U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-301/81-08

Docket No. 50-301

License No. DPR-27

Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company

231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53203

Facility Name: Point Beach, Unit 2

Inspection At: Two Creeks, WI

Inspection Conducted: April 27 - May 1, and May 4-8, 1981

Inspectors: M. A.

5/28/81. 5/28/81.

Approved By:

1. Jackiw, Acting Chief Test Program Section

Inspection Summary

Inspection on April 27 - May 1, and May 4-8, 1981 (Report No. 50-301/81-08) Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of preparations for refueling, refueling activities, and maintenance activities during the refueling outage on Unit 2. The inspection involved a total of 38 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector including six inspector hours on off shifts.

Results: In the three areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*G. A. Reed, Manager, Nuclear Operations

*R. E. Link, Superintendent, Engineering, Quality and Regulatory

J. J. Zach, General Superintendent

*F. A. Zeman, Office Supervisor

R. L. Harris, Reactor Engineer

W. J. Herman, Superintendent, Ma. Lenance and Construction

I. L. Bleeker, SRO/Core Loading Supervisor

E. Ziller, SRO/Core Loading Supervisor

Additional plant technical and administrative personnel were contacted during the course of the inspection by the inspector.

*Denotes those personnel present during the exit meeting.

Preparation for Refueling (Unit 2)

The inspector verified that technically adequate procedures for Unit 2 Refueling 7 were approved for fuel handling, transfers, core verification, inspection of fuel to be reused and handling of other core internals. The following licensee procedures were examined during this review:

WMTP 2.1 Rev. O Refueling 7, Core Reloading

WMTP 2.2 Rev. O Refueling 7, Post Critical Path Fuel Assembly Inspection

RP-1A Rev. 12, Preparation for Refueling

RP-1C Rev. 8, Refueling

RP-1D Rev. 5, Filling and Draining the Refueling Cavity

RP-4A Rev. 2, Full Length Control Rod Drive Shaft Unlatching and Latching

The inspector verified that the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation of the reload core showed that prior NRR review is not required. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's program for overall outage control.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

Refueling Activities

The inspector verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the core, all surveillance testing required by the technical specifications and licensee's procedures had been completed; verified that during the outage the periodic testing of refueling related equipment was performed as required by technical specifications; and observed three shifts of fuel handling operations (removal, inspection, and insertion) and verified that activities were performed in accordance with technical specifications and approved procedures. During

the time frame of the inspection, the licensee incorrectly engaged a fuel element with the gripper fingers extended in the latch position underpisth the leafsprings of the element rather than under the top plate of the top nozzle. Since the analysis of the circumstances surrounding this event was incomplete at the time of the exit, the Senior Resident Inspector agreed to complete the report on this event. However, the inspector became concerned that the licensee's procedure did not require the manipulator crane operator to verify the z-z axis of the gripper to ensure it is correctly inserted in the element prior to engaging. The concern was expressed to management who stated use of the z-z axis tape was normal practice and that they would review its use for inclusion into the procedure.

Additionally, the inspector verified that containment integrity was maintained as required by technical specifications and that staffing during refueling was in accordance with technical specifications and approved procedures. The inspector verified that good housekeeping was maintained on the refueling areas; however, the inspector also became concerned that the licensee did not appear to have an accountability system (such as the use of logbooks) for the control of loose articles which may fall into the cavity. This concern was discussed with management.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Maintenance-Refueling

The inspector reviewed procedure PT.R-1 Rev. 3, Main Steam and Pressurizer Safety Valve Setpoint Test and the associated maintenance work activity for the main steam safety valve setpoint checks. The inspector verified maintenance procedures include administrative approvals for removal and return of systems to service; hold points for inspection/audit and signoff by QA or other licensee personnel; provisions for operational testing following maintenance; reviews of material certifications; provisions for assuring LCO requirements were met during repair; provisions for housekeeping during and following maintenance; and responsibilities for reporting defects to management.

The inspector observed the main steam safety valve setpoint check maintenance activites and verified work was accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and by qualified personnel.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on Friday, May 8, 1981, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.