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COMMISSIONER

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MEMORANDUM TO FILES

FROM: *A* John H. Austin, Technical Assistant to
Commissioner Gilinsky

SUBJECT: TOUR OF THREE MILE ISLAND UNITS 1 AND 2

On July 1, 1981, Commissioner Gilinsky visited the Three Mile Island site principally to see the submerged demineralizer system (SDS) at Unit 2. During the course of that visit he also toured parts of Unit 1 whose restart is the subject of an adjudicatory proceeding. This memorandum has been prepared to inform the parties about the visit to Unit 1 and to provide a written summary of the discussions held during the tour that related to Unit 1. A copy of this memorandum will be placed in the case docket and served upon the Board and parties. Commissioner Gilinsky was accompanied by his technical assistant, John Austin, a summer legal intern in Commissioner Gilinsky's office, Glenn Hutchins, Lake Barrett of NRC's TMI Program Office and Robert Arnold of GPU. Mike Ross of GPU accompanied the group throughout most of the Unit 1 phase of the visit.

During the review of the SDS in the spent fuel pool area of Unit 2, Mr. Arnold pointed out that Unit 1 and 2 spent fuel pools were in the same bay and were not physically separated. Mr. Arnold said that the separation of the two units was an issue in the TMI-1 restart proceeding. He said GPU had considered constructing a wall from the edge of the spent fuel pool of Unit 2 to the ceiling to provide for physical separation, but since the wall would have to be seismically qualified and since GPU would not be able to move the overhead crane between the two spent fuel pools, GPU decided that approach was not practical. Instead, Mr. Arnold indicated, GPU would probably construct an enclosure at the base of the Unit 1 spent fuel pool, forming a corridor that would allow personnel access to adjoining areas of Unit 1 while providing a barrier between Unit 2 and those areas. The Company would then isolate the air system of the spent fuel area of Unit 1 from its auxiliary building to ensure that any release of radioactive substances during operation of the SDS did not affect Unit 1 operations.



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A number of sections of Unit 1 were visited. Mike Ross of GPU joined Mr. Arnold in conducting the tour. We viewed the auxiliary feedwater pumps. Mr. Arnold pointed out a new backup air supply for control/manipulation operations that was being installed. He said a second backup (bottled air) was to be installed later.

The group next visited the area housing the hydrogen recombiners. Mr. Arnold said the system would be operable during plant operation; this would be beyond the NRC requirements which allow about one month to make the system operable following an accident. We then toured the condenser section and the turbine building.

While in the turbine building, Mr. Arnold pointed out a simulator that had been constructed in one corner. He said it was being used to evaluate a new alarm system and to walk through procedures; the experiences were leading to some changes in the Unit 1 control panels.

In the Unit 1 control room, it was mentioned that the Emergency Safeguards Feature panel was being modified and that cathode ray tubes would be installed to display important parameters. The changes in the control room were reflecting the "Human Engineering" inputs. Emergency phone capability was summarized.

The shutdown panels in the auxiliary building were observed. GPU personnel said this area would also serve as the Technical Support Center. Mr. Ross said the panels would be modified to conform with Appendix R (of Part 50) requirements.

The group then passed through the corridor between the spent fuel pools; Mr. Arnold pointed out where the new enclosure would be constructed to provide separation of Units 1 and 2.

After a walk through of the radwaste control panel area, the group viewed one of the make-up pump cubicles. The general locations of other ECCS pumps were pointed out.

The waste gas compressor section was visited. Mr. Ross mentioned it was difficult to establish that the walls were seismically qualified or to make them qualified.

We then visited the video room for the manned entries to the TMI-2 containment. A video-tape of one of the scrubbing operations was shown.

cc: Commissioner Gilinsky