(7-77)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
0	CONTROL BLOCK:
	N C B E P 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 CAT 58 5
CON'T -01 7 8	REPORT L 6 0 5 0 - 0 3 2 5 0 0 3 2 7 8 1 8 0 4 1 0 8 1 9 SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10
0 2	While removing a clearance from the C TIP machine, the Senior Operator expressed a
0 3	concern as to the operability of the isolation ball valve with the TIP machine de-ener-
04	gized. An investigation determined that the isolation ball valve was operable; however,
0 5	power to retract the TIP probe was lost. While the clearance was hung, the probe and
06	associated cable were not retracted, thus making the primary containment ball isolation
0 7	valve inoperable.
0 7 8	Technical Specifications 6.9.1.8b,f and 3.6.1 9 system cause comp valve
09	SUBCODE CAUSE CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCO
	17 REPORT NUMBER 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 32
	ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER COMPONENT ATTACHMENT ALL PRIME COMP. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT ALL PRIME COMP. COM
10	This event was caused by a design deficiency which allowed the removal of power to the
11	TIP probe drive motor when the electronics to the TIP were de-energized. An Engineeridg
1 2	Work Request has been written to correct the probe drive design so that the probe
13	will drive in on an isolation signal so that the ball valve can close.
14	9
	STATUS N POWER OTHER STATUS OTHER STATUS <thother status<="" th=""> <thother status<="" th=""> <thother status<="" t<="" td=""></thother></thother></thother>
	ACTIVITY CONTENT LELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 2 33 Z 34 NA
1 7 7 B	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA
1 +	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (4) 0 0 0 0 (40) NA
7 8	9 11 12 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (1) TYPE DESCRIPTION (1)
1 9	NA 80
20	PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION 45 9 10 NA 68 69 3015
	NAME OF PREPARER M. J. Pastva, Jr. PHONE: (919) 457-9521
0.4	04170455

LER 1-81-42 ATTACHMENT

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 1

Event Date: 32781


At 0710 on March 25, 1981, the Unit No. 1 C TIP machine was placed under clearance to troubleshoot and repair problems caused by excessive moisture from steam leaks in the TIP room. This clearance required de-energizing the TIP machine in the Control Room, which removes power from the probe drive mechanism. When the clearance was placed on the TIP machine, the probe was tagged at position 0001, which was believed to be the "in shield" position. This position actually placed the probe in the indexer mechanism.

While removing the clearance from the tip machine, the Senior Reactor Operator expressed a concern as to the operability of the ball valve. I&C was instructed to investigate and determine the status of this valve with the machine deenergized. The results of this investigation determined that a design deficiency exists in that while the ball valve would still isolate on an isolation actuation signal, power would be lost to the drive mechanism. With the probe located in the indexer, the ball valve would not be able to isolate under an isolation condition due to the probe cable not being capable of withdrawing to its shield, and primary containment integrity could not be maintained.

A contributing factor to this event is the low level of knowledge on the TIP System by the operators. These machines are operated by the nuclear Engineers with very little operator influence. Also, the operating procedure for the TIP machine does not contain sufficient information or precaution to inform the operator that he could get into a situation where the automatic isolation function would be negated.

An Engineering Work Request has been written requesting that Engineering evaluate the system and correct this deficiency. Also, the following actions have been or are being taken to correct this problem:

- 1. All plant licensed personnel will review this event.
- The operating procedure will be revised to provide sufficient instructions and precautions to prevent a reoccurrence.
- Caution tags have been placed on all TIP machines (both units) to warn personnel of the possibilities of an isolation override.
- Upgrading the operator training documents and procedures to include TIP machine influence on the isolation ball valve.
- 5. Increase operator training on the TIP System.



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Figure 9-2-1 Tra Pro Sys