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Locket Nos. 50-213

50-245 50-336 AC1644

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Region 1 Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

References: (1) B. H. Grier letter to W. G. Counsil dated April 9, 1981 transmitting I&E Bulletin No. 81-02.

Gentlemen:

Haddam Neck Plant Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Response to I&E Bulletin No. 81-02

In Reference (1), Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) and Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), respectively, were requested to determine whether there were any gate values listed in Reference (1) which are currently installed or carried as spares. The subject gate values have failed to fully close above the threshold differential pressures listed in the Bulletin.

As a result of their review, NNECO has determined that there are no valves listed in Reference (1) which are currently installed or carried as spares at Millstone Units 1 and 2.

CYAPCO has also reviewed their plant and determined that there are six valves currently installed in safety related systems which are the Westinghouse type listed in Reference (1). Four of these subject valves, however, are isol tion valves for the Reactor Coolant System low pressure relief valves and are locked closed above 375 psig in the reactor coolant system. They would, therefore, never exceed threshold differential pressures listed for the valves. The remaining two valves (CH-MOV-292B and 292C) are installed in the loop 2 charging line in the Chemical and Volume Control System. These valves are normally open through all modes of plant operation. The only time closure of these valves would be required against a large differential pressure would be if the line downstream of these valves severed. The maximum differential across the gate valve which could be encountered during closure would be the difference between the charging pump shutoff head of 2685 psig and reactor coolant system pressure. This difference could exceed 2000 psid. If in this case, however, the valves did not seat fully upon closure, the charging pumps could be shutdown to stop the leakage flow and reduce the differential pressure.

Since the cause of the high differential pressure can be reduced by operator action, value closure under all conditions can be assured. CYAPCO has, therefore, concluded that no further immediate action is necessary for these values. Any long term corrective action recommended by Westinghouse for these values, however, will be evaluated when available for applicability to these values.

In assisting you in evaluating the valve/impact of this bulletin, it is estimated that approximately 30 man-hours were expended in the review and preparation of the correspondence required by this bulletin.

We trust you will find this information satisfactory to disposition the Reference (1) concerns. If you have any questions with the above material, please contact me.

Very truly yours,

COJNECTIOUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

W. G. Counsil Senior Vice President