1-17)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
-	CONTROL BLOCK:
01	TINIS NIP 1 2 0 0 - 10 0 0 0 0 - 10 0 25 26 CICERSE TYPE JO 57 CAT 59
CON'T	SOURCE 1 6 0 15 10 10 10 13 2 7 7 0 4 2 8 8 1 8 0 6 1 1 8 1 9 SOURCE 50 61 CONSEQUENCES (10)
	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROGABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
0 2	lary building gas treatment system was inoperable due to the railroad door to the cask
0 3	loading area being open without personnel being present to close the door if it were
	necessary to do so. This event is reportable under 6.9.1.12.b. There was no effect
0 5	upon public health or safety. Previous occurrences - one (reference SQRO-50-327/80184).
0 6	upon public health of salety, training
0 7	
3 . 8	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
0 9	SIC 11 D 12 Z 13 PENET R 14 C 15 Z 16 PENISION NO.
	TO REPORT NUMBER 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
	ACTION FUTURE OFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS (2) SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER WANDFACTUREN TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD VICE SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER WANDFACTUREN (X 9 9 9 9)
	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
10	A past NRR interpretation and waiverto alter opening of the equipment access door
11	between the auxiliary building and containment building provided the door could be
1 2	closed within 10 minutes if necessary was inappropriately applied to this condition.
1 3	The railroad door was closed immediately upon discovery of being open.
110	METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	STATUS SPOWER OTHERSTATUS DISCOVERY NRC Inspector observation
7 8	ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 33
1 6	Z 33 Z 34 NA 45
1 6	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 30
1 6	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 NA 80
1 6	
1 6	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 NA PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41 NA BO PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41 NA BO LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43 TYPE DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION
1 9	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 NA PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41 NA 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41 NA 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43 TYPE DESCRIPTION NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA N
1 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9	Z 33 Z 34 NA 45 NA 80 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA N
<u>, 19</u>	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (3) PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (4) NA 80 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (4) NA 80 1 1 2 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (4) NA 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 8
, , 19	Z 33 Z 34 NA 45 NA 80 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA N

Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SQRO-50-327/81059 Technical Specification Involved: 3.7.8.1

Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.12.b

Date of Occurrence: 4/28/81 Time of Occurrence: 1200 CDT

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

The auxiliary building gas treatment system was inoperable due to the railroad door to the cask loading area being open without personnel present to close the door if it became necessary to do so. This event was originally evaluated as nonreportable, but subsequent reevaluation by plant management on June 2, 1981, determined the event reportable under 6.9.1.12.b.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 1 in mode 4 with RCS temperature and pressure at 340°F and 1100 psig.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The procedural control which required personnel to be present at the door when it is open was misinterpreted. The interpretation was based on a NRR special exception allowing the auxiliary building to containment equipment access door to be opened during unit 2 construction provided the door could be closed within 10 minutes if required. This was unappropriately applied to the auxiliary building railroad door.

Analysis of Occurrence:

SQRO-50-327/80184 indicated that with the auxiliary building railroad door open, the 1-inch H2O vacuum required for ABGTS operability could not be maintained. Following this first event, a caution tag was placed on the door to require an operator to be present when the door was opened.

Corrective Action:

The door was closed upon discovery. Personnel have been reinstructed to remain at the door while it is open. Modifications, repair work, and testing are being performed to ensure the 1-inch H2O vacuum can be maintained when the railroad door is opened. This work will be completed prior to Unit 2 fuel load which is currently scheduled for June 21, 1981.