



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038
Salem Generating Station

January 03, 1990

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION
LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
UNIT NO. 1
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 89-035-00

This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). This report is required within thirty (30) days of discovery.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "L. K. Miller".

L. K. Miller
General Manager -
Salem Operations

MJP:pc

Distribution

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The Energy People

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Salem Generating Station - Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

Tech. Spec. 3.0.4 Non-Compliance; Mode Change With A Cont. Isol. Valve Open; Personnel

EVENT DATE (6)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER (8)
1	2	0	9	8	9	0	3	5	0	0	0
1	2	0	9	8	9	0	3	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)																
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 1 0 1 0	20.402(b)	20.406(a)(1)(i)	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	20.406(a)(1)(v)	20.406(e)	60.73(a)(2)(iv)	60.73(a)(2)(v)	60.73(a)(2)(vi)	60.73(a)(2)(vii)	60.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	60.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	60.73(a)(2)(ix)	73.71(b)	73.71(e)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 305A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME: M. J. Pollack - LER Coordinator
TELEPHONE NUMBER: 6 0 9 3 3 9 - 4 0 2 2
AREA CODE: 6 0 9 3 3 9 - 4 0 2 2

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
☐ YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
MONTH: DAY: YEAR:

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 12/10/89 at 1850 hours, during routine Mode 3 (Hot Standby) startup operations, valve 1SA118, "Containment Compressed Air Supply Valve", was found untagged in the open position by operations personnel who were preparing to perform the ECCS subsystem surveillance procedure. Investigations revealed the valve had been open during recent operational mode changes contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 3.0.4. The Unit had Changed operational modes on 12/9/89 at 1816 hours, from Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) to Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) and on 12/10/89 at 0920 hours, from Mode 4 to Mode 3 without satisfying the specified conditions of Table 6.2.10 in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and the Limiting Condition for Operation as specified by Technical Specification 3.6.3.1. The 1SA118 valve is a containment isolation valve. As per UFSAR Table 6.2.10 the valve is kept closed during normal operation and accident conditions. Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. The root cause of this event has been attributed to personnel error. The 1SA118 valve had been opened on 12/4/89 to support various on-going work within Containment. The TRIS (Tagging Request Information System) was incorrectly updated, i.e., it was identified as closed. Subsequently when the "off-normal" report was reviewed prior to Mode change, the 1SA118 valve was identified as being closed. This event has been reviewed by Operations Department management. Those individuals involved in this event were held accountable. Procedure IOP-2, "Cold Shutdown To Hot Shutdown", has been revised to include a step to verify that valve 1SA118 is closed prior to changing modes.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx}

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.0.4 Non-Compliance; Mode Change With a Containment Isolation Valve Open Due to Personnel Error

Discovery Date: 12/10/89

Report Date: 1/03/90

This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 89-760.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 3 Reactor Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On December 10, 1989 at 1850 hours, during routine Mode 3 (Hot Standby) startup operations, valve 1SA118, "Containment Compressed Air Supply Valve", was found untagged in the open position. The valve was found in this position by operations personnel who were preparing to perform the ECCS subsystem surveillance procedure.

Investigations revealed that the valve had been open during recent operational mode changes contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 3.0.4 which states:

"Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition shall not be made unless the conditions of the Limiting Condition for Operation are met without reliance on provisions contained in the ACTION statements requirements. This provision shall not prevent passage through OPERATIONAL MODES as required to comply with ACTION requirements. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications."

The Unit had Changed operational modes on December 9, 1989 at 1816 hours, from Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) to Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) and on December 10, 1989 at 0920 hours, from Mode 4 to Mode 3 without satisfying the specified conditions of Table 6.2.10 in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the Limiting Condition for Operation as specified by Technical Specification 3.6.3.1. The 1SA118 valve is a containment isolation valve. It was open during the mode changes. As per UFSAR Table 6.2.10 the 1SA118 valve is kept closed during normal operation and accident conditions. It can be open during shutdown operations. Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. It states:

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

"The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-1."

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The root cause of this event has been attributed to personnel error.

The 1SA118 valve had been opened on December 4, 1989 to support various on-going work within Containment. The TRIS (Tagging Request Information System) was incorrectly updated. Instead of identifying the valve to be in its open position, it was identified as being closed. Subsequently when the "off-normal" report was reviewed prior to Mode change, the 1SA118 valve was identified as being closed.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:


Primary containment integrity ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. Similarly, the operability of the containment isolation valves ensures the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. These restrictions, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 100 during accident conditions.

During this event, the 1SA119 check valve, located in containment downstream of 1SA118, was operable and the integrity of safety related compressed air piping between the check valve and the 1SA118 valve was maintained, thereby providing containment integrity. Therefore, this event did not affect the health or safety of the public. However, since the Technical Specifications were not fully complied with, this event is reportable in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

This event has been reviewed by Operations Department management. Those individuals involved in this event were held accountable.

Procedure IOP-2, "Cold Shutdown To Hot Shutdown", has been revised to include a step to verify that valve 1SA118 is closed prior to changing modes.



General Manager -
Salem Operations