



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

JUN 4 1981

Docket No. 50-341

APPLICANT: Detroit Edison Company

FACILITY: Fermi 2

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF MAY 27, 1981 OL REVIEW MEETING REGARDING THE FERMI 2
FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW

The purpose of the meeting was to hear applicant's plans for revision to fire protection features to meet current staff requirements, as requested in Request No. 021.32. One of the major modifications is provision of alternate shutdown capability for a fire in the control room, cable spreading room or relay room. Enclosure 1 is a list of attendees.

Enclosure 2 is a copy of slides showing existing and proposed alternate shutdown capability for a fire in the control room. The proposed system would provide a means for hot shutdown from outside the control room, if only one control panel is destroyed by fire.

Enclosure 3 provides a draft response for Request 021.32.

Applicant has completed its identification of interaction areas, where redundant, cables (Division I and II) in cable trays or conduits are less than 20 feet apart. Drawings showing these locations will be submitted, together with response to Request 021.32, and a revised and updated Fire Hazards Analysis during the week of June 1, 1981. Procedures for bringing the plant to a cold shutdown after a fire were requested to be completed and available at the plant 3 months prior to fuel loading.


At the conclusions of the meeting staff stated that:

- (1) The CO₂ systems should be replaced with less toxic and more effective systems for fire fighting, e.g. halon with a manual water system as backup. Applicant stated that, because of its relay room under the cable spreading room, it preferred not to use water. However it will consider a dry pipe system as a backup.

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- (2) A fire in the control room external to the panels must be considered, e.g. due to a spill of a flammable fluid. Applicant stated it will run a test to demonstrate that its panels will protect the wiring and switches inside of the panel from such a fire. Staff will consider test plans and test results in its evaluation.



L. L. Kintner, Project Manager
Licensing Branch No. 1
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: See next page

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ENCLOSURE 1

List of Attendees
for
May 27, 1981
Meeting, NRC-Detroit Edison Company

NRC

L. L. Kintner
Jerry L. Mauck
Victor Benaroya
A. Saeed
Raj Anand
C. Woodhead
R. L. Ferguson
Faust Rosa

Edison Electric Inst.

J. E. Evans



Detroit Edison


Larry E. Schuerman
William F. Colbert
William Fahrner
Evalds Lulis
Lawrence F. Wooden
Terence M. McKelvey
Richard C. Anderson
Rick L. Shaw
John W. Honkala


Gage-Babcock & Assoc.

J. Behn

ENCLOSURE 2







POOR ORIGINAL

DRAFT

021.32 RESPONSE

Detroit Edison has provided many design features on Fermi 2 to assure that it meets the requirements of BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A, and that the reactor can be shut down in the event of a fire. The electrical design of the plant was developed in 1970 to meet 3-foot horizontal, 5-foot vertical separation criteria, in response to PSAR Question 6.8.1. Conduit separation criteria was developed with the same criteria as the cable trays. Instrument cable trays are totally enclosed. Other cable trays have covers in areas where additional protection is required. The electrical cable insulation is a fire retardant as established by fire tests using propane burners and typical tray installation. The cable, trays, and conduits are color coded to assure that the installation follows the intended divisional routing. The routing of the cable is performed by a computer program based on the separation criteria.

No power cables are allowed in the critical control areas of the control center control room, cable spreading room, or relay room. A verification program has been conducted as an additional assurance that the electrical design was installed to the above criteria.

The control room and relay room panels are designed to prevent an internal fire from spreading out of the cabinets. A steel barrier with no penetrations allowed is provided between divisional cabinets. The fire hazards analysis of this plant was conducted by an independent consultant in accordance with Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1. Automatic water or gaseous suppression systems were provided in fire areas that contained both safety related divisions. Where the fire hazard analysis indicated, the walls, ceilings and floors were designed to provide rated fire barriers and seals. Manual water hose reels are provided to cover all areas of the plant as backup to automatic suppression. Manual CO₂ hose reels are provided outside the relay room and switchgear room in addition to the water hose stations.

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The above features show that the Fermi 2 design meets the criteria of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1, and thereby provides assurance that the plant can be shut down due to a postulated fire.

