

Richard Major
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
Dear Sir,

I am submitting this readily reproducible copy to you to submit to the ACRS for their meeting on the TMI#1 restart. I hope that you will reproduce this copy and make it available to all ACRS members by placing a copy in their hands previous^{to} or at the April 23, 24 meeting.

Dear Learned Members of the ACRS,

I respectfully request that you look deeply into the matter of the Restart of TMI#1 before taking any action. I am of the opinion that TMI#1 should never be restarted. I entered the TMI#1 Restart hearings with the basis that TMI#1 should never be restarted. Everything that I have learned from the TMI#1 Hearings have strengthened my resolve that TMI#1 should never be restarted.

My resolve that TMI#1 should never be restarted has been strengthened by the many technical ~~and~~ flaws and material deficiencies that have come to light in the Restart proceedings.

I call your attention to the following areas:

1. Mr Steven Sholley makes a beautifully structured argument for hydrogen gas control at TMI#1. This is in his "Limited Appearance Statement" dated Mar 16, 1981. He brings up and discusses several other points that bear directly on the deficiencies at TMI#1.
2. The Staff has presented a clearly deficient EIA on the Restart. Again, I direct the ACRS to "Intervenor Steven C. Sholley Motion to the ASLB to Reject the NRC Staff Environmental Impact Appraisal on TMI1 Restart Or in the Alternative to Seek Leave From the Board to Raise New Contentions." dated Sholly 4/9/81.
3. Block valve problems that are directly related to TMI#1 have been discovered. (See "UCS Motion for Board Order ~~on~~ on Block Valve Test Results.")
4. An NRC engineer by the name of Demetrios L Basdekas of the NRC Staff filed a memorandum to Mr Tourtelotte to the Effect that overcooling transients could affect the integrity of the reactor vessel adversely. (See Memo dated April 7 Basdekas to Tourtelotte on TMI#1.)
5. Intervenor Amodeo's Contentions concerning the care and feeding of farm animals during an evacuation is still unheard and unsettled.
6. The Emergency Evacuation plan does not hold water.
7. Although TMI#2 was hardened for a airplane crash, there was not no equivalent hardening on TMI#1. There isn't even a contention on this point.

Respectfully submitted,

Marvin Lewis . 20

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