U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Region I

Report No. 80-23

Docket No. 50-333

License No. DPR-59 Priority -- Category C

Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York

P. O. Box 41

Lycoming, New York 13093

Facility Name: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Station

Inspection at: Scriba, New York

Inspection conducted: December 1, 1980 - December 31, 1980

Inspectors: J. Linville, Resident Inspector — 2/4/81 date signed

date signed

date signed

Approved by: H. B. Kister, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 4 — 2/17/81 date signed

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on December 1, 1980 - December 31, 1980 (Report No. 50-333/80-23)

Areas Inspected: Routine inspection by the Resident Inspector (41 hours) of licensee action on previous inspection items; plant tours; control room inspections; log and record review; physical security; and ESF verification.

Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.

Region I Form 12
(Rev. April 77)

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

R. Baker, Superintendent of Power
*N. Brosee, Maintenance Superintendent
*V. Childs, Assistant to Resident Manager
*R. Converse, Operations Superintendent
W. Fernandez, Technical Services Superintendent
H. Kieth, Instrument and Control Superintendent
E. Mulcahey, Radiological and Environmental Services Superintendent
*C. Orogvany, Reactor Analyst Supervisor
*R. Pasternak, Resident Manager

The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspection including Shift Supervisors, Administrative, Operations, Health Physics, Security, Instrument and Control, Maintenance, and Contractor Personnel.

*Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items

(Open) Unresolved items 77-26-02, 77-26-03, 77-26-04, 77-26-06: The inspector reviewed modification packages FI-76-90 and FI-78-45, and the licensee's proposed Technical Specifications on the CAD system submitted in July 1977. To date, these modification packages have not been completed and closed out, and the Technical Specifications have not been issued. See paragraph 3.e for more details on this subject.

(Closed) Inspector followup item 79-17-10: The inspector noted during tours that the steam leak on the second stage reheat system was repaired during the refueling outage which ended in August 1980.

3. Operational Safety Verification

a. Control Room Observations

(1) Using a plant specific checklist, the inspector verified plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with the limiting conditions for operations of the plant Technical Specifications. Items checked included:

-- Switch and valve positions
-- Alarm conditions
-- Meter indications and recorder values
-- Status lights and power available lights
-- Computer printouts
-- Comparison of redundant readings

(2) The inspector directly observed the following plant operations to ensure adherence to approved procedures:

-- Routine power operations
-- Issuance of RWP's and Work Requests/Event/Deficiency Forms

(3) Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken.

The inspector had discussions with the licensee on reducing the number of lit annunciators in the control room. On a day to day basis, there are approximately twenty-five lit annunciators in the control room. Some of these alarms are normal for the existing plant conditions and therefore, provide little information or have no meaning. The inspector will continue to review and evaluate the licensee's efforts in this area during future inspections.

(4) Shift turnovers were observed to ensure proper control room and shift manning on both day and back shifts. Shift turnover checklists and log review by the oncoming and offgoing shifts were also observed by the inspector.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

b. Shift Logs and Operating Records

(1) Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to:

-- Obtain information on plant problems and operations

-- Detect changes and trends in performance

-- Detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regulatory requirements

-- Determine that records are being maintained and reviewed as required

-- Assess the effectiveness of the communications provided by the logs

(2) The following logs and records were reviewed:

-- Shift Supervisor Log
-- Senior Nuclear Operator Log
-- Night Orders
-- Shift Turnover Check Sheet
-- Protective Tag Record Log
-- Jumper/Bypass Log

No items of noncompliance were identified.

c. Plant Tours

(1) During the inspection period, the inspector made observations and conducted tours of plant areas including the following:

- -- Control Room
- -- Relay Room
- -- Reactor Building
- -- Turbine Building
- -- Diesel Generator Rooms
- -- Electric Bays
- -- Pumphouse - Screenwell
- -- Cable Tunnels
- -- Battery Rooms
- -- Site Perimeter

(2) The following determinations were made:

-- General Plant Housekeeping: Observations relative to plant housekeeping identified no items of noncompliance.

-- Fluid Leaks: No significant fluid leaks were observed.

-- Piping Vibrations: No excessive piping vibrations were observed and no adverse conditions were noted.

-- Monitoring Instrumentation: The inspector verified that selected instruments were functional and indicated parameters were within Technical Specification limits.

-- Fire Protection: The inspector verified that selected fire extinguishers were accessible and inspected on schedule, that fire stations were unobstructed, and that adequate control over ignition sources and fire hazards was maintained.

