UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

MAY 21 1981

Mr. D. L. Aswell
Vice President - Power Production
Louisiana Power and Light Company
142 Delaronde Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70174

Dear Mr. Aswell:

SUBJECT: OPEN ITEMS - WATERFORD 3

The staff has reviewed those sections of the Waterford 3 SER received as of close of business on May 15, 1981. As promised in my letter of that date, enclosed is an updated list of open items. Please review this list and furnish us by May 22 your schedule for providing the requested information.

If you require any clarification, please contact the staff's assigned project manager.

Sincerely,

Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director
Division of Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: See next page.

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OPEN ITEMS AS OF 5/18/81
(INCLUDING SER SECTION NUMBER)

66. Preservice testing of snubbers (3.9.2)

67. Summary of pre-operational and testing program for piping (3.9.2)

68. ESF Atmosphere Cleanup Systems. (6.5)

69. Liquid, Gaseous, and Solid Radwaste Systems - Conformance to NRC guidance (11.2)

70. Capability of the waste management system to handle oily waste from the turbine building (11.2.1)

71. Staff requires another gas analyzer with continuous measurement and alarm capabilities (11.2.2.8)

72. Staff requires a shroud to test the HEPA filters and charcoal absorbers for sufficient DOP (11.2.2.8)

73. Process Control Program/Waste Stor 11.2.3)

74. Process & Effluent Radiological Monitors (11.3)

75. More information needed on Noble gas monitors, Main Steam Line monitors, and final design (22;IIF.1)

76. Times of closure and opening of the SRV's should be recorded automatically. (22;IIF.1)

77 Leak rate test results (22,III,D.1.1)

78. Operability of containment purge valves (22,III,E.4.2)

79. Confirm that the primary safety valves are sized based on a reactor trip on second safety grade scram signal. (5.2.2)

80. Provide an analysis that demonstrates the plant could be brought to the point of SDCS initiation using safety grade equipment. (5.4.7)

81. Modify SDCS so that the valves with power locked out can be operated from the control room. (5.4.7)

82. Provide LPSI pump suction pressure or discharge flow alarms which are powered from essential power supplies for pump protection. (5.4.7)

83. Expand the scope of the test to include natural circulation test demonstrating adequate boron mixing when forced circulation is not present. (5.4.7)

84. Provide redundant alarm for inadvertent boron dilution event and demonstrate that for all six modes, alarms are available. (15.2.4.4)

85. Explain the nature of the administrative controls to prevent operation of more than one charging pump during boron dilution event. (15.2.4.4)

86. Re-analyze the reactor coolant pump shaft seizure event assuming loss of offsite power and technical specification limit steam generator tube leakage. (15.2.3.1)

87. Commit to confirm the HPI flow performance utilized in the small break LOCA ECCS analyses are conservative with respect to the actual "as installed" HPI flow performance.

88. Provide information regarding the effects of the steam generator tube plugging with respect to the LOCA analyses. (15.3.3)

89. The current CESEC model does not properly account for steam formation in the reactor vessel. Therefore, for all events in which (a) the pressurizer is calculated to drain into the hotleg, or (b) the system pressure drops to the saturation pressure of the hottest fluid in the system during normal operation, we require the applicant to re-analyze these events with an acceptable model or otherwise justify the acceptability of Waterford 3 Chapter 15 analyses conclusions performed with CESEC. (15.3)

90. Clarify the differences in methodology utilized for analyzing feedwater line breaks between that for Waterford 3 and that documented in CESSAR System 80. (15.3.2)

91. Provide evaluation of the effects of lossing offsite power or tripping of the RCPs during the main steam line break transients. (15.3.1)

92. Provide information which explains why is the stuck-open atmospheric dump valve event for Waterford 3 results in fuel damage whereas the steam line break event does not result in exceeding DNBR limit. (15.2.1)

93. Hydrogen recombiner use in plant procedures (22;II.E.4.1)

94. Classification of essential and non-essential systems (22,II.E.4.2)