The review requested in the question poses new requirements beyond that required of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1. The following responses are provided to the subsection part of 021.32:

021.32 Response (Additional Information)

1. A list of systems required to shut down the plant was developed. The systems identified are the minimum necessary to achieve shutdown, with the following assumptions:
 - a. There are no single failures outside of the effects from the single fire.
 - b. A loss of offsite power occurs and the Emergency Diesel Generators start and successfully restore the onsite electrical system.
 - c. For hot shutdown systems, any operator action is from the main control room. For cold shutdown systems, however, some local operations or repair is allowed if such operation or repair can be readily accomplished.
 - d. No additional transients, accidents or release of radioactivity is assumed.

The systems for shutting down the reactor are identified in Table 021.32-1 of this response. The systems are categorized according to hot shutdown only systems, cold shutdown systems, and both hot and cold shutdown systems. The systems are all redundant; both divisions are included when the divisional reference is not marked. The HPCI system (Division II) is redundant to the RCIC system and Division I safety-relief valves.

The HPCI and RCIC systems containment isolation valves have cross divisional circuits for the diverse containment isolation function. The cross-system valves remain open. In the fire scenario, there is no need to assure the isolation function as transients other than the fire are not imposed.

From the shutdown system list, the Table 021.32-2 was developed that identifies the minimum number of valves, equipment, and instrumentation necessary to use the shutdown system. In addition to the valves that must operate, valves are also listed that must be maintained in one position in order to assure system integrity or functionability. Instruments and controls were included when automatic initiation was required or where inadvertent operation would cause a system trip. The RPV level and pressure and suppression pool temperature were included as the basic operating instrumentation.

The cable routings of the basic shutdown systems were identified, using Edison's computerized cable routing program. The computer was utilized to identify all of the cable trays and conduits that contain circuits for the shutdown system equipment of Table 021.32-2. The identified cable trays were marked on "field verified" cable tray layout drawings to physically identify the tray location. Edison routes instrumentation, control, and power cables in separate trays that are differentiated by the tray classification. The conduit routings were added to the cable tray drawings to form the complete composite.

The layout drawings were marked with the various fire barriers identified in the fire hazards analysis of FSAR Appendix 9B.

The layout drawings were reviewed for the possibility of divisional interaction where there was less than 20 feet separation between divisions. These areas were marked by cross-hatching on the drawings and a summary list of problem areas is provided in table 021.32-3. This table includes the areas, suppression, detection, and corrective action necessary to achieve compliance with Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.

Table 021.32-1

SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SHUTDOWN

Systems Required for Hot and Cold Shutdown

C11 Control Rod Drive - Manual Scram Circuits Only
B21 Main Steam Isolation Valves (manual closure only)
T50-04 Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring
B21 Reactor Vessel Pressure Instrumentation
T41 Control Center HVAC
T41 ESF Fan Coil Units, for Areas Servicing Shutdown Systems
P44 EECW
P45 EESW
R30-01 Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliaries
X41-03 EDG and EDG Switchgear Room HVAC
R32 ESF DC System
R30, R14, R16 ESF AC Distribution System, for Shutdown System Equipment
E11-51 RHRSW System
E11-56 RHR Cooling Towers

Systems Required Only for Hot Shutdown

E51 RCIC (Div. I)
B21 Safety Relief Valves (Div. I)
E41 HPCI (Div. II)
E11 RHR, Containment Cooling Mode

Systems Required Only for Cold Shutdown

E11 RHR, Shutdown Cooling Mode
B31 Recirc. (Inboard Isolation Valves Only)

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Table 021.32-2

Equipment, Valve and Instrument List

Unless otherwise noted, all entries to this list are used for hot shutdown or hot and cold shutdown.

