LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [illegible] (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | LICENSEE CODE: [illegible] | LICENSE NUMBER: [illegible] | LICENSE TYPE: [illegible] | CAT: [illegible]

CON'T 01 | REPORT SOURCE: L | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 - 0 2 9 3 | EVENT DATE: 0 6 0 1 8 1 | REPORT DATE: [illegible]

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On 6/1/81 two primary containment isolation valves listed in table 3.7.1 of the

03 Tech. Specs. were made inoperable [illegible] a valve in the same line was placed in the

04 isolated condition. On 7/21/80 [illegible] same valves were made inoperable, however it

05 was not reported. (See [illegible] for details.)

06

07

08

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
09	S B	X	Z	[illegible]	[illegible]	Z

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 1	—	0 2 3	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A	Z	Z	Z	0 0 0	Y	N	L	Z 9 9 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Work performed on the Post Accident Nitrogen Purge System caused inoperability

11 of the Primary Containment Nitrogen Supply valves on 6/1/81. This same work

12 was performed on 7/21/80 however administrative controls failed to recognize its

13 effect on plant operations. (see attachment for details)

14

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
15	E	1 0 0	N.A.	[illegible]	Operator Inspection

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
16	Z	Z	N.A.	N.A.

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
17	0 0 0	Z	N.A.

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
18	0 0 0	N.A.

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
19	Z	N.A.

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION	NRC USE ONLY
20	N	N.A.	

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POOR ORIGINAL

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-293

Attachment to LER 81-021/03L-0

Event Description and Probable Consequences

This report is to notify you of two similar events which occurred at PNPS.

Event #1: On 6/1/81 two manually operated 1" valves on the containment nitrogen purge system were closed to allow work to be performed on the Post Accident Nitrogen Purge System. The ORC determined that closing these valves rendered the primary containment isolation valves on the nitrogen purge system inoperable. Since the nitrogen purge isolation valves are listed in table 3.7.1 of the Tech. Specs. by rendering them inoperable and closing the 1" manually operated valve we placed ourselves in a limiting condition for operation as stated in section 3.7.D.2 of the Tech. Specs.

Event #2: The same event described above occurred on 7/21/80; however we did not recognize that we were operating in a limiting condition for operation at that time and therefore did not submit an LER.

Cause Description and Corrective Action

The work performed on the Post Accident Nitrogen Supply System on 6/1/81 resulted from an inspection performed on 5/27/81 which revealed that two one inch lines on the Post Accident Sample System had been cut and capped. An investigation made to determine when and why the lines had been cut revealed that on 7/21/80 two check valves were removed from the system for use in another system.

It was determined that when the check valves were removed the system isolation caused PNPS to be operating in a limiting condition for operation as described in Event #1.

Regarding event #2, operation in a limiting condition during the 7/21/80 event was not obvious, due to a failure in administrative controls which did not allow for a proper review of the situation prior to the work being performed.

The cause of the administrative breakdown and the effects of removing the Post Accident Nitrogen Purge Supply System are under investigation and will be addressed in a followup report to LER 81-021/01X-0.

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