to the cleanliness and safety of a weapon issued to a security officer (SO) on September 9, 1989. At approximately 2:00 p.m. on that date, a SO was issued a weapon and after checking the weapon's barrel, considered the weapon too dirty to accept and advised a contract security supervisor of his decision and requested that another weapon be assigned to him. The supervisor allegedly advised the SO to either accept the weapon issued to him or go home. The SO then requested that a more senior member of the security force supervision be advised of his concern. The more senior supervisor allegedly told the SO the same options the first supervisor had identified (i.e., take the weapon issued or go home). The SO accepted the weapon and then filed a Security Incident Report pertaining to the issue.

Your review of this allegation should include as a minimum of the following matters.

Your evaluation of the above information should be sufficient to confirm if the cleanliness of the weapon constituted a potential safety concern if the weapon would have had to have been fired.

Response to Allegation RIII-A-0119

Introduction

An investigation was initiated by Corporate Security concerning the allegation. It was determined that the event occurred as described however, the impact was minimal and the event did not constitute a degradation of security nor did the event pose a safety concern.

Investigation

On November 6, 1989, the security officer who was issued the weapon he considered too dirty to accept, was interviewed and stated the trigger housing had built up grease and the barrel contained pieces of lint and apparently loose carbon deposits.

He stated "he felt he could have fired the weapon with confidence if the need should arise". Safety was not the issue with him and he did not believe it was significant enough to raise the issue to higher authorities. His primary objective was to keep the weapons cleaner than they currently are. He opined that the grease on the trigger housing was not equipment grease or a lubricant, but was body oil residue from the hands of numerous guards handling the weapon, or gun oil used during "wipedowns".

An evaluation of the alleged "carbon deposits" in the barrel could not be made because inspection of the weapon did not show any foreign materials as stated in the allegation.

The lint in the barrel could have occurred from two possibilities. The first could have been the result of the swabs used to clean the weapons. The final part of the cleaning process is to use a clean cloth patch to remove any cleaning solvent residue from the barrel. This process could have resulted in "lint" remaining in the barrel. The second possibility exists because the weapons are issued three times per day, which require them to be inserted and removed from the holsters six times; therefore, lint could be present from clothing and/or from within the holster.

None of the above situations posed a safety concern to the guard who was issued the weapon.

In past discussions with Smith and Wesson and coupled with our previous experience, revolvers are not as susceptible to malfunctions due to dirt in the barrel as are semi-automatic weapons. The Smith and Wesson .38 revolver, which is used at all Edison sites, is not subjected to severe conditions or adverse environments. These weapons are used on all three shifts and are not stored for the length of time that would allow dust to accumulate.

The supervisors' response to the security officer who asked for a new weapon was inappropriate. The Guard Force Site Manager has counseled both supervisors about their lack of interpersonal skills and the failure to be receptive to an employe identifying a potential problem. Additional training will be provided to all supervisors.

A review of available documentation indicated this weapon was last cleaned in April 1989. However, undocumented "wipedowns" have occurred since that time. To Edison's knowledge, no other security officers have voiced complaints or concerns about the cleanliness of the weapons at Byron.

Conclusion

A weapon was issued with some residue of body oil, or gun cleaning oil but not grease, on the trigger housing. Lint, if in the barrel, would not have made the weapon ineffective. No carbon material was present in the barrel during inspection. The condition of the weapon did not cause a safety concern if the weapon needed to be fired. Prior to receiving the written allegation, Edison had amended its quarterly cleaning schedule at Byron to a monthly schedule. All Edison sites were directed to ensure they are participating in a monthly cleaning schedule.

The weapons at Byron are not "dirty" and will perform as expected without creating a safety concern.

10 CFR 2.790 INFORMATION
WITHHOLD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSULE