DEFINITIONS

REPORTABLE EVENT

1.7 A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section 50.73 of 10 CFR Part 50.

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

1.8 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1. Capable of being closed by the Safety Features Actuation System, or

2. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except ~~as provided in Table 3.6-2 of Specification 3.6.3.1.~~ those approved to be open under administrative controls.

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed,

c. Each airlock is OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.6.1.3,

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and

e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows or O-rings) is OPERABLE.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION

1.9 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

CHANNEL CHECK

1.10 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that:

1. All penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except ~~as provided in Table 3.6-2 of Specification 3.6.3.1, and~~ those valves that may be opened under administrative controls per Specification 3.6.3.1, and
2. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

b. By verifying that each containment air lock is OPERABLE per Specification 3.6.1.3.

*Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that verification of these penetrations being closed need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

ADDITIONAL CHANGES PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY LETTER
Serial No. 1415 Date 8/31/87

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3.1 ~~The~~ All containment isolation valves ~~specified in Table 3.6-2~~ shall be OPERABLE with isolation times ~~as shown in Table 3.6-2.~~ less than or equal to required isolation times.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve(s) ~~specified in Table 3.6-2~~ inoperable, either:

a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or

** b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

** c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1.1 The isolation valves ~~specified in Table 3.6-2~~ that could affect the valve's performance shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

* Surveillance testing of valves MS100, MS101, ICS11A and ICS11B is not required prior to entering MODE 4 but shall be performed prior to entering MODE 3.

** The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. Selected valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.6.3.1.2 Each isolation valve ~~specified in Table 3.6-2~~ shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that on a containment isolation test signal, each automatic isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

b. Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation test signal, each Purge and Exhaust automatic valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.1.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

TABLE 3.6-2
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
DELETED

TABLE 3.6-2

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NUMBER		VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (seconds)
A. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION				
1		RC240A	Pressurizer Sample Line	30
1		RC240B	Pressurizer Sample Line	30
2	#	SS607	Steam Generator Secondary Water Sample Line	10
3		CC1411A	Component Cooling Water Inlet Line	15
3		CC1411B	Component Cooling Water Inlet Line	15
4		CC1407A	Component Cooling Water Outlet Line	15
4		CC1407B	Component Cooling Water Outlet Line	15
8A		CV5070	Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker	15
8B		CV5071	Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker	15
8C		CV5072	Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker	15
8D		CV5073	Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker	15
8E		CV5074	Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker	15
8F		CV5075	Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker	15
8G		CV5076	Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker	15
8H		CV5077	Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker	15
8I		CV5078	Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker	15
8J		CV5079	Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker	15
12		CC1567A	Control Rod Drive Cooling Supply Line	15
12		CC1567B	Control Rod Drive Cooling Supply Line	15
13		DR2012A	Containment Vessel Normal Sump Drain	15
13		DR2012B	Containment Vessel Normal Sump Drain	15
14		MU3	RCS Letdown Line	10
14		MU2A	RCS Letdown Line	15

TABLE 3.6-2

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ~~(Continued)~~

DELETED

PENETRATION NUMBER	VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (seconds)
16	RC1719A	Containment Vessel Vent Header	10
16	RC1719B	Containment Vessel Vent Header	10
18 #	SS598	Steam Generator Secondary Water Sample Line	10
21	DW6831A	Demineralized Water Supply Line	10
21	DW6831B	Demineralized Water Supply Line	10
30 #	DH9A	Containment Sump Emergency Recirc Line	71
31 #	DH9B	Containment Sump Emergency Recirc Line	71
32	RC1773A	RCS Drain to RC Drain Tank	10
32	RC1773B	RCS Drain to RC Drain Tank	10

TABLE 3.6-2

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ~~(Continued)~~

DELETED

PENETRATION NUMBER	VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (seconds)
41	RC232	Pressurizer Quench Tank Circulating Inlet Line	10
42A	SA2010	Service Air Supply Line	10
42B	CV5010E	Containment Vessel Air Sample Return	15
43A	IA2011	Instrument Air Supply Line	10
43B	CV5011E	Containment Vessel Air Sample Return	15
44A	CF1541	Core Flood Tank Fill and N2 Supply Line	10
44B	NN236	Pressurizer Quench Tank N2 Supply Line	10
47A	CF1545	Core Flood Tank Sample Line	10
47B	CF1542	Core Flood Tank Vent Line	10
48	RC229A	Pressurizer Quench Tank Circulating Outlet Line	10
48	RC229B	Pressurizer Quench Tank Circulating Outlet Line	10
51	CV5037	Hydrogen Purge System Exhaust Line	60
51	CV5038	Hydrogen Purge System Exhaust Line	60
52	MU66A	Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Supply	12
53	MU66B	Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Supply	12
54	MU66C	Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Supply	12
55	MU66D	Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Supply	12
56	MU38	Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Return	12
56	MU59A	Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Return	30
56	MU59B	Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Return	30
56	MU59C	Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Return	30
56	MU59D	Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Return	30