B21 - Nuclear Boiler System

<u>Division I</u>	<u>Division II</u>
<u>Valves:</u>	
B2103-F022A	B2103-F022B
-F022C	-F022D
-F028A	-F028B
-F028C	-F028D
B2104-F013A	
-F013B	
-F013C	
-F013D	
-F013E	
-F013F	

B31 - Recirculation

<u>Valves:</u>	
B3105-F031A	B3105-F031B
<u>Instrumentation:</u>	
B3100-P401A	B3100-P401B
<u>Racks:</u>	
H2100-P006	H2100-P022

C11 - Reactor Protection System (Manual Scram Circuit)

<u>Relay Cabinets:</u>	
H1100-P609	H1100-P611
-P619	
<u>Racks:</u>	
H2100-P084	H2100-P085
-P086	-P087

Table 021.32-2 (Continued)

E11-RHR System

Division I

Division II

Pumps:

E1102-C002A
-C002C

E1102-C002B
-C002D

Valves:

E1150-F003A
-F004A
-F004C
-F006A
-F006C
-F007A

-F009 (Cold Shutdown System)
-F011A
-F015A (Cold Shutdown System)
-F016A
-F017A (Cold Shutdown System)

-F024A
-F026A
-F027A
-F028A
-F047A
-F048A

-F068A

-F104A

-F606
-F607

E1150-F003B
-F004B
-F004D
-F006B
-F006D
-F007B
-F008 (Cold Shutdown System)

-F011B
-F015B (Cold Shutdown System)
-F016B
-F017B (Cold Shutdown System)
-F023
-F024B
-F026B
-F027B
-F028B
-F047B
-F048B
-F049
-F048B
-F073
-F104B

-F608 (Cold Shutdown System)

Instruments:

Racks:

H2100-P018
-P030
-P082

H2100-P021
-P081
-P083
-P488

Relay Panels:

H1100-P601
-P617
-P822
-P823

H1100-P602
-P612
-P618
-P820
-P821

Table 021.32-2 (Continued)

E1151 - RHR SW System and E1156 - RHR Cooling Towers

<u>Division I</u>	<u>Division II</u>
<u>Pumps:</u>	
E1151-C001A -C001C	E1151-C001B -C001D
<u>Fan Motors:</u>	
E1156-C001A -C001C	E1156-C001B -C001D
<u>Valves:</u>	
E1150-F603A -F604A -F605A	E1150-F603B -F604B -F605B
<u>Instrumentation:</u>	
H1100-P807 -P809	H1100-P810

E41 - HPCI System

<u>Pumps:</u>	
	E4101-C002 -C003 -C004 -C005
<u>Valves:</u>	
E4150-F002	E4150-F001 -F003 -F004 -F006 -F007 -F008 -F012 -F021 -F022 -F041 -F042 -F059

Table 021.32-2 (Continued)

E41 - HPCI System (Continued)

Division I

Division II

Instrumentation:

E4100-N028A
-N029A
-N030A

E4101-N028B
-N029B
-N030B
-N062B
-N062D

Instrument Racks:

H2100-P080
-P082

H2100-P083
-P081
-P014

Relay Panels:

H1100-P617

H1100-P620

Control Operating Panel:

H1100-P602

E5I - RCIC SYSTEM

DIVISION I

Pumps

E5I01COO2
E5I01COO3
E5I01COO4

Valve

E5I50 F001

E5I50 F008
F010
F012
F013
F019
F022
F029
F031
F045
F046
F059
F062
F084

Instrumentation

E5I00 N011
E5I00 N021 A
N022 A
N023 A
E5I00 N025 A
N025 C
N026 A
N026 C
N027 A
N027 C

Instrument Racks

H21-P080
H21-P082
H21-P017

Relay Panels

H11-P614
H11-P617
H11-P621

COP

H11-P601

DIVISION II

Valves

E5I50 F007

E5I00 N021 B
N022 B
N023 B
E5I00 N025 B
N025 D
N026 B
N026 D
N027 B
N027 D

H21-P081
H21-P083

H11-P618

P44 - EECW SYSTEM

DIVISION I

Pumps

P4400C001A

Valves

P4400 F 601A
F 602A
F 603A

Instruments

P44 N 403A
N 404A
N 405A
N 406A
N 409A
N 413A
N 431A
N 432A
N 433A

Racks

H2100P447

Relay Cabinets

H1100P808
P857
P891

DIVISION II

Pumps

P4400C001B

P4400 F 601B
F 602B
F 603B

P44 N 403B
N 404B
N 405B
N 406B
N 409B
N 413B
N 431B
N 432B
N 433B

H2100P448
H2100P475

H1100P817
P868

P45 - EESW SYSTEM

Pumps

P4500C002 A

Relay Cabinets

H1100 P808
P857
P868
P891

Pumps

P4500C002 B

H1100 P817
P870

R14 - 4160V Swgr Buses

R1400S001 B
R1400S001 C

R1400S002 A
R1400S002 B

R1400S001 E
R1400S001 F Rx Bldg.

