400 Chestnut Street Tower I.

June 19, 1981

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT - OPEN ITEM 50-328/81-20-04

The subject open item was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. W. Wright on October 24, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR's SQN EEB 8023 through SQN EEB 8042 (excluding SQN EEB 8034), SQN EEB 8045R1, SQN EEB 8051, SQN MEB 8007R1, and SQN NEB 8031 through SQN NEB 8034. Information concerning these items was submitted on November 25, 1980, and January 23, February 18, March 25, April 14, and April 28, 1981. Enclosed is further information concerning two items. SQN EEB 8031R3 and SQN EEB 8036R2 are the only items that have been modified since our last report. We expect to submit our next report by August 21, 1981.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.


Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

oc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555



ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT OPEN ITEM 50-328/81-20-04

Description of Item

During the review of qualification records for electrical equipment required by NUREG-0588, a number of components were identified as having inadequate documentation to verify their qualification levels for the harsh environments resulting from about all or accident conditions at the plant. A listing of the subject components was included in our last report.

Interim Progress

Since SQN EEB 8031R3 and SQN EEB 8036R2 are the only items that have been modified since our last report, the interim progress on only those two items is listed on the attachment to this report.

ATTACHMENT

NCR No.	Component No.	Model No.	Manufacturer	Corrective Action/Resolution
SQNEEB8031R3	101-2012 The Control of the Contro	288A	ITT Barton	See response to SQNEEB8023R1.
	FIS-67-209	"	**	
	FIS-65-554A/B		"	These switches have been
	FIS-65-44E/F		11	determined to be not quali-
	FIS-65-25A/B	"	"	fied for the potentially
	FIS-65-25C/D	n		harsh environment in which
	FIS-65-31A/B	"		they are located. Based on
	FIS-65-55C/D		n	the results of a safety
	FIS-65-44A/B	п	"	evaluation, it was con-
	FIS-65-44C/D	n n	"	cluded that the components
	FIS-65-25E/F	"	"	were not required to operate
	FIS-65-31C/D	"	"	in the event of an accident.
	FIS-70-81	"		Therefore, TVA has modified
	PSID-313-305	"	"	the switch wiring (reference
	PSID-313-340	**	"	engineering change notice
				L5124) to remove those func-
				tions that, assuming failure
				of the switch in the harsh
				environment, could adversely
				affect the safety of plant
				operation.
SQNEEB8036R2	FS-30-184	1627	F. W. Dwyer	See response to SQNEEB8023R1.
	FS-30-185	"	"	
	FS-30-192	11	"	
	FS-30-193	11	"	
	FS-30-157	"	n .	
	FS-30-194	"		
	FS-30-195	"	"	
	FS-30-196	"	"	
	FS-30-197	"	."	
	FS-30-186	"	"	
	FS-30-202		"	
	FS-30-207			
	FS-30-201			
	FS-30-187	"		
	FS-30-200	"	"	Due to their location in the
	FS-30-207	"	"	plant, these flow switches
				are not qualified for the
				postulated accident
				environment. Therefore,
				TVA will either relocate the
				switches in a more suitable
				onstituted the distribute

environment or replace these components with qualified equipment before unit 2 initial criticality.