DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

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WILLIAM D. PARKER, JR. VICE PRESIDENT STEAM PRODUCTION

February 24, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704

21-611-622

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Ke: Oconse Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-269



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/81-3. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours, William O. Parker, Jr.

JLJ:pw Attachment

cc: Director Office of Management & Program Analysis U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Bill Lavallee Nuclear Safety Analysis Center P. O. Box 10412 Palo Alto, California 94303

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Report Number: RO-269/81-3 Report Date: February 24, 1981 Occurrence Date: January 25, 1981 Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: IDID Inverter D. C. Input Fuse Blown Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 85%

Description of Occurrence: At 1209 hours on January 25, 1981, the D. C. input fuse in the 1DID vital inverter blew, causing the inverter to lose its power source. This inverter supplies power for the loads on the A. C. Vital Instrumentation Power Panelboard 1KVID. These loads were manually transferred to the A. C. regulated bus approximately three to four minutes after the 1DID Inverter tripped, and the RPS Channel D loads were reset by 1217 hours. While investigating the problem on the 1DID inverter, personnel received a call from the Control Room informing them that they had lost the 1DIB inverter and the associated A. C. Vital Instrumentation Power Panelboard 1KVIB. At approximately 1450 hours, the A. C. output breaker ca the 1DIB inverter was discovered open. The inverter was put back on line and RPS Channel B was reset at 1503 hours. E.S. Even Digital Channels and E.S. Analog Channel B were reset at 1517 hours. It is not known how the A. C. output breaker on the 1DIB inverter was opened.

At 1526 hours, the 1DID inverter's A. C. output breaker was mistakenly turned off. This de-energized the panelboard 1KVID. The 1DID inverter was immediately returned to service, and RPS Channel D was reset at 1530 hours.

This incident constitutes operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.7.2.d(3) and is thus reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The first trip of the 1DID inverter was caused by _ Jlown D. C. input fuse and a blown logic fuse. The blown fuses were possibly caused by poorly made connections in the logic cards' "edge connectors" and/or intermittent component problems on the logic cards. The resulting high D. C. input current to the inverter also tripped the inverter D. C. input breaker and feeder breaker.

The trip of the IDIB inverter occurred when the A. C. output breaker was apparently opened while personnel were working on the IDID inverter. The breaker was not in the "trip" position so it must have been opened manually. It is possible that the breaker was leaned up against and inadvertently opened since IDIB is very close to IDID. None of the personnel remembers accidently leaning against IDIB, and, in fact, were not aware that IDIB had tripped until notified by the Control Room. Thus it is not known how the A. C. output breaker on the IDIB inverter was opened. After the first trip of the 1DID inverter, a non-Q.A. D. C. input fuse was used to bring 1DID back up. This is common practice since there has been trouble with this particular fuse before. When it was decided to put 1DID back on line, a Q.A. fuse had to be installed. When personnel de-energized 1DID, the A. C. output breaker was mistakenly opened. These breakers are proper' marked.

Analysis of Occurrence: Although both the LKVIB and the LKVID power panelboards were de-energized, they were not de-energized simultaneously. Thus, the requirements of Technical Specification 3.5.1 were met. Therefore this incident was of no significance with respect to safe operation and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action: For the first trip of the 1DID inverter, the loads for the panelboard 1KVID were manually transferred to the A. C. regulated bus, and RPS Channel D was reset. The blown fuses were replaced. The logic cards and their edge connectors on the 1DID inverter will be thoroughly inspected. The logic cards and edge connectors are inspected.

For the trip of the 1DIB inverter, the inverter was put back on line, and RPS Channel B was reset. The E.S. Even Digital Channels and E.S. Analog Channel B were reset. The 1DIB inverter is currently operating satisfactorily.

For the second trip of the 1DID inverter, the A. C. output breaker was immediately returned to service, and the RPS channel was reset.

"Guards" will be installed on all inverter D. C. input and A. C. output breakers to prevent accidental operation.