R1400S002 C
R1400S002 D RHR Complex

DIVISION I

4160 - 480 V Transformers

R1400S022 A
R1400S023 A

R1400S036 A
R1400S037 A

480 V Voltage Regulators

480 V Swgr Buses

R1400S022
R1400S023

R1400S036
R1400S037

R16 - 480 V Motor Control Centers

R1600S002 A
R1600S002 B
R1600S003 A
R1600S003 B
R1600S003 D

R1600S016 A
R1600S017 A

R31 - 120 V AC Power Supplies (MPV's)

R3101S001

R32 - DC System

Batteries

R3200S003

Chargers

R3200S020 A
R3200S020 B

Distribution Cabinets

R3200S026
R3200S062
R3200S063

DIVISION II

R1400S020 A Rx Bldg.
R1400S020 B

R1400S038 A
R1400S039 A RHR Complex

R1400S020 B
R1400A021 B Rx Bldg.
R1400S038 B
R1400S039 B RHR Complex

R1400S020
R1400S021 Rx Bldg.
R1400S038
R1400S039 RHR Complex

R1600S004 B
R1600S005 A
R1600S005 D Rx Bldg.
R1600S005 C
R1600S018 A
R1600S019 A RHR Complex

R3101S002

R3200S004

R3200S021 A
R3200S021 B

R3200S027
R3200S065
R3200S066

Distribution Cabinets (cont.)

DIVISION I

R3200S061 A
R3200S061 B

DC Motor Control Centers

R3200S015

R30 - Emergency Diesel Generators

Generators

R3000S001
R3000S002

Control Panels

R3000S005
R3000S006

EDG Fuel Transfer Pumps

R3000C001
R3000C002
R3000C003
R3000C004

EDG Serv. Water Pumps

R3000C005
R3000C006

DIVISION II

R3200S064 A
R3200S064 B

R3200S016

R3000S003
R3000S004

R3000S007
R3000S008

R3000C009
R3000C010
R3000C011
R3000C012

R3000C007
R3000C008

T41 - CONTROL CENTER HVAC & ESSENTIAL FAN COIL UNITS

Fans & Heating Coils

T4100B007
T4100C031
T4100B007 A
T4100B007 C

Fans

T4100B006
T4100C030
T4100B007 B
T4100B007 D

Pumps

T4100C041

Pumps

T4100C042

Compressors

T4100B009

Compressors

T4100B008

Fan Coil Units

T4100B002 (Div. I Swgr)
T4100B003 (Div. I Swgr)
T4100B018 (Div. I RHR)
T4100B021 (CS & RCIC)
T4100B028 (Div. I AC Eqpt. Rm)

T4100B004 (Div. II Swgr)
T4100B005 (Div. II Swgr)
T4100B019 (Div. II RHR)
T4100B022 (HPCI)
T4100B027 (Div. II AC Eqpt. Rm)

Fan Coil Units (cont.)

DIVISION I

T4100B034 (EECW Div. I)

Instrumentation

Racks

H11P809
P888

Relay Panels

H2100P285 A
H2100P296 A
P296 C
P296 E
P521
P527
P528

T50 - 04 - Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring

Instrumentation

T/C Terminal Box

H2100P584 M

Relay Cabinet

H1100P898 A
P914

Racks

H2100P501 A

X41-03 - RHR Complex HVAC

Fans

X4103C001 EDG 11
C002
C003 EDG 12
C004
C009 EDG 11 Swtch. Gr.
C010
C011 EDG 12 Swtch. Gr.
C014

Motor Operated Dampers

X4103 F103
F104
F106 EDG 11 Swtch. Gr.
F108
F109

DIVISION II

T4100B035 (EECW Div. II)

H1100P817
P889

H2100P285 B
H2100P296 B
P296 D
P296 F
P520
P527 A
P529

T/C Terminal Box

H2100P584 L

H1100P898 B
P915

H2100P501 B

Fans

X4103C005 EDG 13
C006
C007 EDG 14
C008
C013 EDG 13 Swtch. Gr.
C014
C015 EDG 14 Swtch. Gr.
C016

X4103 F127
F128
F130 EDG 13 Swtch. Gr.
F132
F133

Motor Operated Dampers (cont.)

