400 Chestnut Street Tower II

April 28. 1981

1912 ULS, NUCLEAR RECLATCRE COMMISSION

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SORL-50-328/81-28

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Screet Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dea Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - ADDITIONAL LEVEL OF UNDER OR OVER VOLTAGE PROTECTION - SQRD-50-328/81-28 - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on April 3, 1981, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR SQN EEB8114. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to submit our next report by June 2, 1981.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

CC: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure) V Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 ADDITIONAL LEVEL OF UNDER OR OVER VOLTAGE PROTECTION 10 CFR 50.55(e) SQRD-50-328/81-28 FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

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During a design review, it was determined that the present design of the additional level of under or over voltage protection does not fully comply with the time delay selection guidelines as stated in NRC Staff Position 1, "Degraded Grid Voltage Position." These guidelines state that the time delay selected shall: (1) not exceed the maximum time delay that is assumed in the FSAR accident analysis; and (2) minimize the effect of short duration voltage transients on the availability of the offsite power sources. The design basis for the present design was that an accident would not occur during the time delay. The time delay of 30 seconds was selected to satisfy item 2 above. Because of this 30 second delay, TVA's design exceeds the maximum safety response time of 22 seconds (as stated in the FSAR) required for mitigating an accident.

Interim Progress

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As stated in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Safety Evaluation Report, TVA has committed to the implementation of degraded voltage relaying on the Class IE ac auxiliary power system by the end of the first unit 1 refueling outage.

TVA is evaluating the present design to determine what modifications must be made to comply with the time delay selection guidelines.