ADDITIONAL CHANGES PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY LETTER
Serial No. 1415 Date 8/31/87

TABLE 3.6-2

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ~~(Continued)~~

DELETED

PENETRATION NUMBER	VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (seconds)
67	CV5090	Hydrogen Dilution System Supply	60
68A	SS235A	Pressurizer Quench Tank Sample	30
68A	SS235B	Pressurizer Quench Tank Sample	30
68B	CV5010B	Containment Air Sample	15
68B	CV5011B	Containment Air Sample	15
69	CV5065	Hydrogen Dilution System Supply	60
71B	CV5010A	Containment Air Sample	15
71B	CV5011A	Containment Air Sample	15
71C	CF1544	Core Flood Tank N2 Fill	10
73B	CV5010C	Containment Air Sample	15
73B	CV5011C	Containment Air Sample	15
74B	CV5010D	Containment Air Sample	15
74B	CV5011D	Containment Air Sample	15
B. CONTAINMENT PURGE AND EXHAUST ISOLATION			
33 ##	CV5005	Containment Vessel Purge Inlet Line	10
33 ##	CV5006	Containment Vessel Purge Inlet Line	10
34 ##	CV5007	Containment Vessel Purge Outlet Line	10
34 ##	CV5008	Containment Vessel Purge Outlet Line	10
C. OTHER			
5 #	SW1366	Containment Air Cooling Units SW Inlet Line	N/A
6 #	SW1368	Containment Air Cooling Units SW Inlet Line	N/A
7 #	SW1367	Containment Air Cooling Units SW Inlet Line	N/A
9 #	SW1356	Containment Air Cooling Units SW Outlet Line	N/A

TABLE 3.6-2

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ~~(Continued)~~

DELETED

PENETRATION NUMBER	VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (seconds)
10 #	SW1358	Containment Air Cooling Units SW Outlet Line	N/A
11 #	SW1357	Containment Air Cooling Units SW Outlet Line	N/A
17	CV343	Containment Vessel Leak Test Inlet Line	N/A
17	Flange	Containment Vessel Leak Test Inlet Line (Inside Containment)	N/A
19	MU6422	Normal RCS Makeup Line	N/A
19 #	HP57	High Pressure Injection Line	N/A
19 #	HP2A	High Pressure Injection Line	N/A
20 #	HP56	High Pressure Injection Line	N/A
20 #	HP2B	High Pressure Injection Line	N/A
22 #	HP49	High Pressure Injection Line	N/A
22 #	HP2D	High Pressure Injection Line	N/A
23 #	SF1	Fuel Transfer Tube	N/A
23	Flange	Fuel Transfer Tube	N/A
24 #	SF2	Fuel Transfer Tube	N/A
24	Flange	Fuel Transfer Tube	N/A
*25	CS33	Containment Spray Line	N/A
*25	CS17	Containment Spray Line	N/A
25	SA536	Containment Spray Line	N/A
25	SA532	Containment Spray Line	N/A
25	CS1531	Containment Spray Line	N/A
26	CS1530	Containment Spray Line	N/A
*26	CS36	Containment Spray Line	N/A
*26	CS18	Containment Spray Line	N/A
26	SA535	Containment Spray Line	N/A
26	SA533	Containment Spray Line	N/A
27 #	DH1A	Low Pressure Injection Line	N/A
27 #	DH76	Low Pressure Injection Line	N/A
28 #	DH1B	Low Pressure Injection Line	N/A
28 #	DH77	Low Pressure Injection Line	N/A

TABLE 3.6-2

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ~~(Continued)~~

DELETED

PENETRATION NUMBER	VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (seconds)
*29 @	DH11	Decay Heat Pump Suction Line	N/A
*29	DH23	Decay Heat Pump Suction Line	N/A
29 @	PSV4849	Decay Heat Pump Suction Line	N/A
35 @	AF599	Auxiliary Feedwater Line	N/A
36 @	AF608	Auxiliary Feedwater Line	N/A
37 @	FW601	Main Feedwater Line	N/A
38 @	FW612	Main Feedwater Line	N/A
**39 @	MS100	Main Steam Line	N/A
**39 @	ICS11A	Main Steam Line	N/A
39 @	MS375	Main Steam Line	N/A
39 @	MS100-1	Main Steam Line	N/A
*39 @	MS107	Main Steam Line	N/A
*39 @	MS107A	Main Steam Line	N/A
*40 @	MS106	Main Steam Line	N/A
*40 @	MS106A	Main Steam Line	N/A
**40 @	MS101	Main Steam Line	N/A
**40 @	ICS11B	Main Steam Line	N/A
40 @	MS394	Main Steam Line	N/A
40 @	MS101-1	Main Steam Line	N/A
41	RC113	Pressurizer Quench Tank Inlet Line	N/A
42A	SA502	Service Air Supply Line	N/A
42B	CV124	Containment Vessel Air Sample Return	N/A
43A	IA501	Service Air Supply Line	N/A
43B	CV125	Containment Vessel Air Sample Return	N/A
44A	CF15	Core Flood Tank Fill and Nitrogen Supply Line	N/A
44B	NN58	Pressurizer Quench Tank Inlet Line	N/A
*47A	CF2A	Core Flood Tank Sample Line	N/A
*47A	CF2B	Core Flood Tank Sample Line	N/A
*47B	CF5A	Core Flood Tank Vent Line	N/A
*47B	CF5B	Core Flood Tank Vent Line	N/A