F110 EDG 11 Rm.
F115
F116 EDG 12 Swtch. Gr.
F118
F120
F121
F122 EDG 12 Rm.

F134 EDG 13 Rm.
F139
F140 EDG 14 Swtch. Gr.
F142
F144
F145
F146 EDG 14 Rm.

X4103 - RHR Complex HVAC(cont.)

X4103F149 EDG 11 Rm.
X4103F150
F151 EDG 12 Rm.
F152
F157 Div. I Pump Rm.
F159
F161
F162

^4103F153 EDG 13 Rm.
X4103F154
F155 EDG 14 Rm.
F156
F164 Div. II Pump Rm.
F166
F168
F169

Instrumentation

Relay Panels

H2100P350
P351

H2100P352
P353

TABLE 021.32-3

INTERACTION AREAS LESS THAN 20 FEET

<u>Area</u>	<u>Detection</u>	<u>Automatic Suppression</u>	<u>Correction Action</u>
AB, Elev. 551' and 562'	Ionization	Sprinklers	Provide 1-hr barrier wall or barrier for Div. 2
AB Elev. 583 North End, South End and Elev. 603'-6"	Ionization	Sprinklers	Provide one hour barrier around Div. 2 trays
AB Elev. 613' Relay room	Ionization	CO ₂	Provide one hour barrier around Div. 1 tray interaction
AB Elev. 613' Cable Tunnel	Ionization	CO ₂	Provide one hour barrier around Div. 2 and swing bus trays
AB Elev 613 Relay Room Stairwell at H-17	None	None	Analyze failure of both divisional instrument trays or provide suppression, detection, and 1 hour barrier
RB Elev. 613' near F-11	Ionization	Sprinklers	Provide one hour barrier Div 1 Tray
RB Elev. 613' near C-11	Ionization	None	Provide one hour barrier and suppression or justify failure of swing bus and Div. 2 tray
AB Elev. 630' Cable Spreading Room	Ionization	CO ₂	Provide one hour barrier on both divisional Trays in zone
AB Elev. 671' South Cable Tray Area	Ionization	CO ₂	Provide one hour barrier around Div. 1 trays in NE corner of room
AB Elev. 643' DC-MCC Area	Ionization	CO ₂	Provide one hour barrier around Div. 1 trays
AB Elev. 659'	Ionization	None	Provide one hour barrier around Div. 1 trays and suppression, or analyze loss of both divisional trays

R. C. Anderson
/dk
5-22-81

4. Fermi 2 will be using a method of remote shutdown from the control room if a control room panel fire causes the need to evacuate the control room. The design basis for such a fire is that the control room panel fire would be extinguished before damage could occur to more than one panel. The smoke from such a fire could cause the evacuation of the operating personnel after a limited amount of operation is performed. To address such a scenario, Fermi 2 will have two divisional remote shutdown panels.

Table 021.32-1 lists the systems necessary for shutdown and vital support to achieve hot and cold shutdown from the control room. Table 021.32-5 lists the instrumentation and manual equipment control provided on the remote shutdown panels. Because the control panel fire will leave one of the two redundant divisions intact, credit is taken for the automatic operation of equipment in the functional division. The division I remote shutdown panel is provided to meet GDC 19 and is provided with equipment to achieve hot and cold shutdown. Although cold shutdown can be achieved from this panel, the control room habitability would be re-established before the need to go to cold shutdown. The division II remote shutdown panel will include instruments and controls necessary to perform the manual operating functions to achieve hot shutdown.

Fermi 2 is providing remote shutdown capability to bypass any control room operating panel. The cable entry to the control room panels is bottom fed from the cable spreading room.

