UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch Members, DOR

FROM: Robert A. Clark, Chief, Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch, DOR

SUBJECT: ACCEPTABLE COMPENSATORY MEASURES FOR INTRUSION DETECTION HARDWARE OUTAGE (E.G., ZONE, SYSTEM) PROTECTED AREA VITAL AREAS - REVIEW GUIDELINE NUMBER 9

The objective of perimeter intrusion detection hardware is to detect the unauthorized entry or attempted entry of individuals or vehicles into the protected area and to provide an "alert" to the security organization so that response by a response force will be initiated at the time of penetration into the protected area.

In the event of a hardware outage the compensatory measures must satisfy this objective by providing a means for detecting unauthorized entry and for alerting the security organization or by providing a response force to control all paths from the area of outage to all vital areas. Acceptable measures compensatory to perimeter intrusion detection outage are:

a) Back-up intrusion detection system of equal capability.

b) Dedicated CCTV with continuous monitoring of the perimeter zone(s) affected by the outage.

c) On-the-spot guards visually monitoring the perimeter zone(s) affected by the outage.

d) Response force deployed to control all paths from the perimeter zone(s) affected by the outage to all vital areas.

The objective of the vital area intrusion detection hardware is to detect the unauthorized entry of individuals (and at some facilities - vehicles) into vital areas and to provide to the security organization an "alert" so that response by a response force will be initiated at the time of penetration into the vital area.

In the event of a hardware outage the compensatory measures must satisfy this objective by either providing a means for detecting unauthorized

entry and alerting the security organization or providing the response force to control the paths to the affected vital areas. Acceptable measures compensatory to a vital area intrusion detection outage are:

a) A back-up intrusion detection system of equal capability.

b) Dedicated CCTV with continuous monitoring of the portals affected by the outage.

c) On-the-spot guards visually monitoring the portals affected by the outage.

d) Response force deployment to control all approaches to the affected vital areas.

Robert A. Clark, Chief
Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch
Division of Operating Reactors