OYSTER CREEK **NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION**

JCP&L / GPU
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April 20, 1981

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-13/3L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-13/3L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.1 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.
Vice President - JCP&L
Director - Oyster Creek

IRF:dh
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, N. J.

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-13/3L

Report Date

April 20, 1981

Occurrence Date

March 19, 1981

Identification of Occurrence

During surveillance testing, the Core Spray high drywell pressure sensor RV46B tripped at a value greater than the limit as given in Tech. Spec., Table 3.1.1, item D2.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.1.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power.

Major Plant Parameters

Power:	Reactor	1730 MWt
	Generator	590 MWe
Flow:	Recirculation	14×10^4 gpm
	Feedwater	6.33×10^6 lb/hr

Description of Occurrence

On Thursday, March 19, while performing "Core Spray Instrument Channel Calibration and Test" (Surveillance Procedure 610.3.005), high drywell pressure sensor RV46B tripped at a value greater than the Tech. Spec. limit of $\leq$2.0 psig. The as found trip set point was 2.18 psig.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence was attributed to instrument repeatability. The sensor was recalibrated to trip at $2.0 \pm 0_{.1}$ psig, long term repeatability of this sensor is approximately 3% of full scale (.3 psig). It is, therefore, possible for the sensor to function within its design accuracy and exceed the Tech. Spec. limit of $\leq$2 psig.

Analysis of Occurrence

The Core Spray System is made up of two independent loops, each of which provides heat removal from the fuel assemblies in the event of a loss of coolant accident. In order to initiate the Core Spray System, a trip signal from any one of the four (4) high drywell pressure sensors or any one of the four (4) reactor low-low water level sensors must be received.

Although one (1) high drywell pressure sensor would have tripped at a higher pressure (.18 psig) than Tech. Spec. limit of $\leq$2.0 psig it would have operated, on increasing drywell pressure, with some delay.

The three (3) remaining high drywell sensors would have tripped at or below the setpoint limit initiating the intended function of the Core Spray System, therefore, the safety significance of the occurrence is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

The pressure sensor RV46B was recalibrated to trip within the Tech. Spec. limit of <2 psig. An engineering study is currently underway to investigate the problem of repeatability associated with this type of sensor. After reviewing the frequency of out of Spec. occurrences, the PORC recommended replacement sensors qualified and with considerably improved accuracy.

Failure Data

Manufacturer: ITT Barton
Model: 228A Pressure Indicating Switch
Range: 0-10 psig