

Commonwer Edison Quad Cities Nucle ... Power Station 22710 206 Avenue North Cordova, Illinois 61242 Telephone 309/654-2241

NJK-81-73

February 13, 1981

J. Keppler, Regional Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reference: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station Docket Number 50-265, DPR-30, Unit Two Appendix A, Sections 3.5.C.3., 3.5.E.3., and 6.6.B.l.e.

Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence Report Number RO 81-03/01T for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station. This occurrence was previously reported to Region III, Office of Inspection and Enforcement by telephone on February 2, 1981, and by telecopy on February 3, 1981.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.B.l.e., as a failure or malfunction of one or more components which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of system(s) used to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

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N. J. Kalivianakis (Station Superintendent

NJK: JRW/bb

Enclosure

cc R. F. Janecek N. Chrissotimos

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- I. LER NUMBER: LER/RO 81-03/01T
- II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. FACILITY NAME: Unit Two
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On February 2, 1981, at 2215, while performing HPC1 Motor-Operated Valve Operability Test, QOS 2300-3, the Unit Two operator closed the HPC1 Outboard Isolation valve, MO-2-2301-5, but could not re-open it. Unit Two was holding load at 200 MWe. RCIC had been made inoperable prior to the time of the occurrence. Technical Specification 3.5.C.2. outlines requirements to be fulfilled in the event the HPC1 system is inoperable. A unit shutdown was subsequently initiated. Auto-pressure relief and all low pressure ECCS were operable.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

RCIC is required to be operable in the event the HPCI System is inoperable. RCIC had been made inoperable prior to the time of the occurrence and load reduction for unit shutdown within 24 hours from the time of the occurrence was necessary. At 2225, load was reduced at a rate of 25 MWe per hour. At 2330 RCIC was made operable and load reduction was terminated.

VII. CAUSE:

The MO-2-2301-5 valve operator had been replaced during a weekend maintenance outage starting January 31, 1981. The valve proved operable in the cold condition prior to unit startup on February 1, 1981. In the hot condition the valve disc apparently had remained stuck in the valve seat. More torque was therefore required to lift the valve disc off of the seat. The limit switches did not remain on bypass long enough to prevent the torque switches from shutting off the valve motor operator. Thus, the valve disc could not be lifted off of the valve seat.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The limit switches were adjusted to remain on bypass for a longer period. After proper adjustment of the limit switches, proper indication on Control Room panel 902-3 was received after the valve disc lifted off of the valve seat. MO-2-2301-5 was then cycled three times satisfactorily. HPCI was declared operable at 2305 hours on February 2, 1981.