-- Radiation Protection Controls: The inspector verified that the licensee's radiation protection policies and procedures were adhered to. Specific observations included:

(1) Access control including barriers, tagging, posting, and maintenance of step-off pads.

(2) Verification that requirements of RWP's in effect are appropriate and are being followed.

(3) Verification that radiation protection instruments in use are being calibrated as required.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

d. Physical Security

The inspector made observations and verified during regular and off-shift hours, that selected aspects of the plant's physical security systems and organization were in accordance with regulatory requirements, physical security plan and approved procedures.

(1) Physical Security Organization

-- Observations indicated that a full time member of the security organization with authority to direct physical security actions was present, as required.

-- All security members observed appeared to be capable of performing their assigned tasks.

(2) Physical Barriers

-- Physical barriers in the protected and vital areas were frequently observed to assure that they were intact and randomly checked by patrolling guards.

-- Isolation zones were observed to be free of obstructions and objects that could aid an intruder in penetrating the protected area.

(3) Access Control

-- The inspector observed, on frequent occasions, that explosive and metal detectors were operable and used as required.

-- On many occasions persons and packages were observed to be properly searched prior to entry into the protected area.

-- Vehicles were observed to be properly searched and escorted or controlled within the protected area.

-- Persons within the protected area displayed photo identification badges, persons in vital areas were properly authorized, and persons requiring escort were properly escorted.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

e. ESF Verification

On December 22, 1980 the inspector performed a partial valve lineup check list of the CAD system using the check list in Operating Procedure 37, N_2 Ventilation and Purge, Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) and Containment Vacuum Relief, Revision 4, dated October 28, 1980. The Inspector compared the check list with the Flow Diagram Drywell Inerting, CAD and Purge System, Figure OP-37-1, and with FM 18A. During the valve lineup check the inspector found valve 27CNS 14B which is normally locked open in the shut position. In addition, several other normally locked valves were not adequately secured in that the chains were so loose as to permit valve movement without unlocking them. The inspector then examined the last licensee valve lineup check of the CAD system conducted prior to start up following the refueling outage in August 1980. It also indicated that valve 27CNS 14B was improperly positioned. The exception cover sheet required by Operations Department Standing Order (ODSO) No. 5, Valve/Electrical Lineup Checkoff List Review, Revision 0, dated July 7, 1978 indicated that the valve was improperly positioned to prevent tank overpressurization and continuous relief valve lifting which would occur with the pressure buildup coil in service. This was due to an inability to maintain proper vacuum between the inner and outer tanks. This condition had apparently existed since December 26, 1979 when it was documented by work request WR-004630.

The inspector questioned whether the CAD system was able to perform its intended design function under post accident conditions with the pressure buildup coil isolated because paragraph 1.2.4 of the vendor operating manual indicated that the pressure buildup coil should be in service to maintain flow over a 30 day period. In response to the inspectors question, the licensee requested that his Architect Engineer, Stone and Webster evaluate the capability of the system to perform as required in this degraded condition. Subsequently, the licensee has indicated to the inspector verbally that the results of this evaluation indicate that the CAD system will perform as intended in this condition due to nitrogen boil off without the pressure buildup coil in service. This item is unresolved until the licensee provides documentation to support this statement (333/80-23-01).

The inspector also pointed out to the licensee two administrative concerns associated with this CAD system check. First, the inspector was concerned that the CAD system locked valves did not appear on the monthly Locked Valves Surveillance check F-ST-40G, Revision 1, dated December 1, 1978. The licensee stated that the CAD system valves like many other locked valves were not required and were not considered to be important enough to include on the locked valve surveillance. The inspector pointed out that many of the valves on

the locked valve surveillance unlike the CAD system valves were not even safety system valves. The previously unresolved item on this subject noted in paragraph 2 of this report remains unresolved until the CAD system technical specifications are issued.

Second, the inspector pointed out that Operations Department Standing Order No. 2, Revision 1, dated November 30, 1979, Step 6.1.1 requires procedure compliance and that step D.1.b of OP 37 requires that all CAD system valves be aligned in accordance with the valve lineup check list prior to start up. This is not consistent with Operations Department Standing Order No. 5 which permits exceptions to the valve lineup check list as noted above. This item is unresolved pending procedure change to make the Operations Department Standing Orders and OP 37 consistent (333/80-23-02).

The licensee stated that a program for these changes to Operating procedures will be developed by February 15, 1981.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 3.e.

5. Exit Interview

At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. On January 30, 1981, the inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report. During this meeting the unresolved items were discussed.