TABLE 021.32-5

EXISTING SHUTDOWN PANEL (DIV I)
EQUIPMENT LIST

ITEM	P.I.S. NO.	SERVICE	DIV.	CONTROL DEVICE
<u>NUCLEAR BOILER SYSTEM</u>				
20	B21-R605A	Reactor Level Indicator	I	Beckman V5A
21	B21-R005A	Reactor Pressure I Indicator	I	Foxboro 6400C
22	B21-F013D	Manual Relief Valve	I	BLPB
23	B21-F013H	Manual Relief Valve	I	BLPB
<u>RECIRCULATION SYSTEM</u>				
24	B31-F023A	Recirc Pump Suction Valve	I	BLPB
<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>				
25	E1156C001-A	Mech. Draft Cooling Tower Fan A	I	CMC Sw
26	E1156C001-C	Mech. Draft Cooling Tower Fan C	I	CMC Sw
27	C11-C001A	CRD Pump	I	CMC Sw
28		HPCI Manual Trip	II	Selector Sw Cutler Hammer
29		Drywell Press Indicator	I	Foxboro 6400HC
30		Suppression Pool Water Temp. Indicator Off Temp Element T50N405A	I	Weston 1316
31		Transfer Switch Logic Power For 64B BRKR Cont	I	Type SBM Model 10AA50
32		Transfer Switch Logic Power For 64C BRKR Cont	I	Type SBM Model 10AA50

EXISTING SHUTDOWN PANEL (DIV I) EQUIPMENT LIST

ITEM	P.I.S. NO.	SERVICE	DIV.	CONTROL DEVICE
<u>RCIC SYSTEM</u>				
1	E51-C002	Trip throttle valve	I	BLPB
2	E51-C002	Trip throttle valve position	I	BLDS
3	-	Manual initiation of RCIC (Bypass low Reactor Water level)	I	Round PB
4	E51-F045	Steam to turbine	I	BLPB
5	E50-R613	Flow indicator	I	Beckman V5A
<u>RHR SYSTEM</u>				
6	E11-C001A	RHR Service Water Pump	I	CMC Sw
7	E11-C001C	RHR Service Water Pump	I	CMC Sw
8	E11-C002A	RHR Pump	I	CMC Sw
9	E11-F024A	Containment Spray M.O.V.	I	BLPB
10	E11-F028A	Containment Spray M.O.V.	I	BLPB
11	E11-F048A	Hx Shell Side Bypass M.O.V.	I	BLPB
12	E11-F068A	Cont. Cooling Hx Discharge M.O.V.	I	BLPB
13	E11-F008	RHR Suction Cooling (OUTER)	II	BLPB
14	E11-F009	RHR Suction Cooling (INBD)	I	BLPB
15	E11-F006A	Shutdown Cooling M.O.V.	I	BLPB
16	E11-F015A	RHR Injection M.O.V.	I	BLPB
17	E11-F004A	RHR Pump Suction M.O.V.	I	BLPB
18	E11-F017A	RHR Outboard M.O.V.	I	BLPB
19	E11-R604A	RHR Flow Indicator	I	Beckman V5A

BLPB - Back Lighted Push Button
BLDS - Back Lighted Display

PROPOSED DIV II SHUTDOWN PANEL
EQUIPMENT LIST

<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>LEGEND ENGRAVING</u>	<u>MAKE</u>
2-POSITION KEYLOCK SWITCH	TRANSFER DIVISION II POWER - AC	ELECTROSWITCH
2-POSITION KEYLOCK SWITCH	TRANSFER DIVISION II POWER - DC	ELECTROSWITCH
2-POSITION KEYLOCK SWITCH	BYPASS STM LEAK DETECTION ISOLATION SIGNAL	ELECTROSWITCH
BACK LIGHTED PB	HPCI INITIATE	MASTER SPECIALITIES
M/A CONTROL STATION	HPCI FLOW	GE-MAC
PRESSURE INDICATOR	DRYWELL PRESSURE	ANALOGIC
TEMPERATURE INDICATOR	SUPPRESSION POOL WATER TEMPERATURE	WESTON
FLOW INDICATOR	HPIC HEADER FLOW	HAYS REPUBLIC
LEVEL INDICATOR	REACTOR LEVEL	WESTON
PRESSURE INDICATOR	REACTOR PRESSURE	ANALOGIC

MEETING SUMMARY DISTRIBUTION

JUN 4 1981

Docket File
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Local PDR
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D. Eisenhut
R. Purple
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