



Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430-7000

June 18, 1981

Mr. Boyce H. Grier  
Director of USNRC  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region 1  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75  
DOCKET NO. 50-311  
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-28/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-28/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

R. A. Uderitz  
General Manager -  
Nuclear Production

CC: Director, Office of Inspection  
and Enforcement (30 copies)  
Director, Office of Management  
Information and Program Control  
(3 copies)

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Report Number: 81-28/03L  
Report Date: June 18, 1981  
Occurrence Date: 6-3/4-81  
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2  
Public Service Electric & Gas Company  
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Onsite Power Distribution Systems

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 20% - Unit Load 110 MW

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On June 3, 1981, during an accident loading sequence subsequent to a safety injection actuation, the 4KV feeder breaker, 2B4D, tripped when the No.24 Fan Coil Unit was started. When breaker 2B4D tripped the 460/230 Volt 2B Vital Buses were de-energized. Action Statement 3.8.2.1a was entered at 0445 due to the loss of the 2B 460/230 Volt Vital Bus. Number 24 Fan Coil Unit was declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.6.2.3a was entered at 0645 hours since it was assumed at this time that an electrical fault in the motor caused the 2B4D breaker to trip.

This occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode IAW Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Design error. The development of the overcurrent relay settings for 2B4D and 2C4D did not consider simultaneous operation of both fan coil units on that bus in fast speed.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.8.2.1 requires with less than all A.C. Vital Buses operable or energized, restore the inoperable buses to operable and energized status within 8 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Immediately following the incident DCR-2EC-1243 was issued to provide the proper level of overcurrent protection for the starting of the second fan cooling unit from the same bus. These settings were adjusted on breakers 2B4D and 2C4D, feeder breakers for their respective 460/230 Volt Vital Buses. Both breakers tested satisfactorily.

DCR-1ED-0156 was issued for the same purpose on Unit No. 1 and this work was completed October 16, 1980.

At 0630 hours on June 3, 1981, Action Statements 3.8.2.1a was terminated. Action Statement 3.6.2.3a was terminated at 2125 hours on June 3, 1981.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By J. J. Espey

SORC Meeting No. 81-50

*H. J. [Signature]*  
Manager - Salem Generating Station