TENNESSEE VALLEY AUSTROPES --

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

31 MAY 15 A 9 : 49

May 13, 1981

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In response to your letter to H. G. Parris dated April 29, 1981, enclosed is a revised response to items A and C of Inspection Report 50-259/80-40, -260/80-35, and -296/80-34 dated January 9, 1981. If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager

Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO J. P. O'REYLLY'S LETTER DATED JANUARY 9, 1981, REGARDING BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (50-259/80-40, 50-260/80-35, AND 50-296/80-34)

Infraction A

As required by Technical Specification 3.10.A.1, refueling interlocks shall be operable during refueling operation.

Contrary to the above, on October 5, 1980, fuel was loaded into the core with a temporary alteration on control rod 54-19 which defeated the refueling interlocks for prevention of loading fuel with a control rod withdrawn.

This is an infraction applicable to unit 2.

Response

On October 5, 1980, subsequent to maintenance on control cells 58-19 and 54-19, fuel was loaded into control cell 58-19 with control rod 54-19 withdrawn and the "full in" position interlock bypassed. There was no fuel in control cell 54-19 at the time of the occurrence; however, all refueling interlocks were not operable as required by Technical Specification 3.10.4.1.

Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved

- A. Fuel handling was immediately stopped. Control rod 54-19 was inserted and the temporary alteration removed from the "full in" position interlock of control rod 54-19.
- B. GOI 100-3 (Refueling Operations) was revised to include a procedure for unloading control cells for control cell maintenance. Steps were included to ensure placement and removal of refueling interlock bypasses in accordance with Technical Specification 3.10.A.1, 3.10.A.5.a, and 3.10.A.6.a.
- C. A checklist was written and included in GOI 100-3 that ensures any temporary conditions are removed from the refueling interlocks and the interlocks verified in service each time fuel movement is stopped for an 8-hour period or greater.

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Noncompliance

In addition to B and C above, this incident will be reviewed by fuel-handling crews in refueling training classes before future refueling operations.

Date Full Compliance Achieved

Full compliance was achieved on November 26, 1980, when revisions to GOI 100-3 were completed.

Infraction C

Our original response to this infraction committed to procedure revision before the next refueling outage in April 1981. As discussed with your staff, we amend this response to have the procedures revised before unit 1 core loading scheduled for July.