

Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) has reviewed the proposed rule and offers the following comments for your consideration.

GENERAL COMMENTS

- 1. The proposed rule is more restrictive than required.
- 2. The proposed rule cannot be effectively enforced as written.
- Implementation of the rule will probably cost considerably more than the NRC estimates.
- 4. The intent of the rule must be clarified to avoid non-compliances.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS

- 5. The rule lists types of documents which would require controls. This determination should be based on the information in the documents rather than the titles of the documents. The only method which will allow this to be accomplished is to first establish criteria and then permit the Plant Manager or other designated personnel to determine whether information in specific documents meets these criteria.
- 6. The proposed rule excludes certain documents such as Training Qualification Plans and documents containing information in the "Public Domain". The exclusion of Training and Qualification Plans seems arbitrary since this document can contain information as sensitive as any contained in other documents included in the rule. Information in the "Public Domain" should include:

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- Information on file in Public Document Rooms, e.g., information in PSAR-FSAR.
- b. Information originated by or in the possession of vendors, suppliers, etc., which is not controlled by them, e.g. diagrams of security systems sent to their prospective customers.
- c. Information which could be obtained by observing or photographing the plant from outside or overhead in a plane.
- 7. The proposed storage requirements are expensive and difficuit to meet:
 - a. Under the proposed rule, every guard post and location of security drawings would have to have a metal filing cabinet with locking bar and three-position GSA approved combination padlock. On a construction site, such as our St. Lucie 2 unit, where there will be numerous security drawings kept in the field, there will be a considerable number of cabinets required. Each cabinet will have to be modified to accept the locking bars and the approved locks would have to be purchased.
 - b. Combinations will have to be changed every time an individual who knows the combination is terminated, transferred, or no longer has a "need to know". Combinations can be changed by plant personnel, but frequent problems can be expected unless trained personnel are used.
 - c. Complete records concerning access to cabinets and lock combinations will have to be maintained for NRC audits.
 - d. Locations where access is not controlled and security documents are maintained will require an expensive 2,000 pound GSA approved container to be used for storage.
 - e. Control and storage of security documents, when they are taken offsite overnight for meetings, etc., will have to be addressed.
- Proper destruction of security documents will be difficult to accomplish since they must be burned, pulped or shredded. The NRC will probably require documentation, such as "Certificates of Destruction" to verify the proper disposal of security documents.
- Proper transmission of controlled documents in double envelopes, and marking requirements, will add expense to the program.
- The proposed part 73.2, sub-section jj (2), and Appendix E parts A (2) and A (7) require clarification.

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11. The net effect of this rule would be to make it difficult for people to get and maintain information they need without a significant contribution to the protection of unclassified safeguard information.

Sincerely yours,

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Robert E. Uhrig Vice President

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cc: Harold F. Reis, Esquire