ADDITIONAL CHANGES PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY LETTER
Serial No. 1667 Date 6/13/89

ADDITIONAL CHANGES PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY LETTER
Serial No. 1415 Date 8/31/87

TABLE 3.6-2
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ~~(Continued)~~ DELETED

PENETRATION NUMBER	VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (seconds)
49	DE87	Refueling Canal Fill Line	N/A
49	DE88	Refueling Canal Fill Line	N/A
50 @	EF4B	High Pressure Injection Line	N/A
50 @	EF2C	High Pressure Injection Line	N/A
50	MU6421	RCS Makeup Line	N/A
52	MU242	RCP Seal Water Supply	N/A
53	MU243	RCP Seal Water Supply	N/A
54	MU244	RCP Seal Water Supply	N/A
55	MU245	RCP Seal Water Supply	N/A
59	Flange	Secondary Side Cleaning (Inside Containment)	N/A
59	Flange	Secondary Side Cleaning (Outside Containment)	N/A
57 @	MS603	Steam Generator Blowdown Line	N/A
60 @	MS611	Steam Generator Blowdown Line	N/A
67	CV209	Hydrogen Dilution System Supply	N/A
69	CV210	Hydrogen Dilution System Supply	N/A
71A @	CV2000B	Containment Pressure Sensor	N/A
71C	CF16	Core Flood Tank Nitrogen Fill Line	N/A
72A @	CV2001B	Containment Pressure Sensor	N/A
72C @	CV624B	Containment Pressure Differential Transmitter	N/A
73A @	CV2002B	Containment Pressure Sensor	N/A
73C @	CV643B	Containment Pressure Differential Transmitter	N/A
74A @	CV2003B	Containment Pressure Sensor	N/A
*74C	DE2735	Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray	N/A
*74C	DE2736	Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray	N/A

*May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

@Not subject to Type C leakage tests.

**Surveillance testing not required prior to entering MODE 4 but shall be performed prior to entering MODE 3.

@@Provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided the valve is in the closed position and deactivated.

leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. The leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage assumed for the system during the recirculation phase will not be exceeded.

3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. Containment isolation valves and their required isolation times are addressed in the USAR. The opening of a closed inoperable containment isolation valve on an intermittent basis during plant operation is permitted under administrative control. Operating procedures identify those valves which may be opened under administrative control as well as the safety precautions which must be taken when opening valves under such controls.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

Description of Proposed Technical Specification Change

The purpose of this significant hazards consideration is to review proposed changes to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS), Unit Number 1 Operating License, Appendix A, Technical Specifications (TS) 3/4.6.3.1, Containment Isolation Valves, Table 3.6-2, Containment Isolation Valves, TS 3/4.6.1.1, Containment Integrity, TS Definition 1.8, Containment Integrity, and TS Bases 3/4.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves. This request proposes to remove TS Table 3.6-2 from the TS and relocate the list of containment isolation valves and associated information to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). This change would allow changes to be made to the table in accordance with 10CFR50.59 while maintaining the surveillance test requirements for containment isolation valves in the TS. In addition, several administrative changes have been made for clarification purposes. The Technical Description (Attachment 1) discusses these changes.

Significant Hazards Consideration

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has provided standards in 10CFR50.92(c) for determining whether a significant hazard exists. A proposed amendment to an Operating License for a facility involves no significant hazards if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed changes would not: 1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; 2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of an accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration because the operation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit Number 1, in accordance with these changes would:

1. Not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the relocation of the information in the Technical Specification Table to another controlled document is an administrative change which does not affect accident conditions and assumptions since no hardware changes are being made. [10CFR50.92(c)(1)]

2. Not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the accident conditions and assumptions are not affected and no new initiators are created since the changes are administrative only and no hardware changes are being made. On matters related to nuclear safety, no new malfunctions are involved. [10CFR50.92(c)(2)]

3. Not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the TS will continue to require operable containment isolation valves and appropriate surveillance requirements to ensure operability of containment isolation. [10CFR50.92(c)(3)]

Conclusion

Based on the discussion above, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.