

# DAIRYLAND Power

COOPERATIVE • P.O. BOX 817 • 2615 EAST AV. SOUTH • LA CROSSE WISCONSIN 54601

*8/3-2-81*  
*Keppler*  
*8/3/3*  
*Suchaske*

*8 Points!*

(608) 786-4000

February 25, 1981

In reply, please  
refer to LAC-7382

DOCKET NO. 50-409

Mr. James G. Keppler  
Regional Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations  
Region III  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

SUBJECT: DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE  
LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)  
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45  
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE NO. 81-02



- References:
- (1) LACBWR Technical Specifications, Section 3.9.2.b.(2)
  - (2) LACBWR Technical Specifications, Section 4.2.3.1.1
  - (3) LACBWR Technical Specifications, Section 4.2.3.2.1

Dear Mr. Kepp:

In accordance with Reference 1, this report is notification of operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation.

Reference (2) requires that the physically independent circuit between the off-site transmission network and the onsite power distribution system and the electrical feeds from 2400V bus 1A and 1B be operable during Operating Condition 1. Reference (3) requires that specified AC electrical buses be operable and energized from sources of power other than a diesel generator, but aligned to an operable diesel generator.

On February 1, 1981, at 1134, at 28% Reactor Rated Thermal Power, the physically independent circuit between the off-site transmission network and the onsite power distribution system was interrupted when the switchyard operator opened manual Disconnect Switch 25NA4, which disconnected the reserve auxiliary transformer from the 69KV transmission line. (See attached sketch). The emergency diesel generators started automatically and supplied the essential buses. The reactor shut down automatically. All systems functioned properly. Off-site power was restored within 14 minutes.

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*S*  
*1/1*

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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The circumstances surrounding the incident are as follows:

At 1125 on February 1, the turbine operator closed switch 25NB1 to close oil circuit breaker (OCB) 25NB1 to synchronize the generator output with the DPC electrical grid. In closing the switch, he used too much force, breaking the switch internal spring pin. The switch was then reopened. In reaching across the switch, a supervisor's shirt sleeve brushed against the switch handle. Due to the broken spring pin, the slight pressure was enough to cause the switch contacts to close, thus initiating a momentary closing action on OCB 25NB1, with the generator electrically out of phase with the DPC grid. Therefore, it was decided to open the airbreak disconnect switch for 25NB1 as a precaution, to prevent inadvertent or self-closure of OCB 25NB1 and to allow repair.

The switchyard operator was given a switching order to open 25NA1, the air break disconnect to the main transformer. Though the disconnect switch is labeled correctly and the operator had performed a visual check of the label and order, he incorrectly opened 25NA4, the air break disconnect to the reserve auxiliary transformer, which was supplying station power. All subsequent automatic actions functioned and the Control Room Operators carried out the loss of off-site power procedure properly. Disconnect switch 25NA4 was re-closed after the oil circuit breaker 25NB4 was opened and the correct disconnect switch, 25NA1, was opened.


The actions of the switchyard operator were reviewed by plant management. The operator was interviewed to determine the reason for the mis-switching. The problems encountered with the Control Room switch for OCB 25NB1 caused concern for that event and may have interfered with his concentration. Whenever possible, outside switching orders will be executed in the presence of a second person to provide a double check. Also, additional practical training on the switchyard will be provided for all operators.

A Licensee Event Report (Reference: Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4) is enclosed.

If you have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE



Frank Linder, General Manager

FL:LSG:af  
Enclosures

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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
cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30)  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Director, Office of Management Information and (3)  
Program Control  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspectors



6.50 - 336,400

LINE - Q1



0.375 - 4/0


LINE - N53



449-4/0

| Line    | Rev | Low | Approval | Date    |
|---------|-----|-----|----------|---------|
| 449-4/0 |     |     |          | 5/25/76 |
| 057-4/0 |     |     |          | 5/25/76 |

LINE T-5Db



GENOA No.1

STATION No.2

LACBWR

STATION No.25

GENOA No.2

DATE WR upgrading  
with 17. Instrum  
and elect  
distribution  
Rev. of No. 1226

TO GENOA NO.3

POOR ORIGINAL

FIG. 15.1